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Abstract
The pervasive nature of modern computer systems has led to an increase in our
reliance on such systems to provide correct and timely services. Moreover, as
the functionality of computer systems is being increasingly defined in software,
it is imperative that software be dependable. It has previously been shown that
a fault intolerant software system can be made fault tolerant through the design
and deployment of software mechanisms implementing abstract artefacts known
as error detection mechanisms (EDMs) and error recovery mechanisms (ERMs),
hence the design of these components is central to the design of dependable
software systems. The EDM design problem, which relates to the construction
of a boolean predicate over a set of program variables, is inherently difficult,
with current approaches relying on system specifications and the experience of
software engineers. As this process necessarily entails the identification and
incorporation of program variables by an error detection predicate, this thesis
seeks to address the EDM design problem from a novel variable-centric per-
spective, with the research presented supporting the thesis that, where it exists
under the assumed system model, an efficient EDM consists of a set of criti-
cal variables. In particular, this research proposes (i) a metric suite that can
be used to generate a relative ranking of the program variables in a software
ii
with respect to their criticality, (ii) a systematic approach for the generation
of highly-efficient error detection predicates for EDMs, and (iii) an approach
for dependability enhancement based on the protection of critical variables us-
ing software wrappers that implement error detection and correction predicates
that are known to be efficient. This research substantiates the thesis that an
efficient EDM contains a set of critical variables on the basis that (i) the pro-
posed metric suite is able, through application of an appropriate threshold, to
identify critical variables, (ii) efficient EDMs can be constructed based only on
the critical variables identified by the metric suite, and (iii) the criticality of the
identified variables can be shown to extend across a software module such that
an efficient EDM designed for that software module should seek to determine
the correctness of the identified variables.
Dedicated to my parents, Leslie and Jennifer.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Dependability has been a concern for mankind throughout history. Be it the
availability of food, the reliability of building materials or the security of new
settlements, the need for humans to justifiably place trust in some set of services
is inherent to the functioning of society. Indeed, the notion of dependability
has long been used to capture the properties of services that individuals use
on a daily basis, such as the health and transport services. In the context of
computer systems, the notion of dependability has, for many decades, been
synonymous with specific application domains that have stringent requirements
with respect to the functioning of computer system components, including the
avionics, automotive, defence and telecommunications industries. However, the
pervasive nature of modern computing has led to an increase in the reliance
of individuals and organisations on computer systems outside these traditional
application domains, thus making computer system dependability a significant
issue for systems engineers working across all industries. Moreover, the cost and
inflexibility of bespoke hardware development, combined with the flexibility and
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availability of general purpose computing platforms, has led to the functionality
of computer systems being increasingly defined in software, thus making the
issue of more specific issues of software dependability paramount in the design
and development of modern computer systems [16].
The earliest electronic computer systems made use of inherently unreliable
components, such as relays and vacuum tubes, to provide designated services.
The nature of these components and the architecture of these early computer
systems made solving even the most modest computational problems relatively
challenging [144]. However, in the period since these early years of computer
systems engineering, countless advances have been made with respect to the de-
sign and development of dependable computer systems, even in situations where
systems must be constructed using unreliable components [3] [19] [143]. This
is especially true in the context of dependable software systems, where practi-
cal techniques such as N-version programming (NVP) [14], checkpointing and
rollback [85], error detection and correction codes [123], recovery blocks [131]
and modular design [149] have facilitated the design and development of the
software systems that underpin the pervasive technologies on which individuals
and organisations rely. However, whilst these practical advances have provided
software engineers with approaches that aid in the engineering of software sys-
tems of unprecedented scale and complexity, theoretical contributions made in
this period have provided software engineers with equally important approaches
for reasoning about dependable software systems. Indeed, several such contri-
butions are central to the research presented in this thesis. In particular, it has
been shown that aspects of dependability, such as fault tolerance, can only be
achieved through some form of redundancy in the spatial and temporal domains,
e.g., through the replication of software components or the software re-execution
of software statements [53]. Further, the process of imparting fault tolerance
to a software system can be carried out as post-pass, meaning that an unde-
pendable software system can be made dependable once a functionally correct
software system has been implemented [71]. Finally, it has also been shown
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that techniques and approaches for imparting fault tolerance, with respect to
a software system, can be characterised by a combination of abstract artefacts
known as error detection mechanisms (EDMs) and error recovery mechanisms
(ERMs) [12]. When considered in combination, the main implication of these
contributions can be taken to be that a fault intolerant software system can be
made fault tolerant through the design and deployment of software mechanisms
implementing EDMs and ERMs which incorporate some degree of spatial or
temporal redundancy. It is this central premise that underpins the intention of
the work presented throughout this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
As it has been demonstrated that techniques and approaches for the provision of
fault tolerance in software systems can be reduced to the suitable application of
EDMs and ERMs, it is natural to consider how these abstract artefacts can be
realised [12]. In the case of an EDM, which is the focus of the research presented
in this thesis, it has been shown that this artefact is characterised by (i) the
error detection predicate that it implements and (ii) its location in a software
system [70]. This characterisation of an EDM gives rise to two related problems;
the error detection predicate design problem and the EDM location problem.
The focus of the work in this thesis is on the error detection predicate design
problem for EDMs, i.e., designing effective error detection predicates, where an
error detection predicate is a boolean expression over a some set of programs
variables. Specifically, the work presented in this thesis demonstrates that the
error detection predicate design problem can be approximated and addressed
through the identification and incorporation of a set of critical variables. That
is, in order to be effective with respect to the detection of errors, the error de-
tection predicate associated with an EDM should incorporate program variables
from this critical set. Throughout this thesis, the terms “critical” and “critical
variables” are used to described program variables that, due to them holding
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erroneous values, are likely to result in a software system failure.
It is desirable to develop error detection predicates based on the correctness
of as few program variables as possible, as this can allow the complexity and
overheads of the associated EDMs to be reduced. However, incorporating few
program variables typically reduces the efficiency of the associated EDMs. The
vast state space associated with real-world software systems typically prohibits
the consideration of all program variables in a software module, hence current
approaches to the design of error detection predicates rely on the experience of
software engineers and software system specifications. In effect these approaches
mimic the design of error detection predicates based on critical variables, with
some notion of variable criticality being understood with respect to the expe-
rience of software engineers or a system specification. As might be expected,
such approaches succeed in reducing the state space that must be considered
but lack the objectivity and repeatability that could be provided by a system-
atic approach to error detection predicate design. The identification of critical
variables, with respect to the characterisation of criticality proposed in this the-
sis, serves to reduce the state space that must be considered in the design of
error detection predicates for a software system, thus facilitating the design of
effective and simple error detection predicates.
1.2 Thesis and Contributions
The contributions made in this dissertation with respect to the design of error
detection predicates for EDMs are made based on the thesis that:
Where an efficient EDM exists under the defined system model,
that efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables.
Henceforth, accordance with the defined system model and the existence of
an efficient EDM is presumed. In support of this thesis, the following specific
contributions are made to the design of efficient error detection predicates for
EDMs:
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• A metric suite that generates a relative ranking of variables with respect
to the notion of criticality applied throughout this thesis is proposed, as
well as a fault injection approach for its evaluation. The metric suite is
proposed with a view to facilitating the identification of critical variables.
This identification is performed through the application of a threshold to
the relatively ranking generated, thus allowing a cost-benefit analysis to
be undertaken in the design of error detection predicates.
• A systematic approach for the design of efficient error detection predicates
is proposed based on the application of data mining techniques to fault
injection data sets. As well as providing an effective mechanism for the
generation of efficient error detection predicates for real-world, infinite-
state software systems, this approach is also used to demonstrate that
error detection predicates generated using only critical variables achieve
similar levels of efficiency as those generated using all program variables.
This result is central to the thesis stated above, as it implies that the set of
critical variables identified by the proposed metric suite can be exclusively
used in the design of efficient EDMs.
• A methodology for the design of dependable software systems based on the
replication of critical variables using software wrappers is proposed and
applied to demonstrate that significant dependability enhancements can
be achieved through the protection of a relatively small number of critical
variables. This result serves to further substantiate the thesis that efficient
EDMs consists of a set of critical variables. This is because the protection
of relatively few program variables using error detection predicates that
are known to be efficient, e.g., the combination of variable replication and
majority voting, yields significant improvements in system failure rates.
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1.3 Thesis Overview
This chapter has detailed the main motivations and contributions of the research
to be presented in this thesis. The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an account of the concepts, principles and terminology in
software dependability that are central to the appreciation of the work presented
in this thesis. This account includes an overview of dependability attributes,
impairments and means, as well as discussion of EDMs and ERMs, and the role
they play in the design of fault tolerant software systems.
Chapter 3 describes the models under which the contributions made in this
thesis have been developed, including details of the assumed model of software
systems, the fault model under which software dependability was considered
and the experimental setup applied in dependability evaluation.
Chapter 4 develops a metric suite that yields a relative ranking of program
variables with respect a notion of criticality. This metric suite consists of the
spatial impact, temporal impact and importance metrics, where importance is a
function of spatial impact and temporal impact. In addition to its development,
this metric suite is applied to a set of complex software systems and analysed
for metric sensitivity to demonstrate the type of results that can be generated.
Chapter 5 presents an approach for the generation of efficient error detection
predicates for EDMs based on the application of data mining techniques to
data sets obtained during fault injection analysis. Following its development,
the proposed approach is applied and the efficiency of the derived predicates
measured. The results generated are then used as a basis for validating the
capability of the proposed metric suite to identify critical variables.
Chapter 6 demonstrates the potential dependability enhancement that can be
achieved through the protection of critical variables. In particular, a software
system design methodology based on the replication of critical variables through
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the deployment of software wrappers is applied in order to demonstrate that
significant dependability enhancements can be achieved through the protection
of a relatively small number of critical variables.
Chapter 7 discusses the various implications, applications and limitations of
the stated thesis in the context of the research presented. This is done with an
emphasis on how these implications, applications and limitations may influence
the design and development of dependable software systems.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a summary of the research contributions,
a reiteration of the conclusions that can be drawn and a discussion of several
issues relating to efficient EDM design that may be addressed by future research.
7
CHAPTER 2
Software Dependability
The pervasive nature of modern computer systems has led to an increase in our
reliance on such systems to provide correct and timely services. Further, as
the functionality of computer systems is being increasingly defined in software,
it is imperative that software be dependable. In order to give an appropriate
context and provide a consistent perspective for the work presented in this
thesis, this chapter presents a detailed account of fundamental concepts and
terminology in software dependability, with a focus on providing an in-depth
discussion of topics and issues that will be developed in subsequent chapters.
In particular, a widely accepted taxonomy of dependability is presented as a
basis for the consideration of the attributes along which dependability may be
considered, the potential impairments to dependability and the possible means
for providing dependability. This discussion is then used as a basis for the
presentation of several concepts and problems that are central to this thesis,
including the fault-error-failure cycle, the erroneous state propagation problem
and theoretical basis for achieving fault-tolerance based on EDMs and ERMs.
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A set of statements is also provided in this chapter regarding the focus of the
work presented in this thesis and how it relates to these concepts and problems.
2.1 Fundamentals of Dependability
The fundamental concepts of dependability adopted throughout this thesis are
assumed directly from the comprehensive compilation of concepts developed
by Laprie [93]. Hence, the dependability of a computer system is defined as
“the trustworthiness of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably
be placed in the service it delivers”. Further, the dependability of a computer
system may be considered with respect to a set of dependability attributes, may
be compromised by a set of dependability impairments and may be imparted by
a set of dependability means. This characterisation is shown in Figure 2.1, which
depicts a dependability taxonomy that was originally synthesised by Laprie in
1985 [92], with work by the members of IFIP-WG 10.4 [67] resulting in its
incorporation in the collection of concepts and terminology provided in [93].
Whilst the taxonomy of computer system dependability shown in Figure 2.1 was
subsequently refined [16] [94], with further tree levels being added to account for
more specific facets of dependability, this tree structure remains widely accepted
as a characterisation of computer system dependability.
2.1.1 Dependability Attributes
The concept of computer system dependability is a multifaceted concern that
incorporates many properties, each of which relates to a different viewpoint
from which the quality of the services provided by a computer system may be
evaluated. As shown in Figure 2.1 these properties are availability, reliability,
safety, confidentiality, integrity and maintainability. A description and formal
definition, where appropriate, of these dependability attributes is given below.
Availability: The availability attribute is concerned with the likelihood that
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Figure 2.1: The taxonomy of computer system dependability
a service provided by a computer system is ready for use when invoked. More
formally, availability is defined as a function of time representing the probability
a service provided by a computer system is operating correctly and able to
perform its designated function at a given time [82]. Intuitively, the higher the
availability of a service provided by a computer system, the more likely that it
is to be available when requested. The availability of a service provided by a
computer system can be approximated by the ratio of the total time that the
computer system has been capable of providing its designated services correctly
to the total time that the system has been operational. In [82] it was shown that
steady-state availability of a service provided by a computer system was given
by Equation 2.1. The MTTF and MTTR terms in Equation 2.1 represent the
mean time to failure and the mean time to repair for the service respectively.
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Asteady =
MTTF
(MTTF +MTTR)
(2.1)
Reliability: The reliability of a computer system is a measure of how likely a
system is to provide its designated service for a specified period of time. That
is, the reliability of a computer system is defined as the conditional probabil-
ity that the system will provide correct service throughout the interval [t0, t],
given that the system was providing correct service at time t0. It is typically
assumed that time t0 is the current time, hence R(t) is conventionally used to
denote reliability. On the other hand, the unreliability of a computer system is
defined as the conditional probability that the system will provide incorrect ser-
vice throughout the interval [t0, t], given that the system was providing correct
service at time t0. Again, time t0 is usually assumed to be the current time. The
unreliability of a computer system is conventionally denoted by Q(t) = 1−R(t).
Safety: The safety attribute of dependability reflects the extent to which a
system can operate without damaging or endangering its environment [145]. A
safe computer system may deliver correct, incorrect or degraded services but
it will never damage or endanger its environment or users. Computer systems
where the safety attribute of dependability is the paramount concern, usually
due to the potential for the loss of life or high-value resource, are commonly
known as safety-critical systems [151].
Confidentiality: The confidentiality attribute is concerned with the non-
disclosure of undue information to unauthorised entities [83]. The confiden-
tiality attribute serves as a measure of the extent to which a computer system
will allow those without sufficient privilege to obtain information that should
be not be made available.
Integrity: The integrity attribute relates to the capacity of a computer system
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to ensure the absence of improper system alterations, with regard to the with-
holding, modification and deletion of information [16]. The concept of integrity
is typically interpreted such that “improper system alterations” relates only to
information alterations performed by an unauthorised entity, though it also en-
compasses acts where an unauthorised party prevents modifications or causes
information corruption. The composite of the availability, confidentiality and
integrity attributes is usually considered to account for the computer system
security aspect of computer system dependability.
Maintainability: Formally, maintainability is defined as a function of time
representing the probability that a failed computer system will be repaired in
t time or less [41]. The maintainability attribute is conventionally denoted by
M(t). Where a constant rate of repair, µ, can be assumed, the maintainability
of a system can be estimated by Equation 2.2
M(t) = 1− exp−µt (2.2)
A computer system satisfying all dependability attributes for a given application
domain can be said to be dependable in that application domain. However, the
process of developing dependable computer systems is made challenging by the
presence of impairments to dependability.
2.1.2 Dependability Impairments
A computer system is said to provide correct service when the service it provides
complies with its functional specification. Conversely, a computer system is said
to provide incorrect service, i.e., a system failure is said to have occurred, when
the service it provides differs from its a functional specification. In general,
such a failure occurs due to the presence of impairments to dependability. As
shown in Figure 2.1, dependability impairments are faults, errors and failures.
A description of each of these dependability impairments is given below.
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Fault: In the design, development, deployment and operation of a dependable
computer system, events can occur that can potentially reduce computer sys-
tem dependability, i.e., the trustworthiness of services provided by the computer
system. Such occurrences are termed faults. A fault is the hypothesised cause
of an error, thus in a fault-free system there can be no errors. A fault may orig-
inate from within a system boundary or may find its origins in the surrounding
environment. A fault is considered to be dormant until it is activated, at which
points it results in an error. The period of time between fault activation and
the manifestation of the associated error is know as the latency of the fault,
whilst the notion of removal latency corresponds to the period of time between
occurrence and removal.
Error: An error is the manifestation of a fault, i.e., a fault that has been acti-
vated. An error may be detected or undetected in a computer system. Following
its activation, the erroneous state induced by an error may cause other errors to
occur in a system. This process is known as error propagation, i.e., the propa-
gation of erroneous state. The period of time between the occurrence of an error
and the detection of that error, or the manifestation of the associated failure if
the error is not detected, is known as the latency of the error.
Failure: A failure is the result of an error propagating beyond a system bound-
ary, i.e., an erroneous state becoming visible to the environment in which a
computer system operates. Given this definition, a failure can also be consid-
ered to be an observable deviation from an agreed system specification. Dis-
tinctions have often been made between different types of failure. For example,
the failure characterisation in [38] classified failures as omission failures, timing
failures, response failures or crash failures. However, whilst this categorisation
is often relevant and useful in dependability analysis, it is not required for the
appreciation of the research presented in this thesis.
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Figure 2.2: The fundamental cycle of computer system dependability
The Fundamental Chain: The fault-error-failure causality cycle, represented
below with arrows to indicate causality, is known as the fundamental chain [92],
as all dependability attributes are impacted by the interplay of dependability
impairments, i.e, faults, errors and failures, at various levels of abstraction.
fault→ error → failure
As shown in Figure 2.2, the fundamental chain is recursively defined, which
means that a failure at one level of abstraction can represent a fault at another
level of abstraction. Note that these levels of abstraction are considered to be
software modules in Figure 2.2. This recursive nature leads to the definition
extended chains of causality to represent the error propagation process, such as
the causality chain shown below.
. . . fault→ error → failure→ [fault→ error → failure]→ fault . . .
A fundamental capability of any dependable system is to limit the extent of
error propagation. Given the nature of the fundamental chain this capability
can be characterised as the system being able to prevent chains of causality from
growing to the point where a system failure occurs.
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2.1.3 Dependability Means
There are four dependability means that may be employed in combination to
provide dependability attributes in the presence of dependability impairments.
As shown in Figure 2.1 and described below, these dependability means are
fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting.
Fault Prevention: The intention of fault prevention is to hinder and obstruct
the occurrence, introduction and spread of faults. Established examples of fault
prevention techniques include modular software design, software development
methodologies and process quality assurance.
Fault Tolerance: Techniques that actively handle the occurrence of faults and
errors, thus ensuring that a computer system is able to provide its designated
service regardless of these dependability impairments, are termed fault tolerance
techniques. In general, such techniques focus on the recognition of an erroneous
state in a computer system and restoring a suitably correct state, or at least a
safe system state, following the occurrence of an error.
Fault Removal: It is the intention of fault removal techniques to reduce the
number, likelihood of activation and wider consequences of faults in a computer
system. Typically fault removal is a three stage process, where these steps are
validation, diagnosis and system correction. In particular, the validation stage
seeks to determine whether a system adheres to a set of defined properties, the
diagnosis stage identifies problems, i.e., faults, which prevent these properties
from being fulfilled and the system correction stage seeks to modify the system
to allow the defined properties to be fulfilled.
Fault Forecasting: Fault forecasting techniques are primarily concerned with
estimating the number, likelihood of activation and wider consequences of faults
in a computer system. The fault forecasting process typically involves the iden-
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tification and classification and analysis of modes by which a computer system
can fail, as well as an evaluation of dependability attributes using probabilistic
and analytical approaches. Fault injection analysis is a commonly adopted ap-
proach when attempting to establish dependability measures and forecast fault
proneness. Fault injection is a dependability validation approach whereby the
response of a system to the artificial insertion of faults or errors is analysed so
that insights can be gained regarding the dependability of the system [8]. Fault
injection analysis is commonly used in the validation of dependable software
systems [24] [25], hence many specialised fault injection tools and approaches
have been developed for the validation of specific software system architectures
and implementation paradigms [4] [152].
The contributions made in this thesis are primarily related to the areas of fault
tolerance and fault forecasting. More specifically, the research presented in this
thesis is concerned with demonstrating that fault tolerance be achieved through
the design of EDMs based on a set of critical variables, whilst fault forecasting
approaches, including software metrics and fault injection analysis, are used for
dependability assessment and validation.
2.2 Achieving Fault Tolerance
Computer systems that are capable of providing their designated services in the
presence of faults and errors are considered to be fault tolerant. The idea of
deliberately designing computer systems that are able to tolerate the presence
of impairments to dependability can be traced back to systems that were imple-
mented entirely in hardware [134]. In this domain it was accepted that hardware
components would fail, whether due to specific component properties or their
operating environment, thus a degree of tolerance with respect to dependability
impairments was necessitated. In general, the activities that a system under-
takes to provide fault tolerance can be characterised by two processes; error
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processing and fault treatment [7]. These system processes are described below.
Error Processing: The processing of errors involves three sub-processes; error
detection, error diagnosis and error recovery. Error detection involves detecting
the existence of an erroneous system state, ideally before that erroneous system
state results in a system failure. The diagnosis of an error relates to assessing
the impact that an erroneous state has had on a system, including the erroneous
states that were present before error detection. Once detection and diagnosis
have taken place, error recovery is performed in order to replace an erroneous
system state with a suitably correct system state.
Fault Treatment: The process of fault treatment focuses on preventing faults
that have been activated from being reactivated. In general, fault treatment is
composed of fault diagnosis and fault passivation, where fault diagnosis involves
the identification of the cause of errors with respect to a location and an under-
lying fault, and fault passivation relates to the actions taken to prevent a fault
from being reactivated. Fault diagnosis is subtly different from error diagnosis,
as the focus of fault diagnosis is on the origin and type of fault, whilst error
diagnosis focuses on the impact of an error. Typically fault passivation may be
encompassed by steps taken in error processing, more specifically during error
recovery, though it is likely that some level of system reconfiguration will be
required during fault passivation to ensure that the system state accounts for
the any actions taken to make faults passive.
The research presented in this thesis is primarily related to the error processing
aspect of fault tolerance. In particular, the contributions made are related to
the design of software components that are sufficient for the detection of errors.
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Figure 2.3: The partial ordering of fault tolerant system types established by
the presence of EDMs and ERMs
2.3 Error Detection and Recovery
It has been shown that two dependability artefacts, known as EDMs and ERMs,
are integral to the design of fault tolerant software systems [12]. In particular, it
has been shown that EDMs are necessary and sufficient for the design of fail-safe
fault tolerance, whilst ERMs are necessary and sufficient for the design of non-
masking fault tolerance. That is, a software system equipped with only EDMs
can satisfy the safety component of a system specification, whilst a software
system equipped with only ERMs can satisfy the liveness component of a system
specification. To provide masking fault tolerance both EDMs and ERMs are
necessary and sufficient. Masking fault tolerance is strictly stronger than both
fail-safe and non-masking fault tolerance, hence a partial order is established
among types of fault tolerant software systems based on the presence of EDMs
and ERMs. This partial order of fault tolerance types is depicted in Figure 2.3.
When a dependable software system is executing, an EDM in the software
system will attempt to detect whether the state at a given time during execution
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Figure 2.4: The states transition system of a fault tolerant system expressed in
the context of EDMs, ERMs and the fundamental cycle
can threaten the proper functioning of the system. Such a state is generally
referred to as an erroneous state, i.e., EDMs attempt to detect whether a state
is erroneous. If a state is found to be erroneous, then an EDM can be said
to have detected an error [93]. When an EDM detects an error, an ERM may
attempt to restore a suitable system state, i.e., to recover from the erroneous
state, so that the error is contained within a certain boundary and does not
propagate throughout a software system. A failure to contain the propagation
of errors within a software system is known to make recovery more difficult
and increase the likelihood of a system failure [10]. The actions undertaken by
EDMs and ERMs can be related to the fundamental cycle and the provision of
fault tolerance as shown in Figure 2.4. This figure captures the general states
that a fault tolerant system can transition between when equipped with EDMs
and ERMs. It is interesting to note that the interplay between dependability
impairments remains intact despite the presence of EDMs and ERMs.
The effectiveness of EDMs and ERMs is usually evaluated using measures
such as coverage and latency [126]. The effectiveness of an EDM has been shown
to depend on two factors. These factors are (i) the error detection predicate that
it implements and (ii) its location in a software system [70]. This gives rise to
two related problems, i.e., the error detection predicate design problem and the
EDM location problem. The location of an EDM is the program statement it is
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protecting, i.e., an EDM ensures that the software state in which a statement
is executed will not result in an erroneous state or system failure. For some
program statements this predicate, which is a boolean predicate over a set of
program variables, is non-trivial [11]. The properties of this non-triviality have
been shown to be accuracy and completeness [70]. In contrast to an EDM, an
ERM will seek to restore a suitable safe state for a software system, i.e., an
ERM focuses upon error recovery rather than error detection. When system
state is characterised by the assignment of values to variables, this recovery
process implies that a number of corrupted variables must be overwritten with
appropriate values. The described observations regarding EDMs and ERMs
imply that, in order to maintain correct and timely software execution, some
set of variables must hold suitable values to make the software state safe for
further execution. Clearly, if these variables are known, it is easier to develop
error detection predicates and to determine appropriate locations for EDMs.
Thus, knowledge of this set of variables is of significance when addressing the
location and design problems associated with EDMs.
2.3.1 The EDM Location Problem
The EDM location problem focuses on the identification of software locations at
which an EDM will be most effective or is most required, i.e., statements where
a located EDM would be effective or statements that should be protected in
order to achieve some level of dependability. Often this problem is interpreted
as the error containment problem. Indeed, many approaches to the containment
of errors have focused on experimentally evaluating the coverage and latency
of EDMs [9] [59] [159], often using fault injection analysis [66]. Through these
approaches it was established that EDMs exhibiting high coverage and low la-
tency reduced the propagation of errors. These observations served to inform
research relating to the location of EDMs [64] [71] [84]. Indeed, the approach
developed in [64] extended work in [61] and [62] to provide a framework for the
identification of vulnerabilities in software. This framework is based upon a soft-
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ware measure, known as error permeability, which uses data-flow information
to capture how likely errors are to propagate from a module input to a module
output. In situations where it can be employed, i.e., where data flow informa-
tion is available, this framework identifies modules with a high permeability,
which then become candidate locations for EDMs. In contrast, approaches such
as [160] and [161] developed error propagation analysis techniques that aimed
to estimate the probabilities of given source code locations propagating data
errors, when starting from an initially erroneous system state, with a view to
informing the location of EDMs. This research was subsequently extend, largely
in [111], to aid in the design of test cases that would reveal significant defects and
vulnerabilities in software components, again informing the location of EDMs.
2.3.2 The EDM Design Problem
The EDM design problem concerns the derivation of a boolean predicate over
program variables that can be used for the detection of erroneous system state,
i.e., errors. In contrast to the substantial body of knowledge that relates to the
location of EDMs, comparatively little is known that pertains to the design of
efficient error detection predicates for EDMs, particularly for real-world, infinite
state software systems. Note that the phrase “infinite-state software systems” is
used to refer to software systems whose state space makes finite-state modelling
impractical. Indeed, most real-world software systems will be of this kind, as
given a software system with a reasonably small number of program variables,
even where these variables have a limited set of associated states, the state space
of the software system can be too large for a human to interpret and analyse as
a set of actions and state transitions.
The efficiency properties of an error detection predicate can be characterised
along two dimensions; accuracy and completeness. The accuracy property re-
flects the capability of an error detection predicate to avoid detecting non-
erroneous states as errors, whilst completeness refers to the capability of an
error detection predicate to detect erroneous states as errors [70]. In the con-
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text of finite state systems, which are typically represented as state transition
systems, the issue of error detection predicate design has been well considered.
In particular, research in [70] and [91] developed polynomial-time algorithms for
the automatic refinement of error predicates predicates, i.e., algorithms capable
of improving the efficiency properties of an existing error detection predicate
in polynomial-time. However, as finite-state systems can be viewed as an ap-
proximation to real-world, infinite state software systems, these approaches are
not applicable for most real-world software systems. Indeed, the EDM design
problem has received little attention in existing research literature.
The research presented in this thesis is primarily concerned with addressing
the EDM design problem for real-world, infinite state software systems. More
specifically, the work presented provides novel approaches for (i) the automated
identification of program variables that must be captured by efficient error de-
tection predicates, (ii) the generation of efficient error detection predicates, and
dependability enhancement through the protection of identified program vari-
ables with software-wrappers implementing efficient EDMs. Crucially, when
taken in contribution these contribution serve to support the thesis that an ef-
ficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables.
The concepts described in this chapter are by no means exhaustive in their
coverage of topics in software dependability. However, the overview of topics
presented provides a sufficient perspective on software dependability to allow
the contributions of this thesis to be appreciated.
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Models
The models described in this chapter provide information about the context in
which the contributions made by this thesis have been developed. In particular,
the software system model assumed in the development of these contributions,
and the fault model under which they were evaluated are detailed in this chapter.
Information regarding the experimental setup that embodied these models is
also provided in this chapter, including full details of all target systems, test
cases, system failure specifications, software system instrumentation procedures,
and dependability validation techniques used throughout this thesis.
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3.1 System Model
A software system S is considered to be a tuple, consisting of a set of software
modules, M1 . . .Mn, and a set of connections. A software module Mk consists of
an import interface Ik, an export interface Ek, a set of non-composite program
variables Vk and a sequence of actions Ak1 . . . Aki. Each program variable in Vk
has a specific domain of values. Each action in Ak1 . . . Aki may read or write to
a subset of Vk. Two software modules Mk and Ml are connected if the export
interface of Mk is matched with the import interface of Ml, i.e., a connection
exists if Ek is matched with Il. Thus, a software system S = (MOD,CON),
where MOD = {M1 . . .Mn}, and CON = {(Mak ,Mal )}, where Mk exports
to the import interface of Ml over connection a. We assume a software mod-
ule ENV that exports inputs to the software system and imports output from
the software system. Figure 3.1 shows an example of the assumed system
model. Relating this example to the definitions given, it follows that if a soft-
ware system S = (MOD,CON), then MOD = {ENV,M1,M2,M3,M4} and
CON = {(M b1 ,M b2), (M c1 ,M c3 ), (Md1 ,Md3 ), (Me2 ,Me3 ), (Mf2 ,Mf4 ), (Mg3 ,Mg4 ),
(ENV a,Ma1 ), (M
h
4 , ENV
h)}.
A software system is assumed to be grey box, meaning that access to source
code is permitted, but knowledge of functionality, implementation details and
structure is not assumed. It is the variable-centric focus of the contributions
made in this thesis that necessitates this white box access, whilst the adoption
of a generic model of software systems is motivated by the desire to ensure that
the contributions made are widely applicable.
3.2 Fault Model
A fault model has been shown to contain two parts; a local part, and a global
part [165]. The local fault model, known as the impact model, states the type
of faults likely to occur in the system, while the global model, known as the
rely specification, states the extent to which the local fault model can occur. In
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Figure 3.1: A software system represented under the adopted system model
general, the rely specification constrains the occurrence of the local model so
that dependability can be imparted. For example, a rely specification will state
that “at most f of n nodes can crash” or “faults can occur only finitely often”.
In this thesis it is assumed that a software system has to tolerate a transient
data value fault model [125]. Here, the local fault model is the transient data
value failure, i.e., a program variable value is corrupted and this corruption
may never occur again. The global fault model is that we assume that any
program variable can be affected by transient faults. A transient fault model is
generally used to model hardware faults in which bit flips occur in memory areas
that cause instantaneous changes to values held in memory. The transient fault
model has also been shown to mimic the presence of software bugs [33]. Thus,
through the assumption of a transient data value fault model, consideration is
effectively being give to random hardware failures in which random single bit
flips may occur and software bugs whose effect is to cause program variables to
hold erroneous data values. A transient data value fault model is often assumed
during dependability analysis due to the fact that it can be used to mimic several
more severe fault models [125]. It is this characteristic that makes the transient
data value fault model a good candidate for a base fault model.
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3.3 Target Systems
The target systems used throughout this thesis were selected based on their
complex nature, widespread usage, modular structure and varying development
profiles. An overview of each target system used in this thesis is provided below.
7-Zip Archiving Utility: The 7-Zip utility is a high-compression archiver
which supports many file archiving and encryption formats [1]. The 7-Zip utility
is widely-used, modular, written in C/C++ and has been designed, developed
and maintained by a community of software engineers. Most source code and
resources associated with the 7-Zip utility are freely available under the GNU
Lesser General Public License.
FlightGear Flight Simulator: The FlightGear Flight Simulator project is an
open source project that aims to develop an extensible yet sophisticated flight
simulator to serve the needs of the academic and hobbyists communities [50].
The software is modular, contains over 220,000 lines of C/C++ and simulates
a situation where dependability is of utmost importance. All source code and
resources associated with the FlightGear Flight Simulator project are available
under the GNU General Public License.
MP3 Gain: The MP3Gain analyser is an open-source volume normalisation
suite for MP3 files [112]. The MP3Gain analyser is modular, written in C/C++
and has been predominantly developed by a single software engineer. All source
code and resources associated with the MP3Gain analyser are available under
the GNU General Public License.
3.4 Test Cases
Fault injection analysis forms a basis for the formulation and evaluation of the
contributions made in this thesis. To perform fault injection analysis on a given
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target system a set of test cases must first be identified. The test cases used in
the analysis of all target systems in this thesis are described below.
7-Zip Archiving Utility: An archiving procedure was executed in all test
cases. A set of 25 files of varying file formats were input to the procedure. Each
of these files was then compressed to form an archive and then decompressed to
recover the original content. The temporal impact of faults, an issue that will
be discussed at length in Chapter 4, was measured with respect to the number
of files processed. For example, if a fault were injected during the processing of
file 15 and persisted until the end of a test case, then its temporal impact would
be 10. To create a varied system load, the experiments associated with each
instrumented program variable were repeated for 25 distinct test cases, where
each test case involved a distinct set of 25 input files.
FlightGear Flight Simulator: A takeoff procedure was executed in all test
cases. This procedure executed for 2700 iterations of the main simulation loop,
where the first 500 iterations correspond to an initialisation period and the
remaining 2200 iterations relate to pre-fault injection and post-fault injection
periods. The temporal impact of injected faults was measured with respect to
iterations of the main simulation loop. A control module was used to provide a
consistent input vector at each iteration of the simulation. To create a varied and
representative system load, the experiments associated with each instrumented
program variable were repeated for 9 distinct test cases; 3 aircraft masses and 3
wind speeds uniformly distributed across 1300-2100lbs and 0-60kph respectively.
MP3 Gain: A volume-level normalisation procedure was executed in all test
cases. The procedure took a set of 25 MP3 files of varying sizes as input and
normalised the volume across each file. The temporal impact of injected faults
was measured with respect to the number of files processed. To create a varied
system load, the experiments for each instrumented program variable were run
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for 3 distinct test cases, where each test case used a distinct set of input files.
3.5 System Failure Specifications
Conducting any form of software system dependability analysis will typically
necessitate the definition of a system failure specification. In the case of fault
injection analysis, such a specification is particularly important, as it captures
the worst-case impact of an injected fault, i.e., a software system failure. The
system failure specifications for all target systems are described below.
7-Zip Archiving Utility: A test case execution was considered a failure if the
set of archive files and recovered content files were different from those gener-
ated during the corresponding golden run, i.e., a fault free test case execution.
FlightGear Flight Simulator: A failure specification was established using
golden run observation and relevant aviation information. A failure in the exe-
cution of a test case was considered to fall into at least one of three categories;
speed failure, distance failure and angle failure. A run was considered a speed
failure if the aircraft failed to reach a safe takeoff speed after first passing through
critical speed and velocity of rotation. A run was considered a distance failure if
the takeoff distance exceeds that specified by the aircraft manufacturer, where
the specified distance is increased by 10 meters for every additional 200lbs over
the aircraft base-weight. A run was considered an angle failure if a Pitch Rate of
4.5 degrees is exceeded before the aircraft is clear of the runway or the aircraft
stalls during climb out.
MP3 Gain: A test case execution was considered a failure if the set of output
files, normalised by the MP3 Gain analyser, were different from those generated
by the corresponding golden run, i.e., if these files differed from those produced
under a fault free test case execution.
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Table 3.1: Summary of fault injection experiment totals for 7-Zip
Module 8-bit 32-bit 64-bit Total
Injections Injections Injections Injections
7Z1 (ZDecode) 10000 5508000 1680000 7198000
7Z2 (ZInput) 24000 10608000 4144000 14776000
7Z3 (ZHandle) 2000 480000 48000 530000
36000 16596000 5872000 22504000
Table 3.2: Summary of fault injection experiment totals for FlightGear
Module 8-bit 32-bit 64-bit Total
Injections Injections Injections Injections
FG1 (FMass) 864 38880 774144 813888
FG2 (FProp) 77760 743904 155520 977184
FG3 (FGear) 46656 12096 399168 457920
125280 794880 1328832 2248992
3.6 System Instrumentation
Instrumented software modules in each target system were chosen randomly
from all software modules used in the execution of the test cases defined in
Section 3.4. Summaries of the fault injection experiments performed for the
target modules in each target system are shown in Tables 3.1-3.3. All program
variables in each target system were instrumented.
3.7 Fault Injection and Data Logging
The Propagation Analysis Environment (PROPANE) tool was used for all fault
injection and system state logging experiments undertaken in this thesis [63]. A
golden run was created for each test case, where a golden run is a reproducible
fault-free run of the system for a given test case, capturing information about
the state of the system during execution. In-line with the adopted fault model,
bit flip faults were injected at each bit-position for all instrumented program
variables. Each fault injected test case execution entailed a single bit flip in
a program variable at one bit-position, i.e. no multiple fault injections were
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Table 3.3: Summary of fault injection experiment totals for MP3 Gain
Module 8-bit 32-bit 64-bit Total
Injections Injections Injections Injections
MG1 (MLaunch) 86400 4454400 259200 4800000
MG2 (MGain) 9000 201600 7833600 8044200
MG3 (MAnalysis) 0 806400 504000 1310400
95400 5462400 8596800 14154600
performed during a single test case execution. In the case of the FlightGear
Flight Simulator each single bit flip experiment was performed at 3 distinct
injection times uniformly distributed across the 2200 simulation loop iterations
that follow system initialisation, i.e. 600, 1200 and 1800 control loop iterations
after the initialisation period of 500 iterations. In that cases of 7-Zip and MP3
Gain, each single bit-flip experiment was performed at 25 distinct injection
times uniformly distributed across the 25 time units associated with each test
case. The state of all software modules used in the execution of all test cases was
monitored and recorded during each fault injection experiment. The data logged
during fault injection was compared with the corresponding golden run, with
deviations being deemed erroneous subject to the adopted fault model. Any
module containing an erroneous variable, i.e., a variable whose value deviates
from its corresponding value during a golden run, is considered to be corrupted.
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CHAPTER 4
Towards the Identification of Critical Variables
The identification of program variables that should be incorporated by an error
detection predicate is central to the design of an effective EDM. To this end,
this chapter proposes a metric suite that can be used to generate a relative
ranking of the program variables in a software with respect to their criticality.
The intention is then for a threshold to be subsequently applied to the relative
ranking generated, in a cost-benefit analysis, to allow for the identification of
program variables that should be incorporated by an error detection predicate.
The proposed metric suite is composed of three metrics, namely spatial impact,
temporal impact and importance, where the importance metric is a function
of spatial impact and temporal impact. In order to demonstrate the type of
results that the metric suite is capable of generating, the proposed approach
is applied to three complex software systems and analysed for sensitivity with
respect to parameterisation. Analysis of the results presented indicates that the
relative ranking of program variables generated by the metric suite is consistent
with the rationale underpinning its development and that this ranking is robust
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with respect to parameterisation, indicating that the metrics proposed in this
chapter are suitable for use in the identification of critical variables.
4.1 The Identification of Critical Variables
The identification of the program variables that should be captured by error
detection predicates, i.e., critical variables, is fundamental to the thesis an EDM
consists of a set of critical variables. It is the intention of the metric suite
developed in this chapter to provide a systematic approach for the generation of
a relative ranking among program variables that can be thresholded in order to
identify critical variables and, hence, aid in the design of efficient error detection
predicates for EDMs. Such a variable-centric focus is, in-part, motivated by
research which has demonstrated that a relatively small number of variables
can be effective in fault forecasting and fault tolerance. For example, while not
directly concerned with the identification of critical variables, research in [65]
demonstrated that the use of very few system variables could allow a predictive
accuracy in excess of 80% to be achieved in call availability predication for
telecommunication systems. Moreover, it was shown in [117] that adopting a
variable-centric focus in the placement of EDMs can allow a detection coverage
in excess of 80% to be achieved through the protection of an extremely modest
number of program variables, e.g., 10 program variables in the cases of the
studies presented.
To demonstrate how the metric suite proposed in this chapter differs from
approaches already used in the design and development of dependable software
systems, Sections 4.1.1-4.1.4 discuss current approaches to the identifications
of critical software components and vulnerabilities, with a particular emphasis
on how this identification can aid in the detection of errors and the notion of
criticality employed by these approaches. Note that the phrase “software com-
ponents” is used to capture approaches that are not focused on the identification
of program variables, e.g., approaches focusing on vulnerable software modules
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or code locations. Following this discussion of current approaches, the novelty
and distinctive characteristics of the proposed metric suite are then discussed in
Section 4.1.5. The discussion shown in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.4 deliberately avoids
the consideration of approaches for the design and composition of error detection
predicates, as this topic is addressed at length in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5. More
specifically, in considering the identification of critical variables, Sections 4.1.1-
4.1.4 classify techniques as being related to experimental evaluation, experience
and heuristics, system specifications or static analysis.
4.1.1 Experimental Evaluation
Experimental approaches to the identification of critical software components
and vulnerabilities typically involve the application of a dependability validation
approach and an assessment of the results derived with respect to some notion of
criticality. Such notions of criticality often incorporate aspects of measures such
as coverage and latency, particularly when software system has been developed
with EDMs [126]. Dependability validation techniques such as fault injection
analysis have been shown to be a particularly effective means for estimating
difficult to establish software measures, including coverage and latency, where
EDMs already exist in a software system [61]. In [126] it was shown that if ni
faults are injected into a software system and nd of these are detected by an
EDM, an unbiased estimate of the detection coverage for that EDM, cd, is given
by Equation 4.1.
cd =
nd
ni
(4.1)
A caveat on this evaluation of detection coverage is that the faults or errors
injected into a software system should be representative of the errors that could
be experienced during its operation. Indeed, the issue of representativeness in
fault injection analysis, and more generally in software testing, remains an open
issue in research.
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When evaluating an existing EDM, the latency associated with that EDM
is typically interpreted as detection latency, which corresponds to the period
of time between the occurrence of an error and that EDM detecting the exis-
tence of the error. As well as being used to estimate software measures that
can be difficult to establish, fault injection analysis can also permit more ana-
lytical and software system specific analyses to be undertaken with respect to
the identification of critical software components and vulnerabilities. For exam-
ple, Khoshgoftaar et al. proposed a set of metrics to identify software modules
that do not propagate errors. More specifically, it was the goal in [84] to de-
termine whether data errors could propagate from a code location of interest,
i.e., a potentially vulnerable location or component, to the system boundary
when testing using inputs drawn from a representative operational profile. The
intention here was to identify situations where a fault in a program variable
at a location may not be detected during software testing, i.e., a vulnerability
in a software component that was likely to go undetected. Further, Steininger
and Scherrer demonstrated that fault injection techniques can be used to find
optimal combinations of EDMs in hardware, though little attention was given
specifically to the identification of what should be incorporated by the error
detection predicates of these EDMs [148]. Instead, the focus of this work was
on determining the most efficient combination of EDMs when a set of EDMs
is already available. A set of measures were also introduced to assist in sys-
tematically forming and evaluating the efficiency of sets of EDMs, potentially
offering various notions of criticality based on detection coverage and latency.
Similar to this approach, the experimental techniques detailed in [161] and [164],
which largely focused on locating executable assertions, i.e., specific instances
of EDMs, proposed to use sensitivity analysis conducted during fault injection
analysis or program mutation, in order to identify component vulnerabilities;
a technique subsequently applied in [163]. However, the aims of this technique
are not focused on the identification of what should be incorporated by error
detection predicates, rather it is concerned with the rationale underlying the
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identification of locations where EDMs should be located. In [120] and [121],
Pattabiraman et al. developed a technique for the prevention of data errors
through the derivation of fine-grained, i.e., variable-centric, EDMs. This was
based on dynamic application traces and the use of six generic rule templates,
where a single rule template corresponded to a different class of errors that could
be detected. For example, a single template is used capture situations where a
variable should have a constant value. As the EDMs derived in this work are
based on the value of a single program variable at a specific location, rather
than a single predicate capturing the values of multiple variables at a specific
location, a multitude of effective EDM locations may need to be identified in
order to achieve the coverage and efficiency. Further, if a class of error falls
outside the set of rule templates employed, then any errors associated with that
class may not be detected. Hence, the effectiveness of this approach depends on
the capability of a software engineer to generate representative rule templates.
4.1.2 Experience and Heuristics
A variety of guidelines and heuristics have been proposed to characterise the
criticality of software components, which has led to the definition of various no-
tions of criticality, though often not with respect to programs variables or groups
of program variables. For example, the high-level approaches described in [60]
and [62] advocate a rigorous approach to code location analysis, combined with
the use of an established methodology, such as failure mode and effects analysis
(FMEA) or failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) [20] [51] [56],
to aid in identification of critical software components. Such advocation pre-
sumes the existence of a criticality heuristic with little consideration for what
form that heuristic might take or what it might incorporate. Other research in
software dependability measures has more explicitly set out a notion of software
component criticality. For example, with a view to quantifying error propa-
gation between interacting modules, the inter-module influence and separation
measures, originally proposed in [153], were augmented and evaluated in [72]
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through the introduction of software measures known as error transmission
probability and error transparency. These related measures focused on charac-
terising the error propagation between interacting modules at a high-level of
abstraction, such that identified modules can be aggregated and located on dis-
tinct processors in order to confine errors to these processors. The problem of
error propagation was investigated at the operating system level in [80], where
the authors profiled the propagation of errors due to failures of device drivers.
This lead to the development of a measure, known as driver error diffusion,
that aims to capture the impact of a given device driver on operating system
services. Although it is analogous to the metric suite proposed in this chapter,
the fact that driver error diffusion focuses on quantifying the impact of device
drivers means that the approach can be considered to operate at the level of
software modules, rather than at the level of program variables.
4.1.3 System Specifications
A formal specification can be used in the identification of critical software com-
ponents, not least because the constraints that are commonly defined in a formal
specification often relate to aspects of functional correctness. In [132] and [150]
it was proposed that a formal specification can be used to derive programatic
tests which capture aspects of functional correctness. This is similar in intent
to the identification of critical software components, as tests derived will be
based on the components and values stored in some model-based representation
of a software system. In [132], Richardson et al. concluded that specification-
based checks, i.e., boolean predicates over program variables derived from a
model-based specification, should be combined with self-checks, i.e., code-based
assertions defined without a model-based specification, in order to facilitate the
detection of a wider range of errors. The reason for this was based on the as-
sertion that self-checks were more able to consider internal system state, whilst
specification-based checks were removed from such implementation issues. De-
spite this suggestion it was also shown that it can be difficult to design effective
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error detection predicates for programatic tests on the basis of a formal spec-
ification [102]. In support of the assertion that specification based EDMs are
insufficient by themselves, work in [130] suggested that online checks should con-
sider both intermediate data values and the correctness of control flow, which
may or may not be discerned from a system specification. Interestingly, the pro-
cess by which error detection predicates can be derived using [130] requires the
identification of critical software components for EDM enhancement, a process
that necessitates the definition of some notion of software component criticality.
4.1.4 Static Analysis
Static analysis refers to any type of analysis that can be performed without
the execution of the software system being analysed. Static analysis is known
to be complete, though the potential for false positives can make the approach
less appealing in several application domains [29]. With respect to the iden-
tification of critical software components, static analysis has commonly been
used in the identification of software components that have specific vulnerabil-
ities. For example, research by Zheng et al. demonstrated that static analysis
techniques were an economic approach to the detection of a range of software
system implementation issues [173]. More specifically, it was shown that static
analysis is a particularly effective mechanism for the identification of vulnera-
bilities relating to assignment and checking faults. Based on these findings, it
was asserted that static analysis should be used to identify vulnerabilities early
in the development of dependable software, thereby allowing subsequent devel-
opment phases to focus on functional and algorithmic issues. Similar to this
approach, Nagappan and Ball proposed an approach to the early prediction of
defect density based on the number of vulnerabilities identified through static
analysis [113]. More closely aligned with the identification of critical variables,
research by Pattabiraman et al. adopts a notion of variable criticality based
on the sensitivity of variables with respect to random data errors in a software
system [118] [119]. This measure of variable criticality can be evaluated based
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on the highest dynamic fan-out of variables, which can be computed using back-
ward application slices. The premise underlying the use of highest fan-out for
variable criticality is that program variables with a high fan-out, with respect
to other program variables in a function in the case of [118] and [119], are more
capable of propagating errors than program variables with a low fan-out, thus
these high fan-out program variables can be considered to be more critical.
In some situations static analysis has been used to dramatically simplify
or circumvent the problem of identifying critical software components. For ex-
ample, several approaches have used static analysis to compute control-flow
graphs and other abstract representations in order to base EDMs directly on
the control-flow and structure of a software system, potentially obviating the
need for the explicit identification of critical software components or vulnera-
bilities [6] [168]. Indeed, the approaches developed in [2] and [115] operate by
ensuring that a statically generated control-flow graph is preserved during the
execution of a software system. This is achieved by associating software checks
with all program statements that result in branching or a transition between
different program statement blocks. In contrast to this use of static analysis,
the approach described in [130] aimed to detect control-flow errors through the
application of a time trace technique that allowed expected behaviour to be
specified by a software engineer and monitored by a generic control-flow au-
tomaton. However, as a study in [158] showed that around 33% of transient
faults result in a control-flow error, the general applicability and effectiveness of
the approaches discussed here is questionable, even if it is assumed that perfect
coverage can be achieved by the associated EDMs.
4.1.5 Evaluation of Existing Predicate Design Approaches
Current approaches to the identification of critical software components and
vulnerabilities in software systems generally suffer from one of two deficiencies.
Firstly, many current approaches operate at a level of abstraction that prohibits
the identification of program variables that must be incorporated by error detec-
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tion predicates. For example, approaches which operate at the level of software
modules generally do not provide a sufficient level of granularity to aid in the
design of error detection predicates within a software module, meaning that the
process of predicate implementation may be entered without knowledge of the
program variables that must be captured. Secondly, many approaches fail to
provide a systematic, objective and independently-repeatable method by which
the prescribed analysis can be undertaken. For example, approaches which
focus on providing guidelines, metrics and heuristics, even where these have
been shown to be effective for some software systems, rely on the ability of the
software engineer applying them. As a result of this it is possible for two in-
dependent engineers to apply the same approach and produce entirely different
results, which means that the program variables identified may not be composed
to form error detection predicates with the levels of accuracy and completeness
that are required in dependable software systems. Despite these criticisms of
existing techniques, the approach presented in [118] and [119] avoids both pit-
falls, i.e., it is both variable-centric and can be applied systematically to provide
objective, independently-repeatable results. However, despite being the closest
existing work to the proposed metric suite, the notion of variable criticality is
based on statically identified variables that may or may not have a high criti-
cality when the associated software system is in operation. Put differently, the
use of static analysis results in a potential for false positives, which may lead
to the unnecessary identification and protection of variables that do not have
a high criticality when the software system is in operation. To circumvent this
issue a dynamic measure of criticality must to used in order to capture variable
criticality with respect to the execution of a software system.
The metric suite developed in this chapter provides the first dynamic, variable-
centric framework that can, through the application of a threshold, be used for
the identification of program variables that should be incorporated by the error
detection predicates of EDMs. The benefits of this metric suite, with respect
to error detection predicate design, are that (i) error detection predicates can
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be simplified through the identification of the set of variables that should be
captured, (ii) the location of EDMs is informed based on the occurrences of the
program variables identified, and (iii) a cost-benefit analysis can be undertaken
when determining where the dependability enhancement efforts of software en-
gineers should be focused. In contrast to many current approaches, which are
open to some degree of interpretation or subjectivity, the proposed approach is
systematic, objective and independently-repeatable. These characteristics mean
that the proposed metric suite has the potential to provide both transparency
and accountability in the design of dependable software systems.
The proposed metric suite is composed of three metrics; spatial impact,
temporal impact and importance, where the importance metric is a function of
spatial and temporal impact. The reason that the spatial and temporal impact
of variables is considered, as opposed to any other such impact that could be
defined, is the fact that it has been shown that fault tolerance can only be in-
corporated along these two dimensions [53]. The spatial impact metric captures
the extent to which a system is corrupted when a given variable is corrupted.
In contrast, the temporal impact metric captures the duration during which a
system remains corrupted when a given variable is corrupted. To minimise the
likelihood of a software failure, each of these aspects must be handled, i.e., the
number of corrupted variables and the duration of the corruption must be taken
into account. In the following sections the spatial impact, temporal impact and
importance metrics are introduced alongside a fault injection approach for their
evaluation based on the experimental setup described in Chapter 3.
4.2 The Spatial Impact Metric
The aim of the spatial impact metric is to quantify the extent of the affected
area when a particular program variable is corrupted. The intention is then
for the value of this metric for each program variable in a software module to
contribute to the ranking of program variables in that software module with
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respect to criticality. Intuitively, program variables that cause a higher extent
of perturbation should contribute more to a chosen measure of criticality than
program variables that cause a lower extent of perturbation.
4.2.1 A Definition for Spatial Impact
Given a software system whose functionality is logically distributed over a set of
distinct software modules, the spatial impact of program variable v of module
M in a run r, denoted by σrv,M , is defined as the number of software modules
that are corrupted in r as a result of a corruption in v. The spatial impact
of a program variable v of software module M , denoted by σv,M , can then be
defined as:
σv,M = max{σrv,M},∀r (4.2)
Thus, σv,M captures the extent of the affected area whenever a program variable
v in a module M is corrupted. The higher σv,M is, the more difficult it may be
to recover from the extent of corruption in the spatial domain. Observe that it
is possible to have alternative definitions for spatial impact, e.g., by accounting
for the average number of corrupted modules, rather than accounting for the
worst-case situation by using the maximum extent of corruption in the way that
is done in this thesis.
4.3 The Temporal Impact Metric
The aim of the temporal impact metric is to quantify for the duration of the
perturbation when a particular variable is corrupted. The intention is then
for the value of this metric for each program variable in a software module
to contribute to the ranking of program variables in that software module with
respect to criticality. Intuitively, program variables that cause a higher duration
of perturbation should contribute more to a chosen measure of criticality that
program variables that cause a lower duration of perturbation.
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4.3.1 A Definition for Temporal Impact
Given a software system whose functionality is logically distributed over a set
of distinct software modules. The temporal impact of program variable v of
moduleM in a run r, denoted as τ rv,M , is defined as the number of time units over
which at least one software module of the software system remains corrupted in
r following the corruption of v. The temporal impact of a program variable v
of software module M , denoted as τv,M , can then be defined as:
τv,M = max{τ rv,M},∀r (4.3)
Thus, τv,M captures the period of time that the software system state remains
affected whenever a program variable v in a software module M is corrupted.
The higher τv,M is, the more difficult it may be to recover from the extent of
corruption in the spatial domain. As with the spatial impact metic, it is possi-
ble to have different definitions for temporal impact, e.g., by accounting for the
average duration of system corruption, rather than the worst-case situation by
using the maximum duration of corruption in the way that is done in this thesis.
Having defined the spatial and temporal impact metrics it remains to provide a
definition for the importance metric, which will form the basis for the rankings
that can be used, following the application of a suitable threshold, to identify
variables that should be incorporated by the error detection predicates of EDMs.
Note that “important” and “critical” are not used interchangeably. The notion
of criticality is considered to be more abstract than the notion of importance,
which refers specifically to definition and application of the importance metric.
4.4 The Importance Metric
As argued earlier, both spatial and temporal impact must be accounted for when
assessing the criticality of program variables. Hence, a general form for a soft-
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ware metric that accounts for the described factors in expressing the criticality
of a program variable v in a software module M , using arbitrary functions G,
K and L, can be taken to be:
Iv,M = G[K(σv,M )), L(τv,M ))] (4.4)
Equation 4.4 captures the notion that a metric to measure importance should
be a function of spatial impact and temporal impact, which is the role of G. Of
course, as these impact metrics capture different aspect of error propagation it
is reasonable to expect that they might be adjusted before combination, hence
the presence of K and L in Equation 4.4. Further, the general form given in
Equation 4.4 does not preclude the inclusion of measures other than spatial
impact and temporal impact. Indeed, the inclusion of such information into
an instantiated form of this general form can serve to enrich the importance
metric. In particular, as spatial impact and temporal impact capture specific
notions of error propagation it would be reasonable to include measures that
capture other aspects of dependability. For example, the instantiation of Equa-
tion 4.4 proposed in this chapter includes system failure rate, derived through
fault injection, as a supplementary measure, largely because metric provides
information not afforded by spatial impact and temporal impact. In general,
instantiations of the general form should seek to find a combination of spatial
impact and temporal impact that is consistent with the notion of importance
to be applied. For example, where the quantification of vulnerability expose is
a concern it may make sense to combine spatial impact and temporal impact
unevenly, and perhaps to include measures such as coverage, it should be noted
that the variable centric focus of the general form, as imposed by σv,M and
τv,M , should be maintained.
In Section 4.4.1 the general form shown in Equation 4.4 is instantiated. An
approach, based on fault injection, for the evaluation of this instantiation is
subsequently described in Section 4.4.2.
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4.4.1 A Definition for the Importance Metric
Having set out a general form for an importance metric that incorporates both
spatial and temporal impact, a concrete instantiation of this general form is
now provided. This instantiation will be used throughout this thesis to identify
variables that should be incorporated by the error detection predicates of EDMs.
Instantiated Importance Metric: Numerous instantiations of Equation 4.4
could be conceived. For example, an instantiation may incorporate a definition
of erroneous state that is based on deviations from expected values, as was done
in [61]. In this thesis a more general instantiation of the importance metric
is adopted, whereby both erroneous states and system failure are taken in to
account. This view, which is motivated by a focus on the detection of erroneous
states that lead to system failure, means that the adopted instantiation of the
importance metric should enable the generation of a relative ranking where
program variables are ordered based on their association with system failure
and the propagation of erroneous state. With this in mind, the importance of
a variable v in a module M is defined as:
Iv,M =
1
(1− f)n
(1
2
(σv,M
σmax
+
τv,M
τmax
))m
(4.5)
The importance metric instantiation shown in Equation 4.5 accounts for factors
which influence the importance of a variable but are not directly captured by
the spatial and temporal impact metrics. Specifically, the instantiation ensures
that the observed rate of failures f , associated with variable v in module M is
accounted for in the definition of importance, allowing the definitions of σv,M
and τv,M to remain independent of failure rate. Normalisation of the spatial and
temporal impact factors is performed in order to ensure that the combination of
these quantities does not mask or enhance the significance of the spatial impact
or temporal impact metric. This normalisation is achieved by expressing the
spatial impact and temporal impact metrics as a proportion of the maximum
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possible extent of corruption, σmax, and duration of corruption, τmax, respec-
tively. As each normalised impact metric can not be greater than 1, the 12 term
in Equation 4.5 served to bound the sum of normalised impact metrics above
by 1. The definition of importance given in Equation 4.5 allows a balance to
be reached between the need to detect errors and recover from them. Specif-
ically, this can be achieved by varying the values assigned to n and m, which
dictate how much emphasis is placed upon the need to avoid failures or the
need to prevent widespread system corruption in the spatial and temporal do-
mains. By setting n = 0 and m > 0 the importance metric can be made to focus
solely upon state corruption in the spatial and temporal domains, i.e., erroneous
states, whilst setting m = 0 and n > 0 focuses the importance metric solely on
system failures. In general, system specific analysis requirements can be met
through the parameterisation of Equation 4.5. Note that this refocusing of the
importance metric can be achieved with or without system specific knowledge
with respect to system structure and functionality.
4.4.2 Evaluating the Importance Metric
To evaluate the importance metric for all instrumented program variables, the
failure rates and the values of the spatial and temporal impact metrics, σ and
τ , associated with these program variables must be determined. In this thesis
these values are experimentally estimated using fault injection analysis.
Spatial Impact: Applying the definition given in Section 4.2.1, the spatial
impact of a program variable is the maximum number of software modules that
were corrupted during any run where that program variable was the target of a
fault injection, i.e., when that program variable was corrupted.
Temporal Impact: Similarly, applying the definition given in Section 4.3.1,
the temporal impact of a program variable is the maximum duration over which
at least one software module remains corrupted during any run where that pro-
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gram variable was the target of a fault injection, i.e., when that program variable
was corrupted. In the analysis shown, corruption duration is measured by the
number of iterations of a main simulation loop or the number of files processed
by an application. For example, if a program variable has a temporal impact of
1, it is an indication that the software system remained corrupted for exactly
1 simulation loop iteration or file processing tasks. In other words, a temporal
impact of 1 is an indication that, when an error was injected into a program
variable in iteration n, the state corruption remained in iteration n+ 1 but was
such corruption was not present in iteration n+ 2.
Failure Rate: The system failure rate, f , associated with a program variable
v is the number of failure executions where v was the target of a fault injection
expressed as a proportion of the total number of executions where v was the
target of a fault injection.
Weightings: The instantiation of the importance metric shown in Equation 4.5
is adaptable, in the sense that the instantiation can be configured to yield an
importance ranking that focuses on the need to avoid failures or the need to
prevent widespread corruption in the spatial and temporal domains. In order
to demonstrate the type of results that can be generated using the instantiation
shown in Equation 4.5, an initial parameterisation of n = 1 and m = 2 is
adopted. Hence, this initial analysis attempts to balance the identification of
program variables that have been implicated in widespread system corruption
against the identification variables that are implicated in system failure. Several
alternative parameterisations of the instantiation shown in Equation 4.5 are
considered in Section 4.6, where the sensitivity of the instantiation is analysed.
Iv,M =
1
(1− f)1
(1
2
(σv,M
σmax
+
τv,M
τmax
))2
(4.6)
Once the spatial and temporal impact metrics have been estimated for each
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Table 4.1: Importance ranking for 7Z1 variables (σmax = 34, τmax = 25)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 processedPosition 0.012869 2 1 0.002473
2 remainLen 0.010028 2 1 0.002466
3 distance 0.010085 1 1 0.001217
4 posState 0.008381 1 1 0.001215
5 ttt 0.006903 1 1 0.001213
6 matchByte 0.005063 1 1 0.001211
7 probLit 0.004625 1 1 0.001210
8 dicPos 0.004438 1 1 0.001210
9 range 0.002125 1 1 0.001207
10 kMatchLen 0.001600 1 1 0.001206
program variable, the system failure rates associated with program variables
have been determined and the configuration of the importance metric has been
set, the value of the importance metric for each program variable can be directly
calculated using Equation 4.6. Section 4.5 presents several case studies in order
to demonstrate the capability of the importance metric to generate a relative
ranking of program variables that, through the use of an appropriate threshold,
may be used as a means to identify critical variables.
4.5 Importance Metric Case Studies
The importance ranking of program variables in all target software modules are
shown in Tables 4.1-4.9. Tables 4.10-4.12 show the importance rankings of the
most important program variables, with respect to the importance metric, for
each target system. In all tables the top 10 highest ranking program variables,
with respect to the importance metric, are shown. Information used in the
calculation of the importance metric for each program variable can also be found
in these tables. Specifically, an identifier, system failure rate, spatial impact
and temporal impact is shown for each program variable. Unique identifiers are
assigned here to account for situations where two program variables at different
levels of scope have an identical name.
The importance rankings shown in Tables 4.10-4.12 demonstrate the type of
47
4. Towards the Identification of Critical Variables
Table 4.2: Importance ranking for 7Z2 variables (σmax = 34, τmax = 25)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 numberStreams 0.013882 5 15 0.141488
2 highPart 0.015526 3 15 0.120285
3 unpack 0.010994 3 9 0.050787
4 sizeIndex 0.002756 2 8 0.035976
5 i unpack 0.002699 3 4 0.015447
6 attribute 0.018011 2 2 0.004906
7 numInStreams 0.002443 2 1 0.002448
8 numSubstream 0.002386 2 1 0.002447
9 unpackSize 0.002375 2 1 0.002447
10 nextHeaderOffset 0.002313 2 1 0.002447
Table 4.3: Importance ranking for 7Z3 variables (σmax = 34, τmax = 25)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 seekInStreamSint 0.009250 2 8 0.036212
2 wMode 0.008188 2 8 0.036173
3 res 0.001417 2 6 0.022356
4 oSize 0.001375 2 2 0.004825
5 moveMethod 0.001292 2 2 0.004824
6 CFIp 0.000958 2 2 0.004823
7 pos 0.000417 1 2 0.002994
8 lenghR 0.004000 1 1 0.001209
9 pHandle 0.000104 1 1 0.001205
10 cSize 0.000083 1 1 0.001205
Table 4.4: Importance ranking for FG1 variables (σmax = 312, τmax = 2000)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 Weight 0.003472 13 2000 0.272212
2 EmptyWeight 0.011905 2 2000 0.256266
3 bixx 0.000992 2 2000 0.253467
4 bixy 0.000992 2 2000 0.253467
5 bixz 0.000992 2 2000 0.253467
6 bizz 0.000868 2 2000 0.253435
7 biyz 0.000868 2 2000 0.253435
8 biyy 0.000772 2 2000 0.253411
9 Mass 0.011905 12 1432 0.144018
10 PMTotalWeight 0.000771 7 1432 0.136427
results that the importance metric is capable of generating. Relating the vari-
ables ranked in these tables to the component information in Tables 4.1-4.9, it
is evident that the importance metric generally attributes a higher importance
value to variables which are implicated in high levels of spatial and temporal
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Table 4.5: Importance ranking for FG2 variables (σmax = 312, τmax = 2000)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 currentThrust 0.010417 8 2000 0.265753
2 hasInitEngines 0.003472 3 2000 0.255719
3 numTanks 0.004630 1 2000 0.252775
4 totalFuelQuantity 0.004167 1 2000 0.252658
5 firsttime 0.001736 1 2000 0.252043
6 dt 0.005208 3 983 0.063108
7 electricEng 0.122272 8 799 0.051481
8 throttleAdd 0.114087 2 600 0.026494
9 enme 0.120536 1 600 0.026133
10 te 0.009425 1 600 0.023202
Table 4.6: Importance ranking for FG3 variables (σmax = 312, τmax = 2000)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 compressLen 0.013889 17 1311 0.127795
2 groundSpeed 0.001984 5 831 0.046646
3 steerAngle 0.011111 15 8 0.000686
4 contractType 0.062066 8 48 0.000657
5 bDampRebound 0.027778 12 8 0.000464
6 eDampType 0.027344 11 8 0.000396
7 serviceRe 0.032407 4 43 0.000304
8 GearPos 0.120370 4 4 0.000062
9 rfrv 0.100694 3 4 0.000038
10 retractable 0.009549 1 6 0.000010
Table 4.7: Importance ranking for MG1 variables (σmax = 17, τmax = 25)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 selfWrite 0.028650 4 1 0.019506
2 bitridx 0.012650 4 1 0.019189
3 whiChannel 0.008400 4 1 0.019107
4 gainA 0.016700 3 1 0.011914
5 curFrame 0.015300 3 1 0.011897
6 inf 0.014925 3 1 0.011892
7 cuFile 0.005850 1 1 0.002456
8 wrdpntr 0.004167 1 1 0.002452
9 inbuffer 0.003906 1 1 0.002451
10 done 0.000156 1 1 0.002442
corruption, thus demonstrating that the results generated by the importance
metric are consistent with the intentions underpinning its design. However, it
should be remembered that the importance metric takes into account failure
rate, as well as the extent and duration of software corruption. For example,
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Table 4.8: Importance ranking for MG2 variables (σmax = 17, τmax = 25)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 sampleWin 0.194400 2 24 0.360391
2 batchSample 0.031100 2 21 0.236631
3 curSamples 0.008350 2 20 0.212292
4 first 0.006250 2 20 0.211843
5 op 0.014375 8 4 0.100860
6 linpre 0.071250 4 1 0.020400
7 rinpre 0.037917 4 1 0.019693
8 totsamp 0.034583 4 1 0.019625
9 cursamples 0.136458 3 1 0.013566
10 cursamplepos 0.129792 3 1 0.013462
Table 4.9: Importance ranking for MG3 variables (σmax = 17, τmax = 25)
Identifier f σ τ I
1 maxAmpOnly 0.011825 2 25 0.316021
2 dSmp 0.009200 2 14 0.115867
3 winCont 0.000800 2 14 0.114893
4 sum 0.009583 3 12 0.108781
5 mSamp 0.001375 4 10 0.101039
6 bandPtr 0.000250 4 8 0.077107
7 window 0.010179 3 8 0.062254
8 windowSL 0.014643 2 8 0.048595
9 sBuffs 0.002143 1 1 0.002447
10 b0 0.001964 1 1 0.002446
Table 4.10: Importance ranking for instrumented modules in Z-Zip
Rank Identifier Module I
1 numberStreams 7Z2 0.141488
2 highPart 7Z2 0.120285
3 unpack 7Z2 0.050787
4 seekInStreamSint 7Z3 0.036212
5 wMode 7Z3 0.036173
6 sizeIndex 7Z2 0.035976
7 res 7Z3 0.022356
8 i unpack 7Z2 0.015447
9 attribute 7Z2 0.004906
10 oSize 7Z3 0.004825
7Z2 program variables attribute and numInStreams both have a spatial impact
of 2, paired with a temporal impact of 2 and 1 respectively, making these pro-
gram variables comparable in terms of the widespread corruption that they can
incur. However, the fact that their associated failure rates are 0.018011 and
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Table 4.11: Importance ranking for instrumented modules in FlightGear
Rank Identifier Module I
1 Weight FG1 0.272212
2 currentThrust FG2 0.265753
3 EmptyWeight FG1 0.256266
4 hasInitEngines FG2 0.255719
5 bixx FG1 0.253467
6 bixy FG1 0.253467
7 bixz FG1 0.253467
8 bizz FG1 0.253435
9 biyz FG1 0.253435
10 biyy FG1 0.253411
Table 4.12: Importance ranking for instrumented modules in MP3 Gain
Rank Identifier Module I
1 sampleWin MG2 0.360391
2 maxAmpOnly MG3 0.316021
3 batchSample MG2 0.236631
4 curSamples MG2 0.212292
5 first MG2 0.211843
6 dSmp MG3 0.115867
7 winCont MG3 0.114893
8 sum MG3 0.108781
9 op MG2 0.100860
10 mSamp MG3 0.101039
0.002443 respectively, means that the importance metric considers attribute to
be significantly more important than numInStreams, as indicated by the fact
that the importance value of attribute is double that of numInStreams. This
is because the failure rate associated with attribute is significant enough, given
values of n and m in Equation 4.6, to enhance the importance of attribute far
beyond that of numInStreams. Allowing the supposedly dominant component
of Equation 4.6, i.e., the spatial and temporal impact metrics, to be led in this
way is entirely desirable, as the potential for system failure when attribute is
corrupted justifies it being afforded a higher value. It is also interesting to note
how spatial and temporal impact contribute to the value of the importance met-
ric for each program variable. For example, the electricEng variable in FG2 has
a spatial impact of 8 combined with a seemingly high temporal impact of 799.
However, as the importance metric interprets these values as proportions of the
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associated maximum possible values, the overall importance of electricEng is
lower than might otherwise be expected. Most crucially, the case studies asso-
ciated with the relative rankings shown in Tables 4.10-4.12 provide a means for
assessing the capability of the importance metric to identify critical variables,
a process that is undertaken later in this thesis.
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to demonstrate the robustness of the importance metric definition,
details of the rankings that would be generated by changing the values of n and
m in Equation 4.5 are shown in Tables 4.13-4.21. The tuple (p1, p2) is used to
represent a single parameterisation of Equation 4.5, where p1 = n and p2 = m.
Tables 4.13-4.21 show how the relative rankings for each module differ when
(4, 1), (2, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2) and (1, 4) parameterisations are used. For example,
in Table 4.17 the variable dt is considered the 7th most important program
variable under (4, 1), whilst variable electricEng is considered to be the 7th
most important variable under the (1, 1) parameterisation. If the definition of
the importance metric given in Equation 4.5 is robust there should be little
variation in the ranking of program variables across parameterisations, unless
there exists a justification, with respect to spatial impact, temporal impact
and system failure rate, for such variation. Table rows where there is any
discrepancy in the ranking across parameterisation are indicated by a ∗ symbol
in the Identifier column.
The sensitivity analysis presented in Tables 4.13-4.21 demonstrates that the
importance metric given in Equation 4.5 is robust across many possible parame-
terisations. Observe that the relative ranking generated by the (1, 2) parametri-
sation of the importance metric is often replicated by all parameterisations con-
sidered. In cases where the ranking is not replicated, discrepancies are minor,
localised and sensible given the parameterisation of the importance metric. For
example, Table 4.17 shows that the ranking of program variables throttleAdd and
52
4. Towards the Identification of Critical Variables
Table 4.13: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for 7Z1
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
processedPosition 1 1 1 1 1
remainLen 2 2 2 2 2
distance 3 3 3 3 3
posState 4 4 4 4 4
ttt 5 5 5 5 5
matchByte 6 6 6 6 6
probLit 7 7 7 7 7
dicPos 8 8 8 8 8
range 9 9 9 9 9
kMatchLen 10 10 10 10 10
Table 4.14: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for 7Z2
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
numberStreams 1 1 1 1 1
highPart 2 2 2 2 2
unpack 3 3 3 3 3
sizeIndex 4 4 4 4 4
i unpack 5 5 5 5 5
attribute 6 6 6 6 6
numInStreams 7 7 7 7 7
numSubstream 8 8 8 8 8
unpackSize 9 9 9 9 9
nextHeaderOffset 10 10 10 10 10
Table 4.15: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for 7Z3
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
seekInStreamSint 1 1 1 1 1
wMode 2 2 2 2 2
res 3 3 3 3 3
oSize 4 4 4 4 4
moveMethod 5 5 5 5 5
CFIp 6 6 6 6 6
pos 7 7 7 7 7
lenghR 8 8 8 8 8
pHandle 9 9 9 9 9
cSize 10 10 10 10 10
enme, as well as dt and electricEng, are interchanged under the (4, 1) and (2, 1)
importance metric parameterisations. This discrepancy is minor and localised,
as these program variables represent the only changes to the ordering gener-
ated by all other parameterisations for the software module. Indeed, the top
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Table 4.16: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for FG1
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
Weight 1 1 1 1 1
EmptyWeight 2 2 2 2 2
bixx 3 3 3 3 3
bixy 4 4 4 4 4
bixz 5 5 5 5 5
bizz 6 6 6 6 6
biyz 7 7 7 7 7
biyy 8 8 8 8 8
Mass 9 9 9 9 9
PMTotalWeight 10 10 10 10 10
Table 4.17: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for FG2
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
currentThrust 1 1 1 1 1
hasInitEngines 2 2 2 2 2
numTanks 3 3 3 3 3
alpha 4 4 4 4 4
firsttime 5 5 5 5 5
∗ dt 7 7 6 6 6
∗ electricEng 6 6 7 7 7
∗ throttleAdd 9 9 8 8 8
∗ enme 8 8 9 9 9
te 10 10 10 10 10
Table 4.18: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for FG3
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
compressLen 1 1 1 1 1
groundSpeed 2 2 2 2 2
∗ steerAngle 4 4 4 3 3
∗ contractType 3 3 3 4 4
bDampRebound 5 5 5 5 5
eDampType 6 6 6 6 6
serviceRe 7 7 7 7 7
GearPos 8 8 8 8 8
rfrv 9 9 9 9 9
retractable 10 10 10 10 10
5 program variables remain consistent across all parameterisation considered.
The discrepancy observed is sensible given the orientation of the importance
metric, since under (4, 1) and (2, 1) the importance metric attributes greater
weight to program variables with a higher system failure rate, which is why the
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Table 4.19: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for MG1
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
selfWrite 1 1 1 1 1
bitridx 2 2 2 2 2
whiChannel 3 3 3 3 3
gainA 4 4 4 4 4
curFrame 5 5 5 5 5
inf 6 6 6 6 6
cuFile 7 7 7 7 7
wrdpntr 8 8 8 8 8
inbuffer 9 9 9 9 9
done 10 10 10 10 10
Table 4.20: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for MG2
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
sampleWin 1 1 1 1 1
batchSample 2 2 2 2 2
curSamples 3 3 3 3 3
first 4 4 4 4 4
op 5 5 5 5 5
∗ linpre 8 6 6 6 6
∗ rinpre 9 7 7 7 7
∗ totsamp 10 8 8 8 8
∗ cursamples 6 9 9 9 9
∗ cursamplepos 7 10 10 10 10
Table 4.21: Sensitivity analysis of the importance ranking for MG3
Identifier (4,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,2) (1,4)
maxAmpOnly 1 1 1 1 1
dSmp 2 2 2 2 2
∗ winCont 4 3 3 3 3
∗ sum 3 4 4 4 4
mSamp 5 5 5 5 5
bandPtr 6 6 6 6 6
window 7 7 7 7 7
windowSL 8 8 8 8 8
sBuffs 9 9 9 9 9
b0 10 10 10 10 10
program variable enme rises in these rankings. In some cases, such as the (4, 1)
parameterisation for module MG2, the metric is more sensitive to changes in
parameterisation, though when interpreted alongside the associated values for
spatial impact, temporal impact and failure rate, it is clear that this apparent
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sensitivity can be explained by the orientation of the importance metric in these
situations. Specifically, as this parameterisation emphasises the importance of
variable with a high failure rate, those variables with a failure rate that is suf-
ficiently large will rise above variables whose importance ranking is mainly the
result of a high spatial and temporal impact. For example, variables cursamples
and cursamplepos have risen in the (4, 1) ranking for module MG2 due to them
having failure rates of 0.136458 and 0.129792 respectively. Overall, the sensitiv-
ity analysis in Tables 4.13-4.21 has shown the importance metric to be robust
with respect to parameterisation, with all ranking variations being accounted
for by the orientation of the metric.
4.7 Implications and Discussion
The identification of program variables that should be incorporated by error
detection predicates can simplify and guide the design of efficient EDMs. The
importance metric, when used in conjunction with an appropriate threshold,
can enable this identification process through the generation of an importance
ranking of program variables. The application of a threshold to an importance
ranking would essentially entail the selection of an importance value or ranking
position, where all program variables with an importance metric value greater
than the selected value or occupying a position greater than the selected position
would be considered critical variables. Such an application of the importance
metric would allow software engineers to precisely target those variables which
have the most significant impact upon the correct functioning of a software
system. For example, from Table 4.12 it can be observed that program variables
processedPosition and remainLen have the highest importance values. If a
threshold were set such that these program variables could be considered critical
then it would follow that an EDM must ascertain that these program variables
hold appropriate values during the execution of the associated software system.
The relative rankings generated by the importance metric can also be used
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to focus the efforts of software engineers on specific software modules. For
example, from Tables 4.10-4.12 it can be seen that program variables associated
with software modules 7Z1, FG2 and MG2 feature heavily in the importance
rankings for their respective software systems, suggesting that these software
modules should be equipped with dependability mechanisms, re-engineered or
closely monitored. This use of the importance metric is particularly applicable
in the context of commercial software system development, where subsequent
software system releases can not address all known issues and, hence, software
engineers will seek to address software vulnerabilities in order of severity. In such
a situation it would be possible to threshold the relative rankings generated as
part of a cost-benefit analysis, thus ensuring that the most severe vulnerabilities
are readily addressed. Further, observe that the relative rankings presented
in Tables 4.1-4.12 have been generated without prior knowledge of software
system structure or functionality. As the importance measure does not take
into account composition or communication paths, it can be readily applied
in situations where dependability is to be assessed post-implementation or by
software engineers who were not directly involved in the implementation of a
software system. Again, this is consistent with current approaches to commercial
software engineering, where dedicated teams often deal with the maintenance
and on-going support for previously developed software systems.
Over 38 million fault injection experiments were performed in order to es-
timate values for failure rate, spatial impact and temporal impact of program
variables in all target software modules. The PROPANE fault injection suite
allowed these experiments to be conducted in an automated fashion. Provided
that the instrumentation of the target system is concerned with maximising the
number of program variables instrumented in a given module, which will gen-
erally be the case for most software systems, there is no reason why this level
of automation can not be achieved for any given target software system. Once
the values for the spatial and temporal impact metrics have been determined,
the importance metric can be automatically calculated for each instrumented
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variable. As the definition of the importance metric is fixed for a software sys-
tem, rather than individual variables or modules, the cost of employing the
proposed approach, in terms of engineering effort, is relatively low. Further, in
the case of dependable software systems, the fact that fault injection analysis
is a commonly adopted dependability validation techniques means that the in-
formation required to evaluate the importance metric is likely to be available
during software system development.
There are limitations associated with the use of the importance metric. In
particular, the relative ranking generated by the importance metric is sensitive
to the set of program variables under consideration. Ideally, all variables within
a software module should be analysed, thus ensuring that no variable with a
potentially high importance, which may subsequently lead it it being considered
a critical variable, is overlooked. However, performing such a comprehensive
analysis may be impractical in some situations, as it may require a prohibitive
number of fault injection experiments, particularly if all the software modules
in a software system are to be analysed. However, this limitation is, to a large
extent, mitigated by the extended validation and testing periods associated
with dependable software systems and the automated nature of the analysis
process. Another perceived limitation of the importance metric is that its value
for a particular program variable is not an objective representation of the real-
world importance of that program variable. Rather it is a value which, when
viewed relative to others produced during the same analysis, can focus the efforts
of dependability engineers and allow a meaningful cost-benefit analysis to be
undertaken. Finally, although it is not a directly limitation of the metric itself,
the fault injection analysis approach proposed for estimating the importance
metric suffers from the inherent limitations of the fault injection process, such
as a dependence upon a the identification of a representative set of test cases.
As these are limitations of the evaluation mechanism, and more generally of
fault injection analysis as a dependability validation technique, they do not
negatively impact on the use of the importance metric as applied in this thesis.
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4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter a variable-centric, dynamic metric suite that can be used, in con-
junction with an appropriate threshold, for the identification of program vari-
ables that should be incorporated by the error detection predicates of EDMs has
been proposed. The proposed metric suite is composed of three metrics, namely
spatial impact, temporal impact and importance. The spatial and temporal
impact metrics capture the spatial and temporal degree to which a system is
corrupted respectively, whilst the importance metric was defined as a function
of the spatial and temporal impact metrics. After a specific instantiation of the
importance metric was provided, an experimental approach to evaluate the im-
portance metric was presented in order to demonstrate the type of results that
can be generated. These results took the form of a relative ranking amongst the
program variables in a software module. Through the application of a threshold
on importance values or ranking position, this relative ranking can be used in
the engineering of dependable software systems to facilitate the design of EDMs
based on critical variables, as well as informing the positioning of EDMs based
on the premise that critical variables should always hold appropriate values and
permitting a cost-benefit analysis to be undertaken when deciding where the
dependability enhancement efforts of software engineers should be focused.
Having defined, applied and demonstrated the type of results that can be
generated by the proposed metric suite, it is important to consider the capability
of the importance metric to identify variables that should be incorporated by
the error detection predicates of EDMs. To this point it has been presumed
that accounting for the extent and duration of corruption in the spatial and
temporal domains respectively, coupled with consideration of system failure
rate and analysis alignment, will necessarily ensure that the importance metric
identifies critical variables. However, as this capability can not be presumed, a
mechanism must be found for its evaluation. In the next chapter we develop
an approach for the generation of efficient error detection predicates for EDMs.
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Crucially, as this approach is independent of the metric suite developed in this
chapter and does not rely on the experience of software engineers or a system
specification, it can be used in evaluating the suitability of using the importance
metric in the identification of critical variables.
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Generating Efficient Error Detection Mechanisms
In the previous chapter a dynamic metric suite was proposed to facilitate the
identification of program variables that should be captured by the error de-
tection predicates of EDMs. In order to validate the capability of this metric
suite to identify program variables that are critical, when used in conjunction
with an appropriate threshold, an approach for the generation of efficient error
detection predicates is necessitated. To be fit for this purpose, the developed
approach must be unrelated to the proposed metric suite, systematic and re-
peatable. This is in contrast with current approaches for the design of error
detection predicates for EDMs, which generally rely on system specifications
and the experience of software engineers. This chapter develops the first sys-
tematic approach for the generation of efficient error detection predicates for
real-world, infinite-state software systems. More specifically, the proposed ap-
proach employs data mining techniques, including decision tree induction and
rule induction, for the analysis of fault injection data sets, in order to discover
efficient error detection predicates. The results presented demonstrate that this
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approach can be used to generate error detection predicates that are efficient
by design, removing the reliance on system specifications and the experience of
software engineers. Analysis of the error detection predicates generated by the
proposed approach serves to validate the capability of the metric suite developed
in Chapter 4 to identify critical variables.
5.1 The Design of Error Detection Predicates
Predicates for EDMs are commonly designed based on a system specification [60]
or the experience of software engineers [102]. As highlighted previously, it has
been shown that the efficiency properties of EDMs can be classified along two
dimensions; (i) completeness and (ii) accuracy [70]. The completeness of an
EDM relates to its ability to detect erroneous states, i.e., to flag true positives,
whilst accuracy relates to its ability to avoid making incorrect detections, i.e.,
to avoid false positives. Throughout this thesis it is assumed that an erroneous
state is one that will lead to a system failure if the error is not handled. A system
failure is characterised as a violation of a behavioural specification. An EDM
that is both complete and accurate is known as a perfect detector. However,
due to implementation constraints, such as read and write restrictions, it is, in
general, not possible to develop perfect detectors [76]. A perfect detector at
a given location in a program is therefore the most efficient detector for that
location. As previously stated, the term efficient EDM is used to refer to EDMs
that implement detection predicates with high completeness and high accuracy.
Research that has addressed the systematic design of efficient detectors has
generally focused on finite-state software systems. However, little work has
focused on the systematic design of efficient detectors for real-world, infinite-
state software systems. To address this issues, this chapter proposes a systematic
approach to the design of efficient error detection predicates. Most significantly,
the proposed approach is applicable in the context of real-world, infinite-state
software systems and generates error detection predicates whose efficiency is
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guaranteed by design. The premise of the proposed approach is that, since fault
injection analysis captures relationships among the program variables and the
success of software system executions, data mining techniques can be applied to
learn these relationships and how they impact the success of software executions,
with a view to applying these derived relationships as error detection predicates
for failure-inducing software system states.
In order to illustrate the novelty and significance of the proposed approach,
Sections 5.1.1-5.1.5 discuss current approaches to the design of error detection
predicates for EDMs. The work discussed in these sections is also intended to
complement the research surveyed in Chapter 4, which focused on the identifica-
tion of critical software components and vulnerabilities, rather than approaches
for the derivation or composition of error detection predicates.
5.1.1 Heuristics and Experience
Many approaches to the error detection predicate design problem have focused
on the refinement of proposed error detection predicates based on evaluations
carried out with respect to coverage and latency. Often such approaches have
concentrated on the refinement of error detection predicates through the assess-
ment of executable assertions using fault injection analysis [17] [162]. Through
approaches such as these it was established that EDMs with high coverage and
low latency reduced error propagation. However, designing error detection pred-
icates for EDMs is difficult and error-prone, as highlighted in [102], where it was
remarked that “...the process of writing self checks is obviously difficult”. To
remedy this, the authors suggested that “...more training or experience might be
helpful”. Indeed, the use of experience in the design of error detection predicates
for EDMs is commonplace in software engineering, not least due to a shortage
of systematic approaches for the design of efficient error detection predicates.
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5.1.2 System Specifications
Aside from the experience of software engineers, approaches to the design of er-
ror detection predicates have also used the software system specifications and the
constraints placed on signals, parameters and variable to design corresponding
executable assertions [60] [159]. However, such executable assertions may not
exhibit the high levels of efficiency required in dependable software systems. In
particular, it has been shown that the error detection predicates associated with
such executable assertions may not flag erroneous states, i.e., false negatives, or
may incorrectly flag correct states as being erroneous, i.e., false positives [75].
When a particular EDM does not meet the coverage and latency thresholds
required of a software system, it must be redesigned. However, little research
has focused on the refinement of such mechanisms in practical software systems.
The refinement of EDMs has been investigated in finite-state software systems,
which are usually represented as state transition systems [70] [91]. Through
these approaches, polynomial-time algorithms were developed to automatically
refine existing error detection predicates. In contrast, the approach proposed
in this chapter targets the systematic derivation and subsequent optimisation
of error detection predicates for real-world, infinite state software systems, a
problem that has received little attention in existing research.
5.1.3 Verification and Validation Techniques
A number of software validation and verification techniques have been applied in
the design of error detection predicates for EDMs, such as model checking [34],
data-flow analysis [138] and abstract interpretation [37]. Many such approaches
have relied on some form of static analysis. For example, a static analysis-based
approach was used in [118] and [119], specifically to derive detection predicates
for the prevention of data error propagation. Model checking approaches, which
are typically concerned with software verification, generally consider software
systems that have finite-state or may be reduced to finite-state by some degree
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of abstraction, whilst data-flow analysis is a lattice-based software validation
technique for gathering information regarding sets of permissible values. Ab-
stract interpretation is a software validation approach where the aim is to model
the impact that program statements have on the state of an abstract machine,
i.e., a software system is executed based on the mathematical properties of each
program statement. Such abstract machines are known to over-approximate the
behaviours of a software system. The abstract system is therefore made simpler
to analyse at the expense of incompleteness, as not every property that is true
of the original software system is also true of the abstract system. However, if
properly performed, abstract interpretation is sound, which means that every
property that is true of the abstract system can be mapped to a property that
is true of the original software system. Further, it is well known that, barring
some hypothesis that the state space of all computer programs is finite and
small, finding all possible run-time errors, or more generally any kind of viola-
tion of a specification on the final result of a program, is undecidable. Thus,
static analyses-based techniques applied to a software system are, in general,
sound, in the sense that the properties they report are true, but not complete.
5.1.4 Data Mining Techniques
With regard to the derivation of error detection predicates, the application of
data mining techniques have generally focused on the analysis of failure data and
service logs for dependable software systems. For example, research in [124] used
a combination of data mining techniques on data recorded during benchmarking
to identify key infrastructural factors in determining the behaviour of systems
in the presence of faults. These investigations can also serve to help to identify
weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a software system. In contrast, the data mining-
based approach proposed in this chapter seeks to discover predicates for EDMs in
order to enhance dependability and address vulnerabilities in software systems.
Data mining techniques have also been applied to address a number of other
software dependability issues. For example, in the context of computer security,
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data mining has been shown to be an effective approach to intrusion detection
and anomaly identification [105] [167].
5.1.5 Likely Program Invariants
A program invariant is a property that holds throughout the execution of a
program. It is know that determining all the sound invariants for a program
may be undecidable. Further, invariants reported may not be sound, i.e., an
invariant may hold for most executions, but not for some. Thus, determining
likely program invariants may be the best approximation, though steps must be
taken to handle false positives [44]. The use of program invariants is potentially
valuable in many aspects of software development, including program design,
implementation, testing and maintenance. Unfortunately, explicit invariants are
usually absent from programs, depriving programmers and automated tools of
their benefits. The seminal work on discovering likely program invariants shows
how invariants can be dynamically detected from program traces that capture
variable values at specified points of interest [44]. Typically a target program is
executed alongside a test suite to create program traces. An invariant detector
will then process these traces to determine which properties and relationships
hold over program variables. A software tool, called Daikon, exists that supports
the discovery of likely program invariants. Subsequently, several applications of
the techniques have been proposed. For example, Demsky et al. applied these
techniques to discover invariants of abstract data types [39]. More recently, these
techniques have also been applied to detect permanent hardware failures [135].
Dynamic invariant detection is a machine learning technique that can be applied
to arbitrary data. However, program invariants generally do not hold in presence
of transient failures. Indeed, the approach proposed in this chapter seeks to
detect erroneous states that lead to failure rather than all erroneous states,
which contrasts with the intention of likely program invariants.
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5.1.6 Evaluation of Existing Design Approaches
In the context of finite-state systems, the design of error detection predicates
for EDMs can be considered to be well understood [70] [91]. However, state-of-
the-art approaches to the design of EDMs do not provide a systematic approach
for the generation of error detection predicates that exhibit high accuracy and
completeness for real-world, infinite-state software systems. Indeed, the most
efficient EDMs for real-world, infinite-state software systems are often designed
based on some interpretation of a system specification and the experience of
software engineers, with repeated redesign being an accepted part of the EDM
design process. Further, whilst static analysis and the use of likely program
invariants are systematic, the theoretical limitations of static analysis, with
respect to accuracy and completeness, and the necessary focus of likely program
invariants on a constrained definition of erroneous state, i.e., likely program
invariants do not consider erroneous software states that do not result in a
system failure to be permissible, means that these approaches do not solve the
error detection predicate design problem for real-world, infinite-state software
systems.
5.2 Data Mining Concepts
Technology related to the modelling, collection, storage and querying of data
generated by real-world processes have advanced significantly in recent years.
Data pertaining to a real-world process is usually modelled as a set of entities,
their attributes and their relationship to other entities. This is commonly known
as the relational model of data. Data generated, and hence stored, within such
a relational data model is a sample of all the data that may be generated by the
process. Often, rather than being interested in the retrieval of stored data, it is
more interesting and useful to be able to forecast behaviours of the process not
previously encountered or derive knowledge about the process if the process itself
is not well understood. For example, in the context of the research presented in
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this chapter, it is interesting to understand how a software module under test,
and its associated software system, is likely to behave when confronted with an
injected fault.
5.2.1 Fundamentals of Data Mining
It is the aim of data mining to learn useful and actionable knowledge from
large collections of data. In simple domains, it is common to assume that
data exists as a single relation consisting of a set of n input attributes that
define an n-dimensional space called the Instance Space, I. Every point in I
is a potential state of the process being modelled. In supervised learning a
data mining algorithm is tasked with learning a good approximation, fˆ , of an
unknown function f , referred to as the target function, given a training data set,
T ⊆ I, consisting of the N pairs 〈xi, f(xi)〉. If the function is discrete then the
task is referred to as classification. In the case of learning a function from data
generated through fault injection analysis, the function is binary as a system
state is either going to lead to a system failure or a successful execution. The
task of learning a binary function is often referred to as concept learning, which
is a special case of classification. Within a data set to be analysed by a data
mining algorithm, instances of the class of interest, known as the concept, are
referred to as positive instances. In contrast, all instances within a data set that
do not belong to the concept are referred to as negative instances.
A number of algorithms have been proposed to solve classification problems,
including many that employ na¨ıve Bayes, nearest neighbour methods, support
vector machines (SVMs), logistic regression, rule induction, neural networks
or decision tree induction. The key difference between algorithmic solutions
to classification problems is in the kind of decision boundary that is defined
between classes, i.e., their functional form and the set of parameters they fit,
and the heuristic they employ in searching for the optimal function, also known
as the hypothesis, within the space of possible hypotheses as defined by the
functional form of the hypotheses. In this chapter the aim of the proposed
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approach is to generate efficient error detection predicates, hence there is a
focus on evaluating symbolic pattern learning algorithms, such as decision tree
induction and rule induction, as their output can easily be represented as first-
order predicates. In addition, results for classifiers based on the na¨ıve Bayes and
logistic regression algorithms are also shown in this chapter. This is done to
illustrate the levels of error detection predicate efficiency that can be achieved
through the application of relatively modest data mining algorithms.
The function approximation learnt, often referred to as the model, by the
classification algorithm from training instances needs to be evaluated, in order
to obtain a measure of the expected accuracy of the model, on unseen data.
Typically the accuracy of a model is measured by the percentage of test data
instances correctly classified, hence most algorithms seek to learn hypotheses
that minimise the number of errors. However, this implicitly assumes that all
types of misclassification incur an equal cost, which is not always the case. For
example, in the context of a safety-critical software system, a model incorrectly
classifying a failure-inducing state as non-failure-inducing will, in the majority of
circumstances, result in a much more significant cost than a non-failure-inducing
state being classified as failure-inducing. In such situations, the predictions of a
model on a test data set can be cross-tabulated with the actual classes assigned
to the instances by the target function to produce a confusion matrix. Table 5.1
shows the general form of a confusion matrix for a concept learning problem. In
Table 5.1, TP is the number of positives instances labelled as positive instances
by fˆ , known as true positives, whilst FN is the number of positive instances
labelled as negative, known as false negatives. Further, FP is the number of
negative instances labelled as positive, known as false positives, whilst TN is
the number of negative instances labelled as negative, known as true negatives.
Finally, npos/nneg are the number of positive/negative instances in the test data
and nˆpos/nˆneg are the number of instances predicted as positive/negative. In the
design of efficient error detection predicates, it natural to seek out models that
maximise true positives and minimise false positives, not least because these
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Table 5.1: The general form of a confusion matrix for concept learning.
Predicted Class
Pos. Neg. Marginal Sums
Actual Class
Pos. TP FN npos
Neg. FP TN nneg
Marginal Sums nˆpos nˆneg n
correspond closely with the concepts of accuracy and completeness. However,
as a balance must be struck between these related concerns, it is appropriate to
identify an aggregated measures of model quality.
5.2.2 Measuring Model Quality
A variety of metrics for model evaluation have been proposed based on the
structure of the confusion matrix. The most common of these are specificity
or true negative rate (TNR), as shown in Equation 5.1, and sensitivity or true
positive rate (TPR), as shown in Equation 5.2.
specificity = TNR =
TN
TN + FP
(5.1)
sensitivity = TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(5.2)
Kubat et al. used the geometric mean of the TPR and TNR as an evaluation
metric [88]. In contrast, ROC analysis is based on a plot in two dimensions where
each model is a point defined by the coordinates (1−specificity ,sensitivity),
where (1−specificity) is also referred to as the false positive rate (FPR), as
shown in Equation 5.3.
1− specificity = FPR = FP
TN + FP
(5.3)
For different configurations, the same classification algorithm will produce
multiple points on such a plot. The area under the curve (AUC) obtained by
joining these points to (0, 0) and (1, 1) is a common measure of the expected
accuracy of a classification algorithm. For a single model, the simple trapezium
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obtained by connecting the coordinates (0, 0), (FPR, TPR), (1, 1) and (1, 0)
has an area given by Equation 5.4.
AUC =
TPR− FPR+ 1
2
(5.4)
The Euclidean distance from the perfect classifier, which has coordinates (0, 1),
i.e, FPR = 0 and TPR = 1, may be used in the ranking of single models. This
measure is given by the well known formula in Equation 5.5.
distance =
√
(FPR− 0)2 + (1− TPR)2 (5.5)
A model quality metric from the domain of information retrieval is the F1
measure that combines precision and recall by computing their harmonic mean,
where precision is given by Equation 5.6 and recall is identical to the sensitivity
measure shown in Equation 5.2.
precision =
TP
TP + FP
(5.6)
When the cost associated with a false positive is different from that of a false
negative, a more appropriate measure of the quality of a model is the expected
misclassification cost, rather that the expected error. This requires the definition
of a cost matrix. Assuming there are m class labels, Li, an m×m cost matrix,
C, needs to be defined such that the value C(i, j) is the cost of misclassifying
an instance of class Li to the class Lj . Clearly C(i, i) = 0 as there should be no
cost associated with correctly classifying an instance. Minimising the error is a
special case of minimising misclassification cost when the cost matrix is defined
as C(i, j) = 1, where i 6= j and C(i, i) = 0. The expected misclassification
cost, mcost, can then be calculated as shown in Equation 5.7, where CM(i, j)
is represents index access to the associated confusion matrix using i and j.
mcost =
m∑
i
m∑
j
C(i, j) ∗ CM(i, j) (5.7)
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The focus of the approach proposed is this chapter is on the generation of
efficient error detection predicates, which means that the measurement of model
quality is performed with respect to the efficiency, i.e., the levels of accuracy
and completeness, that can be achieved by these predicates. With this in mind,
the AUC measure, which represents an aggregate of accuracy and completeness
in the form of TPR and FPR, is used in model quality evaluation. However, as
misclassification costs are likely to vary in the context of dependable software
systems, steps must be taken to ensure that high AUC values are not achieved
through the neglect of accuracy or completeness. With this in mind, TPR and
FPR are also considered when evaluating the quality of generated models.
5.2.3 Addressing Class Imbalance
The approach proposed in this chapter is founded on the premise that the data
generated during fault injection analysis captures aspects of the relationships
between system states and system failures. Based on the states sampled and
behaviours observed during fault injection analysis, a data mining algorithm can
then generate error detection predicates through learning about these captured
relationships. However, data sets derived from fault injection analysis are often
imbalanced, in the sense that most of the logged states will not lead to a system
failure, i.e., only a small proportion of runs lead to failure. Such an imbalance in
the data sets to be processed must be addressed for the data mining process to
be effective with respect to the generation of efficient error detection predicates.
A key assumption made by concept learning algorithms that are based on
error minimisation is that the training data used is well balanced [68]. That is to
say, such algorithms assume that the distribution of class labels in training data
sets is approximately uniform. However, there are a number of domains, such
as network intrusion detection, fraud detection and software reliability, where
the number of positive instances are often fewer than the number of negative
instances. In addition to this skew in distribution, it is often the case that
the minority class is the more interesting class to predict. Indeed, with respect
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the examples of generating efficient error detection mechanisms and detecting
network intrusion, it is the minority classes, i.e., system failures and network
intrusions, that are of most interest.
Two approaches have been used to address problem of class imbalance. The
first of these is to act as if there is a higher cost associated with misclassifying
instances of the minority class. Specifically, it is possible to define a cost matrix
based on the class imbalance and then use the same error minimisation-based
concept learning algorithms. However, this approach assumes that such a cost
matrix can be incorporated by the learning process. This incorporation can,
for example, be achieved by the altered priors technique proposed by Breiman
et al. [21]. The second approach to addressing the problem of class imbalance
is to replace error minimisation metrics with cost minimisation metrics when
searching the hypothesis space. However, Pazzani et al. showed that using mis-
classification costs as a greedy selection criteria in decision tree induction does
not provide cost minimisation for the model generated [122]. Further, Ting et
al. compared instance weighting to using minimum expected cost metrics for
assigning labels to leaf nodes in a decision tree induced to minimise errors [157].
The results of these experiments suggested that instance weighting is more ef-
fective than a cost minimisation-based approach.
The assignment of distinct weights to training examples, in effect, changes
the data distribution within the training data [40] [46] [122] [157]. The associ-
ated cost matrix must be converted to a cost vector, V, which can be difficult
in the context of multi-class classification problems. Breiman et al. proposed
using the sum of all misclassification costs for instances of the class, though al-
ternatives, such as V (i) = arg max
j
(C(i, j)), have also been proposed [21]. Ting
et al. assign the same weight to all instances of a particular class, Lj , based
on V (j) using the formula shown in Equation 5.8, where Nj is the number of
instances in the data labelled Lj and N =
∑
iNi [157].
w(j) = V (j)
N∑
i V (i)Ni
(5.8)
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An alternative to implicitly changing the data distribution is to resample an
original data set, either by oversampling the minority class or undersampling
the majority class to make the class distribution more uniform [68] [89] [103]. A
variety of resampling approaches have been investigated, with the most common
approaches being those which resample with replacement and sample without
replacement for undersampling the majority class. Japkowicz also experimented
with focussed sampling approaches that oversampled from the boundary regions
and undersampled from regions far from the decision boundary but experiments
in these investigations suggested that there is little value over random sampling
approaches [68]. Chawla et al. proposed the generation of synthetic data for
minority classes along the line segment joining an example to k minority class
nearest neighbours rather than simply sampling with replacement [26]. Empiri-
cal tests showed their method, known as Synthetic Minority Oversampling Tech-
nique (SMOTE), to outperform simple sampling with replacement. Zadrozny
et al. proposed the use of a cost-proportionate rejection sampling technique,
while Kubat and Matwin suggest undersampling by removing redundant and
borderline negative examples [89] [172]. A criticism of the oversampling and
undersampling approaches is that it is not clear how much over oversampling
and undersampling should be carried out. Chawla et al. proposed the use of
cross validation for setting the level of oversampling and undersampling of the
majority and minority classes automatically, ultimately demonstrating that this
process can improve model accuracy [27].
5.3 Error Detection Predicate Generation
The proposed approach for the generation of efficient error detection predicates
is a four stage process. In the first stage, fault injection analysis is performed
on a target software module in order to generate data logs pertaining to system
state that can be used to learn error detection predicates. In the second stage,
an appropriate data mining algorithm is selected and data preprocessing is per-
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Step 1:
Fault Injection Analysis 
to Generate Data Sets 
Locations for 
Error Detection 
Mechanisms
Step 2:
Algorithm Selection and 
Preprocessing
Step 3:
Data Mining / 
Model Generation
Step 4:
Model Refinement and 
Optimisation
Efficient Error 
Detection 
Predicates
Figure 5.1: An overview of efficient error detection predicate generation
formed on the fault injection logs. The goals of preprocessing are to (i) transform
the format of the fault injection data for analysis, (ii) address the class imbal-
ance that is prevalent in fault injection data sets, e.g., using the techniques
identified in Section 5.2.3, and (iii) perform any operations that are know to
specifically improve the effectiveness of the adopted data mining algorithm. In
the third stage, the selected data mining algorithm is used to analyse the trans-
formed fault injection data set in order to generate and evaluate first-attempt
error detection predicates. To improve the efficiency properties, i.e., accuracy
and completeness of the derived predicates, the final step of the approach is to
vary the parameters associated with the selected learning algorithm in search of
improved detection efficiency. The four stages of the error detection predicate
generation process are depicted in Figure 6.1, with detailed description of each
step being provided in Sections 5.3.1-5.3.4.
5.3.1 Step 1: Dataset Generation
The first step of the proposed approach is to perform fault injection analysis on a
target system in order to generate fault injection data sets which capture aspects
of the relationship between system state and system failure. The specific nature
of the fault injection performed will depend on the adopted fault and system
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models, which will in-turn depend on the characteristics and requirements of the
target software system. It should be noted that there will be a direct relationship
between the nature of the fault and system models adopted and the nature of
the predicates that can be derived. For example, in this thesis a transient,
single bit-flip fault model is assumed, which means that the set of system states
from which a relationship to system behaviour can be discerned is constrained.
System states not captured by the adopted fault model will not necessarily be
accounted for by the generated error detection predicates, which means that
the representativeness of the adopted models and test cases is, as always in
fault injection analysis, of utmost importance if the results generated are to
be relevant and useful in dependability enhancement. A further consideration
that must be made when performing fault injection in order to derive data sets
for the generation of error detection predicates is the code location at which
program state is sampled, as this will determine the code location at which the
generated predicate will be relevant and, hence, the code location at which the
associated EDM will be effective. In practice this means that the code location
where program state is sampled should correspond with the location where an
EDM is to be located. Further, extent of system state observed during sampling
will govern the set of program variables that can be captured by a generated
error detection predicate and, hence, the efficiency of that predicate. The results
presented in this chapter are based on sampling all in-scope system state for a
given code location, i.e., sampling all variables in scope at a given code location.
5.3.2 Step 2: Data Preprocessing
Following the compilation of fault injection data, an appropriate data mining
algorithm must be selected for data analysis. To derive first-order predicates
over the program variables whose values were captured during fault injection
analysis, the use of symbolic pattern learning algorithms, such as rule induction
or decision tree induction, is advocated. This use of symbolic pattern learning
algorithms is advocated for the generation of error detection predicate because
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these algorithms learn concepts, such as application-specific system failure, by
constructing a predicate-like structure, such as a decision tree, that describes
a class of objects in a manner that can be easily interpreted as a first-order
predicate. Following the identification of an appropriate data mining algorithm,
the data set collected during fault injection analysis may be preprocessed in
order to maximise the likelihood that an efficient error detection predicate will
be generated. In general, the motivations for this process are threefold:
• To transform the format of the data set derived from fault injection anal-
ysis for processing by the selected data mining algorithm.
• To address the issues of the class imbalance that is prevalent in data sets
obtained through fault injection analysis.
• To perform any and all operations that may be required to improve the
effectiveness of the adopted data mining algorithm.
The transformation of fault injection data to a format that is compatible with
the adopted data mining analysis software will be specific to the adopted fault
injection tool and data mining suite or algorithm. In the case of the results
presented in this chapter, the format transformation was between the logging
format of PROPANE [63] and the Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF) used
by the Weka Data Mining suite [58].
An imbalance in class distribution, i.e., a skewed distribution of positive and
negative instances, is common in fault injection data sets, due to the factors such
as the inherent resilience of software and the difficulty in inducing system failures
under a given fault model. In order for effective predicates to be generated this
imbalance must be addressed through approaches such as undersampling and
oversampling with replacement for the minority class. Oversampling can be
viewed as a case of SMOTE [26]. In SMOTE, synthetic examples are generated
from positive instances in the training data set, ti+. These positive instances are
known as seed instances, as they are used to generate new, synthetic, instances.
This process occurs as follows. First, the k nearest neighbours, nit’s of ti+
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are retrieved. Next, r of these nearest neighbours are chosen through sampling
by replacement, where r is the number of synthetic examples that each of the
positive training instances will contribute to the new oversampled training data
set. For example, if 300% oversampling is to be carried out then r = 3. The
synthetic data instance sij is then generated as shown in Equation 5.9, where q
is a random number between 0 and 1. Oversampling with replacement is a case
of SMOTE where q = 0.
~sij = ~ti+ + q.(~nij − ~ti+) (5.9)
The skewed nature of data sets generated by fault injection analysis, particularly
when using a transient data value fault model, means that it is appropriate,
when using certain algorithms, to perform some form of attribute transformation
before learning begins. For example, when the intention is to use data mining
algorithms, such as na¨ıve Bayes or logistic regression, to generate error detection
predicates, mapping the original attribute values using the logarithm function
shown in Equation 5.10 can improve model quality.
g(xi) =
 log(xi + 1) if xi ≥ 0− log(|xi|+ 1) if xi < 0 (5.10)
In practice the three stated aims of data preprocessing may not be fully realised
at this stage. For example, the transformation of data formats and the learning
enhancement techniques are likely to be simple processes that can be contained
to the preprocessing stage. However, the task of addressing class imbalance can
not completed until data mining has been used to generate some initial model,
hence it is an aim that is only realised during the optimisation of the generated
predicates, as described in Section 5.3.4.
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5.3.3 Step 3: Model Generation
The aim of the third stage of the approach is to generate first-attempt error
detection predicates from the transformed fault injection data. To do this a
baseline configuration of the data mining algorithm selected in the previous stage
is applied the transformed data sets. At this stage the aim is not necessarily to
generate highly-efficient error detection predicates, but to establish a baseline
model that can be optimised and refined in the next stage of the approach.
The evaluation of the generated error detection predicates may take place
by equipping the relevant location in the target system with a runtime assertion
that implements the corresponding predicates or by evaluating the effectiveness
with which predicates classify unseen instances, i.e., instances not used in er-
ror detection predicate generation. In either case, the aim is to evaluate the
effectiveness of the predicate on previously unseen data in order to measure its
efficiency properties.
5.3.4 Step 4: Model Refinement
Once a baseline predicate has been generated and evaluated, it may be refined in
order to improve its level of accuracy and completeness. This can be achieved by
varying the parameters associated with the configuration of the adopted learning
algorithm. In particular, it is useful to vary the levels of undersampling and
oversampling, including the levels and number of nearest neighbours used by any
sampling techniques applied, in order to establish an algorithm configuration
which yields the most efficient error detection predicates.
It is possible to generate an error detection predicate for a location that
will yield a perfect EDM, i.e., a predicate that is both accurate and complete
for a given code location. However, due to theoretical constraints, this is not
always achievable [76]. In reality it may be the case that an error detection
predicate for a given location can not be optimised beyond a certain level of
efficiency. Hence, when evaluating refined error detection predicates, it should
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be remembered that achieving a perfect TPR, FPR, and hence AUC, may not
be possible. Note that this is not a direct limitation of the proposed approach,
rather it is an established theoretical limitation of any approach that addresses
the EDM design problem for real-world, infinite-state software systems.
5.4 Case Studies
To demonstrate that the proposed approach for the generation of error detection
predicates yields efficient error detection predicates, the results of applying each
stage of the approach are presented in Sections 5.4.1-5.4.4.
5.4.1 Step 1: Data Set Generation
In order to generate data sets, fault injection analysis was conducted on all target
systems under the experimental conditions described in Chapter 3. During
fault injection it is possible to inject at the specific code location and then
record the state at any subsequent code location. Broadly, the code location at
which an injection is performed will govern the set of erroneous states explored,
whilst the code location at which program state is recorded is relevant to the
location of an EDM. The code locations selected for EDM deployment, i.e., the
input to the approach as depicted in Figure 6.1, were chosen based on the need
to identify preconditions and postconditions for the execution of instrumented
modules. This meant that entry and exit points of each modules were used as
code locations for fault injection and program state recording. As illustrated in
in Figure 5.2, the fact that a fault injection must be performed before system
state is recorded meant that three fault injection data sets were generated for
each instrumented module. A description of the data sets, as characterised by
injection location and sample location, i.e., whether an entry point or exit point
was used for each, is shown in Table 5.2. The results of fault injection analysis
were stored in the PROPANE analysis and logging format [63].
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Action 1
Action 2
...
...
Action n-1
Action n
Entry
Exit
(Entry, Entry)
(Entry, Exit)
(Exit, Exit)
(Inject, Record)
Figure 5.2: An overview of instrumentation for data set generation
@RELATION newRelation
    
@ATTRIBUTE var1 NUMERIC
@ATTRIBUTE var2 NUMERIC
@ATTRIBUTE failure {TRUE,FALSE}
    
@DATA
32, 3.14    FALSE
33, 3.14    FALSE
34, 3.14    FALSE
Figure 5.3: An overview of instrumentation for data set generation
5.4.2 Step 2: Data Preprocessing
A purpose-built tool was used to convert from the PROPANE analysis and
logging format to the ARFF format used by the Weka Data Mining Suite [58].
An example of ARFF format, consisting of two program variables and three
experiments, is shown is Figure 5.3.
Na¨ıve Bayes: The na¨ıve Bayes classification algorithm estimates the prior
probability distribution of the classes, i.e., failure and non-failure in the case
of learning error detection predicates, and the class conditional probabilities of
input vectors. It assumes conditional independence of input variables given the
class. Given an input vector, x, it assigns the class label that has the maximal
posterior probability, as shown in Equation 5.11.
ci = arg max
ci
p(ci|x) = arg max
ci
n∏
j=1
p(xi|ci)p(ci)
∑
k
n∏
j=1
p(xj |ck)p(ck)
(5.11)
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Table 5.2: Fault injection location-sample information for all data sets
Software Data Set Fault Injection State Recording
Module Location Location
7Z1
7Z1-A Entry Entry
7Z1-B Entry Exit
7Z1-C Exit Exit
7Z2
7Z2-A Entry Entry
7Z2-B Entry Exit
7Z2-C Exit Exit
7Z3
7Z3-A Entry Entry
7Z3-B Entry Exit
7Z3-C Exit Exit
FG1
FG1-A Entry Entry
FG1-B Entry Exit
FG1-C Exit Exit
FG2
FG2-A Entry Entry
FG2-B Entry Exit
FG2-C Exit Exit
FG3
FG3-A Entry Entry
FG3-B Entry Exit
FG3-C Exit Exit
MG1
MG1-A Entry Entry
MG1-B Entry Exit
MG1-C Exit Exit
MG2
MG2-A Entry Entry
MG2-B Entry Exit
MG2-C Exit Exit
MG3
MG3-A Entry Entry
MG3-B Entry Exit
MG3-C Exit Exit
In the case of continuous input attributes, kernel density estimation is used to
estimate the class conditional probability density functions as opposed to the
common assumption of a single Gaussian distribution. The implementation of
the na¨ıve Bayes classification algorithm used to generated the results presented
employs the gaussian kernel, g, as shown in Equation 5.12
p(Xi = x|cj) = 1
n
∑
k
g(x;xk, σj) (5.12)
The na¨ıve Bayes classifier implementation associated with the results presented
is based on the classification process described in [81].
82
5. Generating Efficient Error Detection Mechanisms
Logistic Regression: As opposed to the na¨ıve Bayes classification algorithm,
which uses Bayes’ rule to estimate posterior probabilities of the class labels
given an input vector, logistic regression assumes a parametric form for the
distribution p(cj |Xi) directly. Specifically, for concept learning Equations 5.13
and 5.14 are assumed.
P (c|x) = 1
1 + exp(w0 +
n∑
i=1
wixi)
(5.13)
P (¬c|x) =
exp(w0 +
n∑
i=1
wixi)
1 + exp(w0 +
n∑
i=1
wixi)
(5.14)
The parameterisation of the a posteriori class probabilities in Equations 5.13
and 5.14 results in a simple linear decision boundary where an instance is defined
as belonging to the concept if Equation 5.15 is satisfied, where the wi parameters
are chosen to maximise the conditional log-likelihood.
w0 +
n∑
i=1
wixi > 0 (5.15)
The implementation of the logistic regression-based classifier associated with
the presented results is based on the model described in [95].
Decision Tree Induction: Decision tree induction is a data mining algorithm
that learns a disjunction of conjunctive rules describing a concept. A decision
tree consists of two types of nodes, decision nodes and leaf nodes. A decision
node contains an input attribute value, and each edge emanating from the deci-
sion node is labelled with one of the unique values in the domain of the attribute
labelling the decision node. A leaf node is labelled using one of the classification
labels. Each path of the tree from the root node to a leaf node is interpreted
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as a set of conjunctive expressions that lead to the classification label at the
associated leaf node.
The decision tree induction algorithm works by performing a greedy search
of the space of all possible trees, choosing decision node attributes that max-
imise the reduction in entropy of the class label at each stage. In other words,
at each stage the decision tree induction algorithm selects the attribute that
provides the most information with respect to the class label and uses it to
label a decision node. The C4.5 decision tree induction algorithm was used to
construct the decision trees that represent error detection predicates [128].
Rule Induction: Rule induction is a desirable approach to learning because
the knowledge generated is a set of conjunctive rules that are easy to under-
stand and have a straightforward mapping to first-order logic [127] [129]. The
RIPPER algorithm is used as the rule induction implementation for the results
presented in this chapter [36]. The RIPPER algorithm is an enhancement of the
incremental reduced error pruning (IREP) rule-learning algorithm [52]. Simi-
larly, IREP is based on reduced error pruning (REP), an established pruning
technique that has been shown to function effectively when used in rule learning
systems [22].
The REP algorithm works by splitting all training data into two sets, a
growing set and pruning set. An initial set of over-fitted rules is derived using a
heuristic method, before the rule set is iteratively simplified by applying pruning
operators, where these operators typically delete a rule-part or delete a rule. At
each iteration the pruning operator that most significantly reduces the error on
the pruning set is applied. This pruning terminates only when the application
of any pruning operator would not reduce the error on the pruning set. In
contrast to REP, the IREP rule-learning algorithm constructs a rule set, one
rule at a rime, using a greedy choice. When a rule is identified, all instances,
both positive or negative, captured by the rule are removed. This process is
repeated until the error rate meets a specified threshold or no positive instances
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remain. The key difference between IREP and RIPPER is that each identified
rule is optimised immediately following identification. That is, RIPPER builds
and optimises one rule at a time and post prunes to improve accuracy.
5.4.3 Step 3: Model Generation
Following the application of the four data mining algorithms to each generated
fault injection data set, 10-fold cross validation was used in order to generate the
confusion matrix for each algorithm on each data set. In 10-fold cross validation
the entries in each data set are partitioned into 10 stratified samples, then for
each cross validation run, one of these partitions is used as a test sample, whilst
the other nine are used as the training set for a particular data mining algorithm.
Tables 5.3-5.6 summarise the results of applying the na¨ıve Bayes, logistic
regression, decision tree induction and rule induction data mining algorithms
to each fault injection data set. The statistics shown in these tables relate to
error detection predicates generated using a baseline configuration of each data
mining algorithm, i.e., no attempt was made to search for algorithm parameters
that would yield the most effective predicates. In these table, the FPR and
TPR columns give the mean false positive and true positive rates taken across
all 10 cross validations. A false positive here corresponds to the situation where a
model incorrectly detects a state as being failure-inducing, whilst a true positive
corresponds to a model correctly identifying a failure-inducing state. The AUC
column shows the area under the ROC curve, as described in Section 5.2.2,
whilst the SD column gives the standard deviation in AUC across all 10 cross
validations.
The results shown in Table 5.3 relate to error detection predicates gener-
ated by the na¨ıve Bayes algorithm. Observe that the predicates generated for
each data set have varied TPR values, with entries in Table 5.3 being in the
range 0.78996 to 0.98797. The value of mean FPR for na¨ıve Bayes are equally
diverse across different data sets, with these values being in the range 0.00423
to 0.14218. In general, the TPR and FPR values shown in Table 5.3 mean that
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Table 5.3: Predicate efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 0.78996 0.05100 0.86948 0.02049
7Z1-B 0.82856 0.01811 0.90522 0.03782
7Z1-C 0.96218 0.02446 0.96886 0.02387
7Z2-A 0.94278 0.09042 0.92618 0.00707
7Z2-B 0.94822 0.09940 0.92441 0.03225
7Z2-C 0.92569 0.11010 0.90780 0.01612
7Z3-A 0.92819 0.00711 0.96054 0.04817
7Z3-B 0.97607 0.01881 0.97863 0.05119
7Z3-C 0.81070 0.00423 0.90324 0.00548
FG1-A 0.98610 0.09512 0.94549 0.01414
FG1-B 0.96755 0.11886 0.92435 0.00548
FG1-C 0.89957 0.14218 0.87869 0.02345
FG2-A 0.85122 0.04435 0.90344 0.01000
FG2-B 0.88874 0.05842 0.91516 0.01581
FG2-C 0.86244 0.04684 0.90780 0.01000
FG3-A 0.84521 0.10611 0.86955 0.02280
FG3-B 0.93145 0.01092 0.96027 0.04483
FG3-C 0.83131 0.09440 0.86846 0.04940
MG1-A 0.85461 0.02563 0.91449 0.00316
MG1-B 0.85812 0.02783 0.91515 0.08509
MG1-C 0.87785 0.10835 0.88475 0.02121
MG2-A 0.89966 0.10882 0.89542 0.04712
MG2-B 0.96666 0.11393 0.92636 0.02236
MG2-C 0.84404 0.13106 0.85649 0.04604
MG3-A 0.98797 0.05419 0.96689 0.04472
MG3-B 0.81853 0.04340 0.88757 0.00316
MG3-C 0.88492 0.03537 0.92477 0.04743
0.8951 0.0663 0.9144 0.0281
the worst performing predicates generated by na¨ıve Bayes may not have the
levels of efficiency that are required in the context of dependable software. In
contrast, the best performing of these predicates may be useful in the design of
dependable software. For example, the predicates associated with 7Z3-B have
a TRP and FRP of 0.97607 and 0.01881 respectively, yielding a promising AUC
of 0.97863. Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the results presented
in Table 5.3 is the consistently low standard deviation in mean AUC, which
indicates that high levels of detection efficiency, i.e., TPR and FPR rates, were
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Table 5.4: Predicate efficiencies for logistic regression with no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 0.86935 0.01328 0.92804 0.10025
7Z1-B 0.83851 0.03274 0.90289 0.02915
7Z1-C 0.85139 0.03743 0.90698 0.30232
7Z2-A 0.87851 0.044711 0.91690 0.02000
7Z2-B 0.85862 0.053304 0.90266 0.03240
7Z2-C 0.87938 0.043068 0.91816 0.00632
7Z3-A 0.82177 0.09813 0.86182 0.15103
7Z3-B 0.88461 0.09631 0.89415 0.04593
7Z3-C 0.92025 0.02983 0.94521 0.03332
FG1-A 0.94544 0.08762 0.92891 0.00707
FG1-B 0.92391 0.08175 0.92108 0.00548
FG1-C 0.78287 0.18602 0.79843 0.15388
FG2-A 0.90671 0.03645 0.93513 0.02608
FG2-B 0.89962 0.04620 0.92671 0.01871
FG2-C 0.91344 0.04210 0.93567 0.00632
FG3-A 0.93917 0.00869 0.96524 0.01049
FG3-B 0.97946 0.09830 0.94058 0.03000
FG3-C 0.88357 0.04952 0.91703 0.03302
MG1-A 0.85564 0.05326 0.90119 0.04785
MG1-B 0.88434 0.07482 0.90476 0.00775
MG1-C 0.88471 0.06335 0.91068 0.00632
MG2-A 0.95960 0.02203 0.96879 0.00775
MG2-B 0.87028 0.07887 0.89571 0.00949
MG2-C 0.88397 0.08470 0.89964 0.17745
MG3-A 0.95524 0.03913 0.95806 0.00949
MG3-B 0.88327 0.03726 0.92300 0.00707
MG3-C 0.90740 0.08961 0.90890 0.00775
0.8911 0.0603 0.9154 0.0479
consistently achieved during each of the 10 cross validations.
The results presented in Table 5.4 demonstrate that the error detection pred-
icates generated by the logistic regression classifier are comparable with, but
marginally less efficient than, those generated using na¨ıve Bayes, with all mean
AUC values being in the range 0.79843 to 0.96879. Indeed, the na¨ıve Bayes
classifier surpassed the logistic regression classifier, with respect to mean AUC,
for all but 7 of the data sets. Logistic regression also yielded the worst results for
a single data set, with FG1-C having a TRP and FPR of 0.78287 and 0.18602
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Table 5.5: Predicate efficiencies for rule induction with no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 0.96456 0.00157 0.98150 0.00010
7Z1-B 0.94018 0.03494 0.95262 0.00008
7Z1-C 0.94009 0.02147 0.95931 0.00014
7Z2-A 0.94648 0.04554 0.95047 0.00063
7Z2-B 0.91891 0.02253 0.94819 0.00447
7Z2-C 0.92471 0.02635 0.94918 0.00141
7Z3-A 0.93912 0.07671 0.93120 0.00026
7Z3-B 0.92937 0.09719 0.91609 0.00006
7Z3-C 0.90103 0.06047 0.92028 0.00045
FG1-A 0.94151 0.09568 0.92291 0.00045
FG1-B 0.98804 0.01560 0.98622 0.00028
FG1-C 0.92306 0.04026 0.94140 0.00045
FG2-A 0.97342 0.03998 0.96672 0.00200
FG2-B 0.97722 0.02533 0.97595 0.00084
FG2-C 0.98387 0.03895 0.97246 0.00063
FG3-A 0.94786 0.00033 0.99376 <0.00000
FG3-B 0.98716 0.02340 0.97188 0.00045
FG3-C 0.95952 0.09413 0.93269 0.00045
MG1-A 0.95481 0.00922 0.97280 0.00632
MG1-B 0.93365 0.02219 0.95573 0.00837
MG1-C 0.92935 0.02006 0.95465 0.00224
MG2-A 0.96559 0.00332 0.98114 0.00004
MG2-B 0.97930 0.09288 0.94321 0.00032
MG2-C 0.99393 0.07091 0.96151 0.00014
MG3-A 0.90587 0.04206 0.93190 0.00024
MG3-B 0.93431 0.05055 0.94188 0.00004
MG3-C 0.94874 0.04487 0.95193 0.00022
0.9493 0.0414 0.9544 0.0012
respectively. Interestingly, the standard deviation in mean AUC remains consis-
tently low, again indicating the consistency with which similarly efficient error
detection predicates are generated during cross validation.
The results presented in Table 5.5 indicate that the error detection predicates
generated using rule induction surpass those generated under na¨ıve Bayes and
logistic regression with respect to the level of efficiency achieved, with all mean
AUC values in Table 5.5 being in the range 0.91609 to 0.99376. The standard
deviation in AUC is also markedly lower than for the na¨ıve Bayes and logistic
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Table 5.6: Predicate efficiencies for decision tree induction with no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 0.94347 0.00012 0.97168 0.01732
7Z1-B 0.96912 0 0.98456 0.00003
7Z1-C 0.96541 0 0.98271 0.00003
7Z2-A 0.99001 0.00048 0.99477 0.00020
7Z2-B 0.98922 0.00201 0.99361 <0.00000
7Z2-C 0.99111 0.00181 0.99465 0.00014
7Z3-A 0.99792 0.00002 0.99895 0.00017
7Z3-B 0.99792 0 0.99896 0.00010
7Z3-C 0.99868 0 0.99934 0.00010
FG1-A 0.79282 0.00011 0.89636 <0.00000
FG1-B 0.95842 0.00001 0.97920 0.00100
FG1-C 0.82232 0.00014 0.91109 0.00024
FG2-A 0.98622 0.00010 0.99306 0.00017
FG2-B 0.99218 0.00021 0.99599 0.00001
FG2-C 0.98108 0 0.99054 0.00008
FG3-A 0.99063 0.00021 0.99521 0.00026
FG3-B 0.98071 0.00317 0.98877 0.00173
FG3-C 0.98780 0.00060 0.99360 0.00173
MG1-A 0.97922 0.00092 0.98915 0.00014
MG1-B 0.98084 0.00010 0.99037 0.00008
MG1-C 0.97990 0.00210 0.98890 <0.00000
MG2-A 0.97404 0 0.98702 <0.00000
MG2-B 0.97404 0 0.98702 <0.00000
MG2-C 0.97280 0 0.98640 <0.00000
MG3-A 0.99381 0 0.99691 0.00003
MG3-B 0.99381 0.00032 0.99675 0.00026
MG3-C 0.99890 0 0.99945 <0.00000
0.9697 0.0005 0.9846 0.0009
regression classifiers, with the highest observed standard deviation being less
than the lowest value associated with na¨ıve Bayes and logistic regression. In
general, the results associated with rule induction are promising with respect
to the generation of efficient error detection predicates, not least because these
results relate to a baseline configuration of the rule induction algorithm.
Table 5.6 suggests that decision tree induction is the most effective of the
data mining algorithms applied to this point. Observe from Table 5.6 that the
mean AUC of all baseline predicates generated through decision tree induction
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is greater than 0.97168. As this measure reflects both FPR and TPR, this is
an indication that the predicates generated are effective classifiers for failure
inducing states. Observe also that, aside from data sets FG1-A and FG1-C,
the mean TPR for all predicates is greater than 0.94347, with the maximum ob-
served being 0.99890. Further, the mean FPR is extremely low in all cases, with
the maximum observed value being 0.00317. This indicates the discriminatory
nature of the predicates generated by the decision tree induction algorithm. It
is also interesting to note that the standard deviation of the predicates gener-
ated, regardless of the data mining algorithm applied, is consistently low, which
demonstrates the consistency with which efficient predicates can be generated
when using a decision tree induction-based approach.
Interestingly, despite the differing levels of efficiency achieved by the data
mining algorithms applied, the results presented for each algorithm generally
outperform existing approaches to the error detection predicate design. Indeed,
in [75] it was shown that predicates, realised as executable assertions, designed
on the basis of a system specification and domain knowledge could have an
accuracy as low as 0.75 and a completeness as low as 0.75. Further, it was shown
in [159] that, when component replication and repeated execution was employed
for error detection and correction, the number of transient value failures could
only be reduced to a minimum of 3%. In most cases, these levels of efficiency
are surpassed by the predicates evaluated in Tables 5.3-5.6, each of which was
generated under a baseline configuration. Moreover, even under such a baseline
configuration, the levels of efficiency achieved by the error detection predicates
generated by rule induction and decision tree induction, i.e., the advocated
symbolic pattern learning algorithms, are appropriate for use in dependable
software systems, i.e., they have high accuracy and completeness.
5.4.4 Step 4: Model Refinement
Having generated and evaluated a set of baseline error detection predicates,
these predicates can now be refined by varying the parameters associated with
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the applied data mining algorithms. In particular, it is interesting to vary
parameters that are independent of any data mining algorithm, such as data set
sampling levels prior to learning. This allow the same refinement process to be
applied regardless of the selected data mining algorithm.
The results of model refinement process for the presented case studies are
summarised in Tables 5.7-5.10. The columns of Tables 5.7-5.10 are identical to
those as those given in Tables 5.3-5.5, except for the Sampling and N columns,
which show the sampling level and the number of nearest neighbours used in
sampling to generate the associated predicates respectively. Each entry in the
Sampling column also shows the type of sampling performed, where an O in-
dicates oversampling and a U indicates undersampling. A total of 20 under-
sampling and 15 oversampling percentage levels were used in model refinement.
These levels were uniformly distributed over [5,100] and [100,1500] for under-
sampling and oversampling respectively, giving increments of 5 and 100 respec-
tively. The number of nearest neighbours considered in the sampling process
were uniformly distributed over [1,15] with increments of 1. The values in the
Sampling and N columns of Tables 5.7-5.10 represent optimal observed values,
with regard to achieved AUC, across all candidate values considered.
All entries in Table 5.7 improve on the results presented for the na¨ıve Bayes
classifier in Table 5.3, clearly indicating that varying the sampling parameters
associated with the application of na¨ıve Bayes can improve the efficiency of the
error detection predicates generated. More specifically, all mean TPR and FPR
values have been improved, which lead to a increase in mean AUC. The standard
deviation in AUC is consistently low and remains comparable with the results
generated under a baseline configuration of the na¨ıve Bayes classifier.
Similar to the results derived from varying the sampling parameters of the
na¨ıve Bayes classifier, Table 5.8 indicates that varying the parameters associated
the logistic regression classifier yields a universal improvement in the level of
efficiency that can be achieved by generated predicates. Again, the mean AUC
is improved and the associated standard deviation remains low in all cases.
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Table 5.7: Predicate efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 200 (O) 8 0.85697 0.00375 0.92661 0.08473
7Z1-B 900 (O) - 0.90012 0.00680 0.94666 0.02646
7Z1-C 400 (O) - 0.96784 0.00033 0.98376 0.05657
7Z2-A 1100 (O) - 0.94912 0.07931 0.93491 0.02145
7Z2-B 1200 (O) 4 0.95865 0.08899 0.93483 0.03619
7Z2-C 700 (O) - 0.94933 0.07554 0.93690 0.03317
7Z3-A 200 (O) 4 0.96851 0.00037 0.98407 0.24958
7Z3-B 100 (O) 2 0.99043 0.00339 0.99352 0.08497
7Z3-C 500 (O) 2 0.83297 0.00257 0.91520 0.18163
FG1-A 200 (O) - 0.99118 0.07037 0.96041 0.00775
FG1-B 300 (O) 2 0.98234 0.00000 0.99117 0.14856
FG1-C 35 (U) - 0.94226 0.10326 0.91950 0.00775
FG2-A 200 (O) 6 0.87420 0.03232 0.92094 0.07450
FG2-B 1300 (O) 4 0.89994 0.03893 0.93051 0.07280
FG2-C 100 (O) 11 0.89825 0.03089 0.93368 0.03146
FG3-A 500 (O) 9 0.87823 0.00000 0.93911 0.04919
FG3-B 600 (O) 3 0.97470 0.01004 0.98233 0.04506
FG3-C 20 (U) - 0.83824 0.03941 0.89942 0.01844
MG1-A 500 (O) 12 0.86274 0.02019 0.92128 0.04405
MG1-B 200 (O) 10 0.96827 0.02000 0.97414 0.01703
MG1-C 1100 (O) 2 0.85213 0.03607 0.90803 0.09808
MG2-A 1100 (O) 5 0.95668 0.04734 0.95467 0.04147
MG2-B 600 (O) 3 1 0.00576 0.99712 0.08556
MG2-C 100 (O) 9 0.88544 0.11873 0.88336 0.06411
MG3-A 900 (O) - 0.99620 0.00153 0.99734 0.08485
MG3-B 800 (O) - 0.85319 0.00119 0.92600 0.09690
MG3-C 200 (O) - 0.91393 0.01157 0.95118 0.06542
0.9238 0.0314 0.9462 0.0677
A notable improvement can be seen in the predicates associated with FG1-C,
where the mean TRP and FPR have increased to 0.85503 and 0.005 respectively.
This is a particularly notable improvement, as the value of TPR and FPR
were previously 0.78287 and 0.18602 respectively, which resulted in the lowest
mean AUC observed for any baseline configuration of any data mining algorithm
employed.
The results presented in Table 5.9 demonstrate that the refinement process
has improved the efficiency properties of the error detection predicates gener-
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Table 5.8: Predicate efficiencies for logistic regression with sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 900 (O) 14 0.89954 0.03100 0.94094 0.08136
7Z1-B 500 (O) 2 0.90605 0.04017 0.93233 0.04817
7Z1-C 500 (O) 12 0.88466 0.00620 0.93893 0.03082
7Z2-A 200 (O) - 0.88193 0.00404 0.93895 0.00949
7Z2-B 100 (O) - 0.88843 0.00209 0.94317 0.01095
7Z2-C 900 (O) 2 0.90612 0.00099 0.95257 0.09586
7Z3-A 300 (O) 3 0.89451 0.00044 0.94704 0.01549
7Z3-B 800 (O) - 0.90967 0.00237 0.95365 0.04336
7Z3-C 100 (O) 2 0.92072 0.00073 0.96000 0.17378
FG1-A 100 (O) 8 0.94857 0.00525 0.97166 0.09143
FG1-B 200 (O) - 0.98993 0.04967 0.97013 0.01789
FG1-C 800 (O) - 0.85503 0.00538 0.92483 0.08894
FG2-A 400 (O) - 0.91415 0.02554 0.94431 0.02098
FG2-B 200 (O) 5 0.90290 0.02712 0.93789 0.02881
FG2-C 100 (O) 3 0.92941 0.02920 0.95011 0.04669
FG3-A 1000 (O) - 0.94612 0.01542 0.96535 0.09965
FG3-B 500 (O) 12 0.98173 0.00111 0.99031 0.02983
FG3-C 700 (O) 11 0.89350 0.00049 0.94651 0.04817
MG1-A 400 (O) - 0.85906 0.04914 0.90496 0.08781
MG1-B 1300 (O) 4 0.90654 0.06572 0.92041 0.08025
MG1-C 800 (O) - 0.89453 0.06003 0.91725 0.02864
MG2-A 35 (U) - 0.96054 0.00001 0.98027 0.08136
MG2-B 900 (O) 6 0.87469 0.00629 0.93420 0.06519
MG2-C 900 (O) 7 0.93115 0.00039 0.96538 0.03362
MG3-A 500 (O) 7 0.96200 0.00001 0.98100 0.09418
MG3-B 200 (O) 11 0.89273 0.00463 0.94405 0.05000
MG3-C 100 (O) 10 0.91559 0.00350 0.95605 0.04940
0.9130 0.0162 0.9486 0.0575
ated using rule induction. Indeed, the results show an improved mean AUC
in all cases, though in several cases this improvement is less than a 0.000001
increase. The standard deviation in mean AUC is easily comparable with stan-
dard deviation observed under a baseline configuration of rule induction, with
some generated predicates even yielding a reduction in standard deviation with
respect to mean AUC.
Despite being the best performing algorithm under a baseline configuration,
the entries in Table 5.10 show consistent improvements, with respect to the mean
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Table 5.9: Predicate efficiencies for rule induction with sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 100 (O) 2 0.96456 0.00157 0.98150 0.02646
7Z1-B 1200 (O) - 1 0.03494 0.98253 0.00245
7Z1-C 900 (O) - 0.94009 0.02147 0.95931 0.02449
7Z2-A 400 (O) 4 0.98554 0.01241 0.98657 0.00316
7Z2-B 800 (O) - 0.99521 0.00470 0.99526 0.01414
7Z2-C 200 (O) 8 0.98529 0.00955 0.98787 0.01000
7Z3-A 200 (O) 3 0.93912 0.07671 0.93120 0.00245
7Z3-B 700 (O) 9 0.92937 0.09719 0.91609 0.00095
7Z3-C 100 (O) - 0.92103 0 0.96052 0.00141
FG1-A 25 (U) - 0.94151 0.09568 0.92291 0.02236
FG1-B 1100 (O) 8 0.99804 0.01560 0.99122 0.08367
FG1-C 200 (O) - 0.92306 0 0.96153 0.02646
FG2-A 1100 (O) 3 0.98244 0.00420 0.98912 0.00707
FG2-B 800 (O) - 0.98974 0.01000 0.98987 0.00141
FG2-C 200 (O) 2 0.99877 0.00711 0.99583 0.00141
FG3-A 1100 (O) 5 0.98786 0.00033 0.99376 0.00894
FG3-B 400 (O) 3 0.96716 0.02340 0.97188 0.07746
FG3-C 300 (O) 8 0.95952 0.09413 0.93269 0.00089
MG1-A 100 (O) - 0.97130 0.00001 0.98565 0.00632
MG1-B 1200 (O) 3 0.96972 0.00055 0.98459 0.00316
MG1-C 300 (O) 2 0.96818 0.00034 0.98392 0.00300
MG2-A 10 (U) - 0.99559 0 0.99780 0.00300
MG2-B 900 (O) 2 0.97930 0.09288 0.94321 0.00020
MG2-C 200 (O) - 0.99393 0.07091 0.96151 <0.00000
MG3-A 100 (O) - 0.90587 0.04206 0.93190 0.00084
MG3-B 600 (O) - 0.93431 0.05055 0.94188 0.00001
MG3-C 500 (O) 9 0.94874 0.04487 0.95193 0.03000
0.9658 0.0300 0.9679 0.0134
AUC measure, during the error detection predicate refinement process. In some
cases this improvement is small, again less than a 0.000001 increase in some
cases, though in the context of an error detection mechanism this magnitude
of increase can be significant. In almost all cases the standard deviation of
all predicates is increased, though it should be noted that these values remain
extremely low, particularly in comparison to the results shown for other data
mining algorithms.
In addition to evaluating the efficiency of the error detection predicates gen-
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Table 5.10: Predicate efficiencies for decision tree induction with sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 300 (O) 12 0.99849 0.00100 0.99875 0.00077
7Z1-B 900 (O) 6 0.98768 0.00035 0.99367 0.00775
7Z1-C 700 (O) 7 0.99998 0.00007 0.99996 0.00017
7Z2-A 1200 (O) 4 0.99914 0.00009 0.99953 0.00028
7Z2-B 900 (O) 2 0.99901 0.00005 0.99948 0.00003
7Z2-C 500 (O) 5 0.99091 0.00006 0.99543 <0.00000
7Z3-A 85 (U) - 0.99826 0.00002 0.99912 0.00004
7Z3-B 300 (O) 4 0.99836 0.00005 0.99916 0.00022
7Z3-C 500 (O) 14 0.99919 0 0.99960 <0.00000
FG1-A 35 (U) - 0.79633 0.01311 0.89161 0.00447
FG1-B 500 (O) - 0.96280 0.00024 0.98128 0.00002
FG1-C 500 (O) - 0.82292 0.00020 0.91136 0.00002
FG2-A 100 (O) 3 0.99982 0 0.99991 0.00001
FG2-B 200 (O) 8 0.99950 0 0.99975 0.00100
FG2-C 300 (O) 7 0.99121 0.00011 0.99555 0.00100
FG3-A 500 (O) 12 0.99662 0.00111 0.99776 0.00028
FG3-B 900 (O) 1 0.99952 0.00405 0.99774 0.00010
FG3-C 500 (O) 11 0.99631 0.00151 0.99740 0.00032
MG1-A 200 (O) 2 1 0.00990 0.99505 <0.00000
MG1-B 35 (U) 2 1 0.00995 0.99503 <0.00000
MG1-C 200 (O) - 0.99904 0.00009 0.99948 0.00004
MG2-A 30 (U) - 0.97403 0 0.98702 <0.00000
MG2-B 5 (U) - 0.97403 0 0.98702 <0.00000
MG2-C 5 (U) - 0.97281 0 0.98641 <0.00000
MG3-A 100 (O) 2 0.99380 0 0.99690 <0.00000
MG3-B 40 (U) - 0.99380 0 0.99690 <0.00000
MG3-C 5 (U) - 0.99892 0 0.99946 <0.00000
0.9794 0.0016 0.9889 0.0006
erated by different data mining algorithms, it is meaningful to consider the
efficiency of predicates across the same fault injection and state recording loca-
tions, e.g., data sets where an module entry point was used for fault injection
and state recording. As explained previously, each target software module is
associated with three data sets, where each data set related to a distinct pair
of fault injection and state recording locations, i.e., entry-entry, entry-exit and
exit-exit data sets. Table 5.11 shows the average efficiency achieved by each
data mining algorithm across all data set using the same fault injection and
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Table 5.11: Fault injection location-sample information for all data sets
Locations Mean AUC
NB LR RI DTI
Entry-Entry 0.94882 0.95272 0.96893 0.98507
Entry-Exit 0.96403 0.94735 0.96850 0.99444
Exit-Exit 0.92567 0.94574 0.96612 0.98718
state recording locations. The result presented reflect the mean AUC of error
detection predicates following predicate refinement.
The results presented in Table 5.11 demonstrate that there is no clear rela-
tionship between error detection predicate efficiency and the code locations used
in fault injection analysis. As can be seen from Tables 5.7-5.10, the standard
deviation in AUC of the generated predicates varies across data sets. Given
these observations it is clear that, whilst the results presented suggest that the
data mining algorithm plays a significant role in determining the efficiency of the
error detection predicates generated, no such relationship is evident regarding
fault injection and state recording locations. However, more research is required
in this area before general conclusions can be reached.
The application of the proposed approach has illustrated its capability to
generate predicates that are efficient by design. Indeed, the levels of efficiency
achieved by the derived error detection predicates make them suitable for use
in dependable software systems, not least because the approach has been shown
to generate predicates that are complete or accurate. The standard deviation
associated with the generation of predicates has also been shown to be low,
particularly when the evaluation employed used stratified samples in the cross
validation process, i.e., having little or no data repetition across the training
and test data should hinder the derivation of similar predicates during cross
validation. Perhaps most crucially, the case studies presented have served to
demonstrate that the proposed approach can be used as a systematic approach
to generating error detection predicates for real-world, infinite-state software
systems. Indeed, the results presented surpass those achieved where a functional
specification and domain knowledge were available, as well as those where repli-
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cation and repeated execution were employed to detect and tolerate transient
value errors [75] [159].
5.5 Efficient Predicates and Variable Criticality
To this point a systematic approach for the generation of efficient error detection
predicates has been proposed, with case studies demonstrating the application
of the approach in the context of various algorithms, configurations and software
systems. As well as being the first systematic approach to generation of error
detection predicates for real-world, infinite-state software systems, the fact that
the proposed approach is independent of the metric suite developed in Chapter 4,
means that the predicates it generates may serve as a basis for assessing the
capability of the importance metric to identify critical variables. In particular,
it is possible to determine how critical the program variables identified by the
importance metric are by evaluating the levels of efficiency that can be achieved
by error detection predicates generated using only these critical variables.
5.5.1 Variable Importance and Error Detection
If efficient error detection predicates can be constructed using only critical vari-
ables, then this is a strong validation of the thesis that an efficient EDM consists
of a set of critical variables, not least because it would demonstrate that there
is at least one set of justifiably critical variables that facilitate efficient error de-
tection for specified locations in a target system. To determine whether efficient
error detection predicates can be constructed using the critical variables identi-
fied through the application of a threshold to the importance metric, a new set
of error detection predicates for each software module are now evaluated.
Table 5.12 shows the evaluation of the error detection predicates that were
generated using all variables in each software module, whilst table Table 5.13
shows the evaluation of the error detection predicates generated using only the
most important 25% of the variables in each software module, i.e., a threshold
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was set based on ranking position. The statistics shown in Table 5.12 are based
on the error detection predicates previously generated and optimised under the
most effective data mining algorithm, i.e., decision tree induction. These result
have been repeated here for convenience. In Tables 5.12 and 5.13 the FPR
and TPR columns give the mean false positive and true positive rates taken
across all cross validations. A false positive here corresponds to the situation
where a predicate incorrectly detects a state as being failure-inducing, whilst a
true positive corresponds to a predicate correctly identifying a failure-inducing
state. The AUC column shows the area under the ROC curve. To reiterate,
the AUC column aggregates the performance of the generated predicates with
respect to TPR and FPR. Again, a mean AUC close to 1 is desirable in the
design of error detection predicates, though may not always be achievable due
to theoretical constraints [76], whilst an AUC of 0.5 is indicative of random
performance. To provide a measure of how the efficiency of the generated error
detection predicates varied during cross validation, the SD column gives the
standard deviation in AUC for 10-fold cross validation. It would be hoped that
no significant increase would be observed in the SD column when generating
error detection predicates using only important variables.
Observe from Tables 5.12 and 5.13 that the difference in the efficiency of
the predicates generated using all variables and those generated using only the
most important 25% of variables is small. The largest difference in AUC when
comparing these results is associated with data set 7Z1-A. For this data set the
predicates generated using all variables have a mean AUC of 0.97168, whilst
those generated using only important variable have a mean AUC of 0.96535,
giving a difference of just 0.00633 in this worst case. Observe also that the
absolute AUC values for predicates generated using important variables are
consistently high, with the maximum and minimum being 0.99924 and 0.89616
respectively. These consistently high AUC values, which are indicative of high
true positive and low false positive rates, serve to suggest that error detection
predicates generated using important variables can safeguard the functioning of
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Table 5.12: Predicate efficiencies achieved using all variables (also Table 5.6)
Data Set TPR FPR AUC Var
7Z1-A 0.94347 0.00012 0.97168 0.01732
7Z1-B 0.96912 0 0.98456 0.00003
7Z1-C 0.96541 0 0.98271 0.00003
7Z2-A 0.99001 0.00048 0.99477 0.00020
7Z2-B 0.98922 0.00201 0.99361 <0.00000
7Z2-C 0.99111 0.00181 0.99465 0.00014
7Z3-A 0.99792 0.00002 0.99895 0.00017
7Z3-B 0.99792 0 0.99896 0.00010
7Z3-C 0.99868 0 0.99934 0.00010
FG1-A 0.79282 0.00011 0.89636 <0.00000
FG1-B 0.95842 0.00001 0.97920 0.00100
FG1-C 0.82232 0.00014 0.91109 0.00024
FG2-A 0.98622 0.00010 0.99306 0.00017
FG2-B 0.99218 0.00021 0.99599 0.00001
FG2-C 0.98108 0 0.99054 0.00008
FG3-A 0.99063 0.00021 0.99521 0.00026
FG3-B 0.98071 0.00317 0.98877 0.00173
FG3-C 0.98780 0.00060 0.99360 0.00173
MG1-A 0.97922 0.00092 0.98915 0.00014
MG1-B 0.98084 0.00010 0.99037 0.00008
MG1-C 0.97990 0.00210 0.98890 <0.00000
MG2-A 0.97404 0 0.98702 <0.00000
MG2-B 0.97404 0 0.98702 <0.00000
MG2-C 0.97280 0 0.98640 <0.00000
MG3-A 0.99381 0 0.99691 0.00003
MG3-B 0.99381 0.00032 0.99675 0.00026
MG3-C 0.99890 0 0.99945 <0.00000
0.9697 0.0005 0.9846 0.0009
a software system. Further, the fact that standard deviation in AUC remains
low, even unchanged in many cases, when only important variables are used in
the generation of error detection predicates means that efficient predicates can
be consistently generated across separate cross validations. This implies that the
proposed approach remains robust when using only important variables, which
is particularly important given that using data sets containing fewer variables,
in effect, reduces the amount of information available during the construction
of error detection predicates for EDMs.
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Table 5.13: Predicate efficiencies achieved using important variables
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
7Z1-A 0.93090 0.00020 0.96535 0.05477
7Z1-B 0.95873 0.00005 0.97934 0.00014
7Z1-C 0.96011 0 0.98006 0.00007
7Z2-A 0.98802 0.00238 0.99282 0.03162
7Z2-B 0.98765 0.00355 0.99205 0.00173
7Z2-C 0.98990 0.00202 0.99394 0.00707
7Z3-A 0.99574 0.00477 0.99549 0.00200
7Z3-B 0.99520 0.00011 0.99755 0.00141
7Z3-C 0.99361 0.00006 0.99678 0.00141
FG1-A 0.79232 0.00001 0.89616 <0.00000
FG1-B 0.95708 0.00002 0.97853 0.00100
FG1-C 0.82100 0.00024 0.91038 0.02828
FG2-A 0.98502 0.00042 0.99230 0.04472
FG2-B 0.99196 0.00342 0.99427 0.00100
FG2-C 0.98027 0.00093 0.98967 0.00283
FG3-A 0.98862 0.00003 0.99430 0.00024
FG3-B 0.97994 0.00437 0.98779 0.00141
FG3-C 0.98608 0.00501 0.99054 0.00004
MG1-A 0.97809 0.00111 0.98849 0.01414
MG1-B 0.98004 0.00084 0.98960 0.00173
MG1-C 0.97902 0.00492 0.98705 0.01000
MG2-A 0.97328 0.00003 0.98663 <0.00000
MG2-B 0.97346 0.00028 0.98659 0.00141
MG2-C 0.97261 0.00030 0.98616 0.00141
MG3-A 0.99330 0.00305 0.99513 0.00003
MG3-B 0.99368 0.00086 0.99641 0.00026
MG3-C 0.99847 0 0.99924 <0.00000
0.9676 0.0014 0.9831 0.0077
5.5.2 Variable Importance and Decision Tree Depths
In order to understand why efficient error detection predicates can be con-
structed using only critical variables, the predicates structures generated by the
decision tree induction algorithm, i.e., the data mining algorithm used to gener-
ate these efficient error detection predicates, should be analysed. As described
previously, the decision tree induction algorithm performs a greedy search of
the space of all possible trees choosing decision node attributes that maximise
the reduction in the entropy of the class label. Figure 5.4 shows an example
of the type of tree generated by the decision tree induction algorithm in the
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context of generating efficient error detection predicates. The tree is based
on a predicate generated during the decision tree induction experiments pre-
sented preciously. In Figure 5.4, non-leaf nodes are labelled with variables,
edges are labelled with potential variable states and leaf nodes are labelled
with a failure classification, where true indicates failure and false indicates non-
failure. An error detection predicate is derived from the structure shown in
Figure 5.4 by interpreting the tree as a conjunction of disjunctions. For ex-
ample, the program variable V arOne is labelling the root node and each edge
emanating from it represents a set of values for V arOne, e.g., ≤ 43.32. Fol-
lowing two such these edges from the root results in a conjunctive expression
being created, i.e., (V arOne ≤ 43.32) ∧ ((V arTwo > 523)). If edges are fol-
lowed from the root node to a leaf node then a complete conjunctive expression
will be associated with a class label, failure or non failure in the case of this
thesis, and the number of instances captured by the conjunctive expression,
e.g., consistently taking the leftmost edges yields the conjunctive expression
(V arOne ≤ 43.32) ∧ ((V arTwo > 523)) ∧ (V arFour > 0) that captures 126
instances of failure in the data set used in decision tree construction.
The premise of this analysis method is that critical variables will feature
near the root, i.e., at a lower depth measured from the root, of a decision
tree constructed during decision tree induction because these program variables
capture the most information regarding the ultimate success of a software system
execution, i.e., critical variables provide the greatest reduction in the entropy
of the class label. This validity of this evaluation approach is ensured by (i)
the mutual focus on failure-inducing states, (ii) the independence of the error
detection predicate generation mechanism from the importance metric and (iii)
the manner in which decision trees are constructed in the generation of error
detection predicates.
The case studies shown in Section 5.4 used 10-fold cross validation to ac-
curately asses the effectiveness of generated error detection mechanisms. This
meant that data set was partitioned into ten stratified samples, then for each
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TRUE (148)
TRUE (249)
FALSE (126)
FALSE (59)
TRUE (119)
TRUE (49)TRUE (52)
VarOne
VarThreeVarTwo
VarSixVarFour
VarFive
VarSix
VarFive
VarSix
VarSeven
VarTwo
VarFour
< 43.32 ≥ 43.32
< 42 ≥ 42
> 523 ≤ 523 > -0.99 ≤ -0.99
> 0 ≤ 0 > 1 ≤ 1 > 522 ≤ 522
> 0 ≤ 0 > 10 ≤ 10
Figure 5.4: An example decision tree constructed during decision tree induction
cross validation run, one of the partitions was used as the test sample, whilst
the other nine were used as the training set. This meant that three predicates
were generated for each fault injection data set. As 3 fault injection data sets,
corresponding to three distinct pairs of injection and sampling locations, were
compiled for each software module, a total of 30 separate error detection predi-
cates were generated for each target software module.
Tables 5.14-5.21 show the importance ranking and importance values of the
ten most important variables in each instrumented module. These values were
calculated using the approach described in Chapter 4 and the experimental
conditions described in Chapters 3. Tables 4.1-4.8 can be used to assess the
correlation between the importance of a variable and its depth in a decision
tree representing a predicate, as they show the minimum tree depth at which a
variable was used to label a decision node in any predicate for a given module.
The root of a decision tree is assumed to have a depth of 1. The decision was
taken to use this as a basis for comparison with the importance ranking because,
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Table 5.14: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for 7Z1
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 processedPosition 0.002473 1
2 remainLen 0.002466 1
3 distance 0.001217 2
4 posState 0.001215 2
5 ttt 0.001213 2
6 matchByte 0.001211 3
7 probLit 0.001210 3
8 dicPos 0.001210 3
9 range 0.001207 4
10 kMatchLen 0.001206 3
at each state of decision tree construction, the decision tree induction algorithm
selects a decision node attribute that maximise the reduction in entropy of the
class label. In effect, the decision tree induction algorithm selects the variable
whose value can be viewed as providing the most information regarding system
failure. This is commensurate with the stated aims of the importance metric.
To appreciate why the minimum decision tree depth is appropriate, as opposed
to a measure such as average tree depth, consider Figure 5.4. V arTwo is used
to label decision nodes at depths of 2 and 4. In the former case, this allows 249
instances of failure to be discerned using a simple predicate, i.e., ((V arOne <
43.32) ∧ (V arTwo ≤ 523)), whilst the latter allows only 49 instances of failure
to be discerned using a more complex predicate, i.e., ((V arOne ≥ 43.32) ∧
(V arThree ≤ −0.99) ∧ (V arSix > 522) ∧ (V arTwo ≤ 10)). The selection of a
decision node attribute that maximise the reduction in entropy of the class label
means that nodes at a lower depth will capture more failure information, hence
the pattern in the V arTwo example will always be observed. This reasoning is
the basis for the decision to use minimum decision tree depth in this evaluation.
Observe from Tables 5.14-5.22 that there is a pattern between the importance
ranking and the minimum tree depth of the variables in each software module.
Variables with a higher importance ranking generally feature at the lower levels
on the predicate structures generated during decision tree induction. Further,
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Table 5.15: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for 7Z2
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 numberStreams 0.141488 1
2 highPart 0.120285 1
3 unpack 0.050787 1
4 sizeIndex 0.035976 2
5 i unpack 0.015447 2
6 attribute 0.004906 2
7 numInStreams 0.002448 3
8 numSubstream 0.002447 3
9 unpackSize 0.002447 3
10 nextHeaderOffset 0.002447 4
Table 5.16: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for 7Z3
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 seekInStreamSint 0.036212 1
2 wMode 0.036173 2
3 res 0.022356 2
4 oSize 0.004825 3
5 moveMethod 0.004824 3
6 CFlp 0.004823 3
7 pos 0.002994 3
8 lengthR 0.001209 2
9 pHandle 0.001205 3
10 cSize 0.001205 3
it is interesting to note the relationship between the value of the importance
metric and the minimum decision tree depth observed for the highest ranked
variables. For example, the two highest ranked variable in Tables 5.14 and 5.19
have importance metric values that are much greater than the other variables
in their respective tables. This is then mirrored in the minimum decision tree
depth, which shows that these variables are the only variables that feature at
the root of the decision trees generated for their respective software modules.
Variables in 5.14-5.22 that do not feature in an error detection predicate, such as
inf and done in Table 5.20, have a lower importance relative to other variables
in their respective tables. Indeed, every variable with an importance ranking
of 1-5 features in an error detection predicate. This observation demonstrates
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Table 5.17: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for FG1
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 Weight 0.272212 1
2 EmptyWeight 0.256266 1
3 bixx 0.253467 2
4 bixy 0.253467 2
5 bixz 0.253467 2
6 bizz 0.253435 2
7 biyz 0.253435 3
8 biyy 0.253411 2
9 Mass 0.144018 3
10 PmTotalWeight 0.136427 3
Table 5.18: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for FG2
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 currentThrust 0.265753 1
2 hasInitEngines 0.255719 2
3 numTanks 0.252775 2
4 totalFuelQuantity 0.252658 2
5 firsttime 0.252043 2
6 dt 0.063108 3
7 electricEng 0.051481 3
8 throttleAdd 0.026494 4
9 enme 0.026133 -
10 te 0.023202 4
that variables identified by the importance metric feature in the efficient error
detection predicates generated through decision tree induction.
Having applied the proposed approach for the generation of efficient error
detection predicates to assess the capability of the importance metric to identify
critical variables, it has been shown that efficient error detection predicates can
be generated using only critical variables and that program variables identified
by the importance metric feature in efficient error detection mechanisms. As
well as serving to validate the capability of the importance metric to identify
program variables that should be captured by error detection predicates, these
results also serve to validate the thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set
of critical variables. Indeed, in this chapter it has been shown that an efficient
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Table 5.19: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for FG3
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 compressLen 0.127795 1
2 groundSpeed 0.046646 1
3 steerAngle 0.000686 2
4 contractType 0.000657 2
5 bDampRebound 0.000464 2
6 eDampType 0.000396 2
7 serviceRe 0.000304 3
8 GearPos 0.000062 4
9 rfrv 0.000038 2
10 retractable 0.000010 4
Table 5.20: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for MG1
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 selfWrite 0.019506 1
2 bitridx 0.019189 1
3 whiChannel 0.019107 2
4 gainA 0.011914 2
5 curFrame 0.011897 2
6 inf 0.011892 -
7 cuFile 0.002456 3
8 wrdpntr 0.002452 4
9 inbuffer 0.002451 -
10 done 0.002442 -
EDM can consist only of a set of critical variables.
5.6 Implications and Discussion
The case studies presented have demonstrated that the proposed approach is
capable of generating predicates for efficient error detection mechanisms. In
particular, decision tree induction and rule induction have, even under a baseline
configuration, been shown to be effective and consistent methods for generating
predicates which exhibit high accuracy and completeness. In the case of decision
tree induction and rule induction, generated predicates are represented as a tree
structure to be interpreted as a conjunction of disjunctions and directly as a
first-order predicate respectively. This reduces the implementation of an EDM
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Table 5.21: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for MG2
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 sampleWin 0.360391 1
2 batchSample 0.236631 2
3 curSamples 0.212292 2
4 first 0.211843 2
5 op 0.100860 3
6 linpre 0.020400 -
7 rinpre 0.019693 -
8 totsamp 0.019625 -
9 cursamples 0.013566 -
10 cursamplepos 0.013462 -
Table 5.22: Importance values and minimum decision tree depths for MG3
Importance Variable Importance Min. Tree
Ranking Identifier Metric Depth
1 maxAmpOnly 0.316021 1
2 dSmp 0.115867 2
3 winCont 0.114893 3
4 sum 0.108781 2
5 mSamp 0.101039 2
6 bandPtr 0.077107 2
7 window 0.062254 2
8 windowSL 0.048595 3
9 sBuffs 0.002447 3
10 b0 0.002446 -
based on the representations generated by these algorithms to the process of
interpreting a decision tree or first-order predicate.
Despite the presented case studies suggesting that the decision tree induction
and rule induction algorithms yield significantly more efficient error detection
predicates than na¨ıve Bayes and logistic regression, it is not possible to conclude
that these algorithms will consistently outperform other algorithms, including
na¨ıve Bayes and logistic regression. As any two classification algorithms can
differ only in the class boundary that they define, i.e., the boundary defined
to classify system failures and non-failures in the generation of error detection
predicates, it is not possible to determine which classification algorithm will
define an boundary that is appropriate for a particular data set. Indeed, it is
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current practise in data mining approaches to classification problems to seek out
an acceptable model through the investigation of many classification algorithms.
As fault injection analysis is commonly used in the validation of dependable
software systems, the availability of fault injection data can often be assumed.
This means that the main cost of applying the proposed approach is associated
with the execution of data mining algorithms, which in-turn means that the
cost of generating efficient predicates using our approach is related to data set
magnitude, the data mining algorithm applied and the comprehensiveness of
the refinement undertaken, i.e., the number of algorithm configurations that
are considered in model refinement. It was shown in the cases studies presented
in Section 5.4 that using only a baseline configuration of several data mining
algorithms can yield highly-efficient error detection predicates and that a naive
parameter search, i.e., systematically varying the level of sampling applied to
data sets, can allow the efficiency of those predicates to be consistently improved,
often to levels that would make the associated EDMs applicable in the design
of dependable software systems.
The focus of the analysis presented has been on generating predicates for
EDMs that are capable of detecting failure-inducing system states. Hence, the
fault injection analysis undertaken focused on recording the system state during
varied executions and whether those executions resulted in a system failure. This
focus contrasts with existing work in fault injection analysis, which typically
adopts the view that an error is any deviation from a fault-free execution, i.e.,
a golden run. Interestingly, whilst the approach described in this chapter is not
directly applicable in this context, a similar approach can be adopted to derive
error detection predicates that can identify such deviations from a golden run.
The novelty of the proposed approach for the generation of error detection
predicates is in the application of data mining to fault injection data sets in order
to obtain predicates for efficient EDMs. The main advantage of this approach
is that efficient error detection mechanisms can be obtained by design, rather
than a system specification or the experience of software engineers.
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5.7 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter a systematic approach to the design of efficient error detection
predicates has been proposed, with a view to providing the first such systematic
design approach for real-world, infinite-state software systems and validating the
metric suite developed in Chapter 4. The premise of the proposed approach was
that, given program locations at which EDMs will be located and for which the
associated error detection predicates must be designed, data mining techniques
can be applied in the analysis of fault injection data sets to obtain efficient error
detection predicates for those EDMs. Following its description, the proposed
approach was applied to software modules in three complex software systems,
with error detection predicates being generated and evaluated for multiple code
locations in each software module. The results presented demonstrated that the
proposed approach can be used to generate efficient error detection predicates,
i.e., error detection predicates exhibiting high accuracy and completeness. To
validate the capability of the importance metric to identify critical variables, the
predicate structures generated under decision tree induction, which was shown
to be the most effective data mining algorithm under test, were compared with
the relative rankings generated by the importance metric. Further, a new set of
error detection predicates were generated using data sets containing information
regarding only important variables, i.e., variables identified by the importance
metric. The comparisons between the generated predicate structures and the
relative rankings derived from the importance metric, in addition to the effi-
ciencies of the newly generated error detection predicates, served to validate
the capability of the importance metric to identify critical variables.
The validation of the importance metric has demonstrated its capability to
identify critical variables and shown that it is possible to generate efficient error
detection predicates using only important variables. However, this validation
does not demonstrate, in any meaningful way, the dependability enhancements
that can be achieved through the protection of critical variables. In order to
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demonstrate the existence of a set of critical variables whose correctness is cen-
tral to the proper functioning of a software system, it must be shown that soft-
ware system dependability can be achieved through the protection of a small
number of program variables. In the next chapter the level of dependability that
can be achieved through the identification and protection of critical variables
is explored, with a view to further validating the thesis that an efficient EDM
consists of a set of critical variables.
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A Validation of Critical Variables
To this point it has been shown that it is possible to generate efficient error
detection predicates for EDMs based only on critical variables, where these
critical variables have been identified through the application of a threshold
to the relative rankings generated by the importance metric. However, as the
error detection predicates generated were concerned with specified locations in
a software module, the program variables captured by these predicates can only
be deemed critical with respect to those locations. As the importance metric
operates at the level of software modules, i.e., it accounts for all locations where
a program variable is used throughout a software module, it is necessary to
demonstrate that the critical variables it identifies are critical throughout a
software module, rather than just at the locations for which error detection
predicates were generated. To determine whether the criticality of the program
variables identified by the importance metric extends to wider context of a
software module, the impact of protecting these critical variables throughout a
software module must be considered. In this chapter an automated wrapper-
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based approach for the design of dependable software is proposed, with a view
to assessing the impact that the protection of critical variables can have on the
dependability of a software system. In contrast to state-of-art approaches, which
operate at the level of software modules, the approach developed in this chapter
operates based on the replication of critical variables identified by the important
metric, i.e., the approach is variable-centric. The results presented demonstrate
that the failure rate associated with a software system where critical variables
are wrapped, even when this is a small number of critical variables in a single
software module, can be several orders of magnitude lower than that of an
unwrapped equivalent. These results serve to substantiate the thesis that an
efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables, in that they confirm that the
criticality of the program variables identified by the importance metric extends
throughout a software module.
6.1 The Wrapping of Critical Variables
It has been argued throughout this thesis that the design of efficient EDMs is
an inherently difficult task, with the results presented in Chapter 5 being at the
forefront of what can currently be achieved in the generation of efficient error
detection predicates for real-world, infinte-state software systems. One approach
to overcoming this difficulty is to reuse standard dependability mechanisms that
are know to implement efficient error detection predicates, such as majority
voting, in the design of EDMs [14]. This can be viewed as akin to the reuse of
trusted components in software engineering [54] [90] [116]. However, techniques
such as software replication or NVP are expensive, as they typically operate
at the level of a software system, e.g., an entire software system or numerous
software components may be replicated in some way [14] [15].
To address the expensive nature of replication at a software level, it would
be ideal for standard dependability mechanisms, that are known to implement
highly-efficient error detection predicates, to be adapted to operate at a finer
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granularity. To this end, this chapter proposes an approach to dependability
enhancement based on the replication of the critical variables identified by the
importance metric. This application of the importance metric serves to reduce
the cost associated with replication whilst retaining the potential for depend-
ability enhancement through the reuse of dependability mechanisms that are
known to implement efficient error detection predicates. More specifically, the
developed approach operates as follows. Firstly, a lookup table, in which the
program variables in a software module are ranked according to their impor-
tance metric value, is generated. Once this lookup table is obtained, a subset
of important variables is duplicated or triplicated, based on the application of
a threshold to this lookup table, using software wrappers, i.e., shadow variables
are created. Note that these program variables are termed “important”, as op-
posed to “critical”, because they are identified on the basis of the importance
metric. Then, when an important variable is written during the execution of the
software system, the value held by the relevant shadow variables are updated.
Similarly, when an important variable is read during the execution of the soft-
ware system, its value is compared against that of its shadow variables. Subject
to the adopted fault model, any discrepancy amongst these values would be an
indication of an erroneous state. Depending of the level of replication performed
in the application of the approach, i.e., the level of duplication and triplication,
an attempt can then be made to recover from this erroneous state through
majority voting, forced validity methods or random value selection [14] [59].
Software wrappers have been investigated in many fields of research, such
as computer security, software reengineering, database systems and dependable
software systems. Although the approaches and techniques applied in these
domains have commonalities, the motivation for their usage inevitably varies. To
provide context for the described approach, Sections 6.1.1-6.1.3 give an overview
of how software wrapper technology is currently used in various application
domains, before Section 6.1.4 discusses how the characteristics of the approach
developed in this chapter compare with current techniques.
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6.1.1 Software Engineering
Software wrappers have been widely applied in software engineering research and
practice, usually with a view to overcoming problems associated with the inte-
gration of legacy systems [146] [170]. In this context, software wrappers are most
typically employed as connector components, usually to allow independently de-
veloped software systems to interact or as a means of providing or reconciling
supplementary functionality [23] [28] [147]. Indeed, Bartolomei et al. focused
on how an application programming interface (API) can be wrapped to permit
some degree interoperability with alternative APIs, with a particular focus on
using wrappers to span software platforms [18]. A key result of this work was
the identification of common issues and challenges in software wrapper design,
particularly for object-oriented systems. Similarly, Marosi et al. used software
wrappers to allow legacy applications to execute on desktop grid resources with
minimal local modification [107]. This approach was based on the development
of a POSIX like shell scripting environment that was used to describe how ap-
plication software was to be run. Further examples of software wrappers being
used in systems integration can be found in the field of database systems, where
software wrappers are typically used to encapsulate legacy database systems
so that they can be reused or integrated with newly developed systems, often
using the same automated wrapper generation techniques that emerged from
the application of wrappers in software reengineering [35] [156].
6.1.2 Operating Systems
Software wrapper technology has been extensively investigated in the context of
operating systems, where emphasis is often placed on wrapping device drivers
and shared libraries [155] [169]. In the context of wrapping shared libraries
to enhance robustness, Fetzer et al. proposed a highly-automated and adapt-
able approach for the generation and deployment of wrappers that can pre-
vent the crash, hang and abort failures associated with the use of libraries in
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the C programming language [49]. This approach was based on the extrac-
tion of type information from header files and manual pages, followed by the
generation of bespoke fault-injectors that experimentally established robust ar-
gument types for C library function calls. The approach proposed in [49] was
evaluated under Ballista tests, which have previously been use to demonstrate
that many POSIX C library functions are fragile with respect to invalid argu-
ments [86] [87]. Similarly, research in [154] led to the development of protection
wrappers for the enhancement of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components,
including shared libraries. In contrast to research focusing on protecting shared
resources, Ghosh et al. developed software wrappers that allowed applications
to gracefully handle operating system failures, such as those induced by device
driver failures or system stress [55]. This approach was motivated by previous
work in [137], where several operating system calls in the dynamic link libraries
(DLLs) of the Win32 API were shown to be fragile and capable of inducing se-
vere consequences when presented with unexpected inputs. Working at a similar
level of abstraction, Epstein et al. developed a software wrapper-based approach
for improving the resiliency of application proxy-based firewalls [43]. Despite
the effectiveness of this approach, the fact that it entailed the development of
bespoke wrappers for all protocols and protocol variants to be permitted oper-
ation through a firewall, means that a significant level of insight and software
engineering is required for its adoption.
A consequence of wrapping shared resources and application interfaces is a
reduction in error propagation. This is because the behaviours of these com-
ponents are constrained, thus ensuring that erroneous state are less likely to
be entered and propagated. Research in software wrappers for operating sys-
tems has focused specifically on addressing the problem of error propagation.
For example, Johansson et al. proposed approaches for the identification and
wrapping of vulnerable locations in operating systems, with a view to directly
addressing the error propagation problem [79] [80]. This work was built on the
premise that error propagation analysis can reveal the types of errors occurring
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in an operating system that will propagate through the operating system and
impact applications. Similarly, Fabre et al. proposed analysis approaches that
can assist in the the design of fault containment wrappers based on the consid-
eration of failure modes [45]. In particular, these approaches made use of the
MAFALDA fault injection tool, which was specifically designed as an evaluation
tool for microkernel dependability and wrapper design [133].
6.1.3 Dependable Software Systems
With respect to the process of dependability enhancement it is the general
intention of a software wrapper to implement a simple, well-understood predi-
cate that constrains the behaviour of a software component, thus limiting the
occurrence of an erroneous software state. A central premise of software wrap-
per technology is that the component being wrapped should be oblivious to
the wrapping performed, though in practise this ideal may be violated when a
software wrapper imposes a specification constraint that would not have been
enforced before wrapping. These notions of simplicity and transparency are
embodied by standards for component interoperability such as the Common
Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), the Distributed Component
Object Model (DCOM) and JavaBeans, each of which has been widely applied
in the development of dependable software systems [104] [166]. The principles
of simplicity and transparency are adhered to in research such as [42], where
software wrappers were used to detect contract violations in component-based
systems. This work also demonstrated that software wrappers could be used
to allow the users of a software system to layer contract-checking components
on top of the system without source code access. Moreover, research in [73]
and [74] developed approaches for the generation of fault containment software
wrappers for the enhancement of component-based systems, with a particular
emphasis on maintaining safety properties when components were composed.
Software wrappers have also been used to address the, widely-acknowledged,
problem of improving dependability in COTS software [136]. For example, work
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in [13] developed an approach for the integration of COTS components to form
idealised fault-tolerant COTS components in a dependable software system, es-
sentially providing a mechanism by which a set of fault-intolerant components
can be transformed into a functioning dependable software system. A focus on
application level issues can also be seen in [47], where software wrappers were
combined with checkpointing mechanisms to address the problem of non-atomic
exception handling. In particular, this work introduced a notion of failure atom-
icity in exception handling to capture the semantics of the software wrappers
developed and govern the management of checkpointing and recovery. Further,
in [48] the authors developed a wrapper-based approach to address the issue of
buffer overrun in the C programming language. The approach, which could be
adopted without source code access, entailed the transparent interception of C
library calls that are known to be unsafe, coupled with argument checking and
a subsequent call to the unsafe function with checked arguments.
In the context of computer security, software wrappers have typically been
used to encapsulate software systems so that a specific set of security policies
can be enforced to protect vulnerable assets, particular when these assets have
a public interface. For example, the wrapper-based approach in [32] focused on
the transparent protection of a domain name system (DNS) through message
inspection. More specifically, a formal system specification was used to char-
acterise DNS clients and name servers with respect to some security objective,
before a DNS wrapper that examines the incoming and outgoing DNS messages
of a name server was formally specified. This DNS wrapper was designed to
detect and drop messages that could cause violations of the defined security ob-
jective, thus providing protection again many common DNS attacks, including
cache poisoning and a subset of spoofing attacks [5] [57]. As a further example,
work in [139] addressed the problem of developing concurrent software systems
using the composition of wrapped software components. Building on the process
calculus developed in [140] and the causal type to capture permissible informa-
tion flows developed in [141], this approach proposed to use software wrappers
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to encapsulate components and enforce specific security policies. Further to
these examples, it has also been shown that security wrappers deployed at the
level of an operating system kernel can be used to meet a range of application
specific security requirements, with work in [109] and [110] proposing the use
of kernel hypervisors to protect against malicious downloadable content and
safeguard firewall services. Most significantly, these kernel hypervisors, which
were implemented as loadable kernel modules for the Linux operating system,
provided an “unbypassable” layer of security within an operating system kernel
but did not necessitate kernel modifications.
6.1.4 Evaluation of Existing Software Wrapper Usage
Despite the widespread application of software wrapper technology, not least
in the design of dependable software systems, the granularity at which exist-
ing approaches have applied serves to differentiate the approach proposed in
this chapter. Specifically, the variable-centric nature of the proposed approach,
as facilitated by the application of the importance metric, is distinctive when
compared to the existing approaches, which are generally concerned with the
wrapping of software components such as software modules and entire software
systems. A justification for the higher-level focus of existing approaches may
relate to the fact that the overheads associated with a software wrapper are
typically linked to the number of invocations of that wrapper, meaning that a
fine-grained approach, where more software wrappers are to be deployed, will
lead to more invocations and, hence, greater overheads. However, the already
significant overhead of wrapping software modules, e.g., over 1200% in [47], com-
bined with the focused approach enabled by the importance metric, motivate
the consideration of a more selective fine-grained approach to the application
of software wrappers. The approach developed in this chapter represents the
first variable-centric approach to dependability enhancement through the use
of software wrappers and variable replication. It is this variable-centric focus,
facilitated by the metric suite developed in Chapter 4, that enables the key ben-
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efits of the approach over current state-of-the-art techniques in dependability
enhancement. Further, the approach described in this chapter (i) circumvents
the need to obtain non-trivial predicates by using standard efficient predicates,
e.g., majority voting (ii) circumvents the need to know the optimal location of
a given predicate by comparing values on all accesses to critical variables, (iii)
allows the efficiency of the associated EDMs to be known a priori, obviating the
need for dependability validation [66], (iv) incurs significantly lower overheads
than approaches that do not operated with such granularity, and (v) reduces
the risk of inserting software bugs during dependability enhancement [47] [142].
6.2 A Wrapper-based Software Design Approach
The approach proposed in this chapter is based on the premise that the replica-
tion of critical variables, as identified by the importance metric, can significantly
increase software system dependability without incurring significant execution
overheads. Thus, the approach serves a mechanism for further validating the
thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables. The proposed
approach is a three stage process. First, a lookup table ranking variables based
on their importance metric value for a given module is generated. Next, all read
and write operations on important variables, as defined by the application of a
threshold, are identified. These identified operations are known as important
actions. Finally, all important actions are protected using software wrappers
that implement error detection and correction predicates that are known to be
efficient, i.e., comparisons between replicated values and majority voting. An
overview of the described approach is shown in Figure 6.1, whilst Sections 6.2.1-
6.2.3 provide a description of each stage of the approach.
6.2.1 Stage 1: Establishing Variable Importance
The first stage of the proposed approach is to establish the criticality of each
variable within a target software module. To achieve this the metric suite and
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Step 1: 
Establish Variable 
Importance
Original 
Software
Step 2:
Identify Important 
Actions
Step 3:
Wrap Important 
Variables
Wrapped 
Software
Variable Importance Lookup Table
Thresholded Importance Table 
and Important Read / Writes
Figure 6.1: An overview of enhancing dependability through the replication of
critical variables using software wrappers
fault injection approach developed in Chapter 4 are used to measure variable im-
portance. The importance of all program variables in a target software module
can be evaluated automatically in this way. In Chapter 4, as well as [100], fault
injection analysis was used to estimate variable importance, though, as stated
previously, the metric suite can be evaluated using alternative approaches. Once
this first stage of the approach has been completed, a lookup table relating any
given variable to its importance metric value can be constructed.
6.2.2 Stage 2: Identifying Important Actions
The second stage of the approach is to identify all read and write actions on
important variables. As the replication of a whole software system, or indeed
every program variable in a software system, incurs a large overhead, a subset
of the most important variables are selected for replication. This is done using
thresholds to govern the levels of duplication and triplication performed. Specif-
ically, two thresholds are set to govern the number of duplicated and triplicated
program variables; λd and λt respectively. These thresholds may be defined with
respect to importance metric values, though as the absolute important metric
values will have little meaning in the context of most software systems, it is
reasonable to define thresholds as a proportion of the program variables in a
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module. For example, to specify the triplication of the top 10% and duplication
of the top 15% of program variables in a target software module, λt = 0.10 and
λd = 0.15 would be set. The use of these two thresholds, one for duplication
and one for triplication, allows replication overheads to be reduced, as not every
program variable must be triplicated in situations where perfect error detection
followed by a best-efforts recovery attempt is sufficient. Once threshold values
have been set, the program variables to be wrapped can be identified. How-
ever, before wrapping can be performed, every possible read and write location
on an important variable must be identified. This can be achieved by several
means, including system call monitoring and memory management techniques.
The only requirement is that all possible read and write actions on important
variables must be identified. As will be detailed in Section 6.3, the use of au-
tomated source code analysis is advocated as an means for the identification of
important actions. The completion of this stage of the approach will mean that
all program variables to be wrapped have been identified and a mechanism has
been used, or is in place, to identify read and write actions.
6.2.3 Stage 3: Wrapping Important Variables
Having established the importance of the program variables in a target software
module, based on the importance metric, and identified all locations where read
and write actions could be performed on sufficiently important variables, the
final stage of the described approach is to deploy software wrappers in order
to protect critical variables in these locations. Two types of software wrapper
are employed by the described approach; read -wrappers and write-wrappers.
Description of how these software wrappers operate is given below, whilst pseu-
docode for the write-wrapper and read-wrapper is shown in Figure 6.2 and 6.3
respectively.
Write-Wrapper: This software wrapper is invoked when an important vari-
able is written. When a variable v is assigned a value f(. . .), where f is some
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6. Assessing the Impact of Protecting Critical Variables
Algorithm 1 Write-Wrapper: Writing a variable v
v := f(. . . )
if (rank(v) ≥ λt) then
create(v￿);
create(v￿￿);
v, v￿, v￿￿ := f(. . . );
else if (rank(v) ≥ λd) then
create(v￿);
v, v￿ := f(. . .);
end if
tions could be performed on suﬃciently important variables, the final stage of
the described approach is to deploy software wrappers in order to protect crit-
ical variables in these locations. Two types of software wrapper are employed
by the described approach; write-wrappers and read -wrappers. Description of
how these software wrappers operate is given below, whilst pseudocode for the
read-wrapper and write-wrapper is shown in Algorithms 2 and 1 respectively.
Write-Wrapper: This software wrapper is invoked when an important vari-
able is written. When a variable v is assigned a value f(. . .), where f is some
function, in the unwrapped module, the ranking of the variable is checked. If
the rank of v is in the top λt, then two shadow variables, v
￿ and v￿￿, are created.
Alternatively, if the rank of v is between λt and λd, then a shadow variable v
￿
is created. Then, v and all of its shadow variables are updated with f(. . .).
Read-Wrapper: This software wrapper is invoked when an important variable
is read. When a variable y is updated with a function g(v, . . .) in the unwrapped
module, where g is a function and variable v is to be read, the rank of v is
checked against λt. If the rank of v is greater than λt then function g uses the
majority of the v, v￿, v￿￿. If the rank of v is between λt and λd, then g uses v or v￿.
The completion of this final stage will yield a software system where all read
and writes to critical variables are protected by an EDM that implements an
eﬃcient error detection predicate, i.e. duplicate checking. In the case of the
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Figure 6.2: The algorithm executed by a software wrapper when a write action
is performed on a sufficiently critical variable6. Assessing the Impact of Protecting Critical Variables
Algorithm 2 ReadWrapper: Reading a variable v
y := g(v, . . .);
if (rank(v) ≥ λt) then
y := g(majority(v, v￿, v￿￿), . . . );
else if (rank(v) ≥ λd) then
y := g(random(v, v￿), . . . );
end if
most important variables, which have been triplicated, an eﬀective ERM, i.e.,
majority voting, will also be tightly integrated with the error detection process.
On the other hand, those variables that have been duplicated will be given the
opportunity to recover based on a random selection between the two values that
enabled error detection. In the application of the approach it may be tempting
to consistently triplicate important variables, by setting λd = λt. However,
this incurs the maximum level of replication overhead in order to provide an
eﬀective ERM, hence in situations where an eﬀective ERM already exists or is
not required, i.e., error detection is suﬃcient for software system function, this
would not be a reasonable approach. Indeed, such a situation may be better
served by a configuration where λt = 0.
The stages of the described approach are intentionally kept independent of
implementation, in that sense that the input and outcomes of each stage are the
focus of the description given, rather than the means by which they are achieved.
For example, whilst it is suggested that the generation of the lookup table in
the first stage of the approach be undertaken using the metric suite proposed
in Chapter 4, this lookup table can be generated using alternative approaches,
e.g., static analysis, software engineer experience or heuristic approaches. Sim-
ilarly, the identification of read and write actions on critical variables could be
undertaken using dynamic analysis and instrumentation, memory management
techniques or system call monitoring, as opposed to the use of automated source
code analysis. Despite this implementation independence there are operational
dependencies between the stages of the approach. In particular, the means by
which software wrappers should be implemented and deployed will be guided by
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Figure 6.3: The algorithm executed by a software wrapper when a read action
is performed on a sufficiently critical variable
function, in the unwrapped module, the ranking of the variable is checked. If
the rank of v is in the top λt, then two shadow variables, v
′ and v′′, are created.
Alternatively, if the rank of v is between λt and λd, then a shadow variable v
′
is created. Then, v and all of its shadow variables are updated with f(. . .).
Read-Wrapper: This software wrapper is invoked when an important variable
is read. When a variable y is updated with a function g(v, . . .) in the unwrapped
module, where g is a function and variable v is to be read, the rank of v is
checked against λt. If the rank of v is greater than λt then function g uses the
majority of the v, v′, v′′. If the rank of v is between λt and λd, then g uses v or v′.
The completion of this third stage will yield a software system where all read
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and writes to important variables are protected by an EDM that implements
an efficient error detection predicate, i.e. replicated program variable checking.
In the case of the most important variables, which have been triplicated, an ef-
fective ERM, i.e., majority voting, will also be tightly integrated with the error
detection process. On the other hand, those variables that have been duplicated
will be given the opportunity to recover based on a random selection between
the two values that enabled error detection. In the application of the approach
it may be tempting to consistently triplicate important variables, by setting
λd = λt. However, this incurs the maximum level of replication overhead in
order to provide an effective ERM, hence in situations where an effective ERM
already exists or is not required, i.e., perfect error detection is sufficient and
best-efforts recovery is sufficient, this would not be a reasonable approach. In-
deed, such a situation may be better served by a configuration where λt = 0.
Each stage of the described approach has been intentionally kept independent of
implementation, in that sense that the input and outcomes of each stage are the
focus of the description provided, rather than the means by which each stage
should be achieved. For example, whilst it is suggested that the generation of
the lookup table in the first stage of the approach can be undertaken using the
metric suite proposed in Chapter 4, this lookup table can be generated using
alternative means, e.g., static analysis or the experience of software engineers.
Similarly, the identification of read and write actions on critical variables could
be undertaken using dynamic analysis, memory management techniques or sys-
tem call monitoring, as opposed to the use of automated source code analysis.
Despite this implementation independence there are operational dependencies
between the stages of the approach. In particular, the means by which software
wrappers should be implemented and deployed will be guided by the approach
used for the identification of important actions. For example, if memory mon-
itoring techniques were used in the identification of read and write actions on
critical variables then it may be difficult to relate these actions to locations in
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source code, regardless of how well the target software system is understood.
In such situations it would be more appropriate to deploy dynamic software
wrappers, rather than relying on source code transformation.
6.3 Case Studies
To demonstrate the dependability enhancement that can be achieved through
the protection of a small number of critical variables, the results of applying the
described approach to target software modules are shown in Sections 6.3.1-6.3.3.
6.3.1 Stage 1: Establishing Variable Importance
Using the approach developed in Chapter 4 under the experimental conditions
detailed in Chapter 3, the spatial and temporal impact of each variable was
experimentally estimated. This information, as well as the failure rate for fault
injections on each variable, was used to evaluate the importance of the variables
in each software system. Note that system failure rate here is, again, assessed
on a per variable basis. For example, if a variable is target of 100 fault injection
executions and 25 of these result in a system failure, then that variable consid-
ered to have a failure rate of 0.25. The entries in the thresholded lookup tables
generated by the importance metric represent a subset of the entries that were
previously presented in Tables 4.1-4.9. For this reason, the thresholded lookup
tables generated during the first stage of the proposed approach are not shown.
To explore multiple applications of the approach described in this chapter,
threshold settings of (0.10, 0.15), (0.15, 0.20) and (0.20, 0.20) were applied. In
this notation, (0.10, 0.15) denotes λt = 0.10 and λd = 0.15, which indicates that,
for each target software module, the top 15% of variables would be wrapped,
with the top 10% being triplicated and the next 5% being duplicated.
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6.3.2 Stage 2: Identifying Important Actions
Once the importance table for each module had been thresholded, source code
analysis was used to identify read and write actions on important variables. The
implementation of this source code analyser was based on the premise that reads
and writes to important variable are the only operation types that are deemed
to be important actions. When adopting a source code analysis approach it
must be recognised that any analysis tool must work under the assumption that
any unidentifiable operation type could be an action relating to any important
variable. This conservative stance ensures that the coverage of the approach is
maximised, though unnecessary overheads, with respect to runtime and memory
consumption, may be incurred where a location is unnecessarily instrumented.
6.3.3 Stage 3: Wrapping Important Variables
Following the identification of read and write actions on important variables,
the software wrappers described in Section 6.2.3 were deployed. As the locations
for read-wrapper and write-wrapper deployment were necessarily consistent with
the code locations of important read and write actions respectively, information
generated during source code analysis was used to drive wrapper deployment.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show concrete examples of write-wrapper and read-
wrapper deployments respectively. The first line in each example shows the
original program statement before wrapping. The second line in each figure
illustrates the use of software wrappers. In Figure 6.5 the dt variable is being
read-wrapped, whilst Figure 6.4 shows the currentThrust variable being write-
wrapped. Observe that, in both cases, it is necessary to provide the wrapping
functions with identifiers for the variable and location. This information is
generated, maintained and known only to the wrapping software following the
identification of important read and write actions. This means that it has no dis-
cernible impact on the execution of the target system, which remains oblivious
to the existence of the read-wrapper and write-wrapper deployments.
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/* currentThrust = Engines[i]->GetThrust();*/
currentThrust = writeWrapper(VARID_17, LOCID_8, Engines[i]->GetThrust());
Figure 6.4: A write-wrapper deployment in source code
/* tankUPD = calc + (dt * rate); */
tankUPD = calc + (readWrapper(VARID_12, LOCID_4, dt) * rate);
Figure 6.5: A read-wrapper deployment in source code
To investigate the dependability enhancement afforded by the described ap-
proach, the fault injection experiments described in Chapter 3 were repeated
on wrapped target systems, i.e., more than 38 million experiments were per-
formed to measure observed to failure rates with wrapped software systems. A
single software module in any target software system has its important variables
wrapped at any one time. Although each target system was deterministic, each
experiment was triplicated to account for the random choice aspect of the de-
ployed software wrappers. The standard deviation for all sets of experiments
was less than 0.00001. Table 6.1 summarises the impact that the described
approach had on the dependability of all target software modules. The Un-
wrapped Failure Rate column gives the original system failure rate with respect
to all fault injection experiments, i.e., the proportion of system failures of the
unwrapped target system when fault injection across all variables in the given
software module are considered. The Wrapped Failure Rate column gives the
same measure for wrapped modules.
Observe from Table 6.1 that the system failure rate of each software module
dramatically decreased in all cases under the (0.15, 0.20) threshold setting, thus
demonstrating the effectiveness of the approach for dependability enhancement.
Further, the decrease in system failure rate of many modules is greater than
combined failure rates of the wrapped variables in those modules. For example,
module MG3 had an unwrapped failure rate of 0.002780830, which corresponded
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Table 6.1: System failure rates for wrapped and unwrapped modules
Target Unwrapped Wrapped Failure Rate
Module Failure Rate (0.10, 0.15) (0.15, 0.20) (0.20, 0.20)
7Z1 0.002407940 0.000017 0.000003 <0.0000001
7Z2 0.007082023 0.000142 0.000014 <0.0000001
7Z3 0.000856604 0.000506300 0 0
FG1 0.001929009 0.000022 0 0
FG2 0.002481621 0.000002047 0.000001 <0.0000001
FG3 0.001471873 0.000135395 0.000002 0
MG1 0.004983750 0.000012083 0.000029 0
MG2 0.007888044 0.000013426 0.0000011 0
MG3 0.002780792 0.000006076 <0.0000001 <0.0000001
0.00354241 0.000095147 0.00000626 <0.0000001
to 39361 failures. The same module had a wrapped failure rate of 0.000006105,
corresponding to 86 failures. This improvement can not be accounted for by
the 1142 failures incurred by the three wrapped variables, hence the wrapping
performed must account for fault injections elsewhere. The results associated
with the (0.15, 0.20) and (0.20, 0.20) threshold settings also show this pattern.
In particular, Table 6.1 shows that, when chosen appropriately using the im-
portance metric, safeguarding just 20% of the program variables in a software
module can be sufficient to reduce the system failure rate of that software mod-
ule to 0. Further, in cases where the same threshold was applied but this level
of dependability was not reached, the associated software module failure rate
was near-zero and dramatically improved over all other threshold settings, thus
indicating the near-sufficiency of the identified critical variable with respect to
safeguarding the proper functioning of these target software systems.
As the focused, fine-grained nature of the replication undertaken by the pro-
posed approach has the potential to permit low executions and memory over-
heads, it is interesting to consider the performance of the approach with respect
to these measures. To this end, Tables 6.2 and 6.3 summarise the worst-case
overhead of applying the approach on all target software modules. Table 6.2
gives the peak percentage increase in runtime, whilst Table 6.3 gives the peak
percentage increase in memory consumption. These increases reflect peak in-
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Table 6.2: Peak increase in execution time incurred by module wrapping
Target Execution Time (Peak % increase)
Module (0.10, 0.15) (0.15, 0.20) (0.20, 0.20)
7Z1 26.05% 22.83% 22.91%
7Z2 31.47% 31.55% 31.79%
7Z3 20.36% 20.36% 22.84%
FG1 18.24% 21.07% 24.21%
FG2 35.83% 35.87% 35.83%
FG3 23.53% 30.10% 31.97%
MG1 25.98% 29.44% 31.28%
MG2 28.09% 31.02% 31.08%
MG3 23.17% 27.02% 27.02%
25.86% 27.70% 28.77%
Table 6.3: Peak increase in memory usage incurred by module wrapping
Target Memory Usage (Peak % increase)
Module (0.10, 0.15) (0.15, 0.20) (0.20, 0.20)
7Z1 07.55% 08.04% 08.82%
7Z2 18.16% 18.92% 20.04%
7Z3 00.94% 00.94% 01.87%
FG1 02.22% 03.28% 03.51%
FG2 03.32% 08.24% 09.04%
FG3 02.03% 03.47% 03.89%
MG1 05.22% 09.22% 10.90%
MG2 04.93% 07.21% 08.84%
MG3 00.58% 04.01% 04.75%
4.99% 7.04% 7.96%
creases observed when comparing non-fault injected executions of a unwrapped
target software module against non-fault injected executions of a wrapped target
software module. The test case executions used for observation were identical
to those used in fault injection analysis. All overheads were measured by mon-
itoring target modules in isolation using the Microsoft Visual Studio Profiler
running in both sampling and instrumentation modes, with the stated over-
heads being the maximum observed under either configuration [108].
Observe from Table 6.2 that the minimum and maximum execution over-
head, across all replication thresholds, of wrapped modules varies between
18.24% and 35.83%. The worst-case absolute increase in the execution time
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of a target module was observed for module 7Z2, which increased by 31.79% to
approximately 28µs. There is a coarse correlation between the increase in exe-
cution time and the number of variables in each module, though the frequency
with which each variable is used is likely to impact this overhead more directly.
Table 6.3 shows that the increases in memory consumption are more varied than
increases in execution time. As the memory usage increases shown are the peak
observed increases for each target software module, the increase is unlikely to
be sustained beyond the execution of a module. Further, the absolute magni-
tude of these increases may be small. For example, the seemingly large 18.16%
increase in memory consumption shown for the 7Z2 target module corresponds
to an absolute additional overhead of less than 3 kilobytes.
6.4 Implications and Discussion
Inserting tailored EDMs and ERMs into a software system is likely to result
in a low overhead, due to the fact that only a small number of variables and
code segments must be added or replicated. However, as argued earlier, this
approach necessitates the design of non-trivial predicates, which is known to
be difficult [102]. Also, the design and deployment of EDMs often introduces
additional bugs into a software system [47]. The approach developed in this
chapter circumvents these problems by using standard efficient error detection
and recovery predicates, though this comes at the cost of greater execution and
memory overheads. This issue can be seen as a tradeoff. Inserting dependability
mechanisms directly is difficult and error prone but imposes less overhead, whilst
approaches such as the one described in this chapter reuse simpler mechanisms
at the expense of greater overheads.
The performance overheads of the proposed approach will vary according
to the extent of wrapping performed, i.e., according to λd and λt. Overhead
comparison with similar approaches are desirable but generally invalid due to
difference in the extent, intention and focus of the wrapping mechanisms em-
129
6. A Validation of Critical Variables
ployed. For example, the results presented in this paper demonstrate that with
λd = 0.15 and λt = 0.10, for a single module measured in isolation, our ap-
proach introduces a additional runtime overhead of approximately 18%-35%
and a memory overhead of approximately 0.5%-20%. In contrast, the approach
developed in [47] had a memory overhead for the masking of a fixed-duration
function, set at 5µs, of over 1200%. However, the software module-centric focus
of the approach in [47], as opposed to the variable-centric focus adopted in this
chapter, invalidates such a comparison of overheads.
Given that the developed software wrappers operate by updating replicated
variables during writes and selecting the most appropriate value during reads,
the described approach will work with variables of different types whenever the
notion of equality exists or can be defined for that type. Equality is well-defined
for integer, real and boolean types but can also be defined for composite types.
The most significant implication of the approach developed in this chapter
can be seen in the results of the case studies presented in Section 6.3. These
results demonstrate that adequately protecting a relatively small set of critical
variables in a target module can serve to safeguard the proper functioning of
a software system. Indeed, the fact that the decrease in system failure rate
observed for many target modules was greater than combined failure rates of
the wrapped variables in those modules, is a clear indication that the protected
variables in each modules are accounting for issues occurring in unwrapped
variables, i.e., the propagation of errors is halted by protected variables before
a system failure can ensue.
6.5 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter an automated approach to dependability enhancement based
on the replication of the critical variables has been developed, with a view to
further validating the criticality of the program variables identified as critical
by the importance metric. The developed approach operates based on the reuse
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of dependability mechanisms that are known to implement efficient error de-
tection predicates. More specifically, for any target software module, software
wrappers are used for the replication of a set of critical variables identified us-
ing the metric suite developed in Chapter 4, i.e., shadow variables were created
for critical variables. Thus, when an important variable is written during the
execution of a target software module, the value held by the relevant shadow
variables is updated. Similarly, when an important variable is read during the
execution of a target software module, the value of the variable is compared
against that of its shadow variables. Any discrepancy amongst these values is
an indication of an erroneous state. Depending of the level of replication per-
formed, i.e., duplication or triplication, an attempt can then be made to recover
from this erroneous state through majority voting, forced validity methods, or
a random value selection. To investigate the dependability enhancement that
it can achieve, the developed approach was applied to software modules in all
target software systems, with various levels of critical variable duplication and
triplication being applied in each case. The results presented demonstrate that
the system failure rate associated with a software modules can be dramatically
decreased, to 0 in many cases, through the protection of a relatively small set
of variables, thus suggesting that a relatively small set of critical variables can
be use to capture to correctness of a software system and the thesis that an
efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables.
To this point (i) a metric suite for the identification of critical variables
has been developed, (ii) the effectiveness of the metric suite has been validated
through the development of a separate approach for the generation of efficient
error detection predicates and (iii) the criticality of the program variables identi-
fied by the metic suite has been validated with respect to the associated software
modules. When considered in combination, these contributions serve as evidence
to support the thesis that efficient EDMs consist of a set of critical variables. In
the next chapter the contributions made in Chapters 4-6 are analysed, alongside
a full discussion of their contribution to supporting this thesis.
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Discussion
Chapters 4-6 made novel research contributions in support of the thesis that an
efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables. To this point these contribu-
tions have been considered in isolation, with each building on those previous and
serving to motivate subsequently presented research. Indeed, the analysis and
discussion presented to this point has focused largely on the implications and
applications of the contributions made, rather than solely on the implications
of these contributions in the context of the stated thesis. In this chapter these
contributions are drawn together in support of the thesis that an efficient EDM
consists of a set of critical variables. In particular, this chapter summaries and
analyses the overarching outcomes of the work presented in each chapter with
respect to the thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables,
before concluding with a discussion of the potential applications and limitations
of the thesis. The discussion presented in this chapter ultimately concludes that
the research presented substantiates the thesis that an efficient EDM contains
a set of critical variables on the basis that (i) the importance metric is able,
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through application of an appropriate threshold, to identify critical variables,
(ii) efficient EDMs can be constructed based only on the critical variables iden-
tified by the importance metric, and (iii) the criticality of identified variables
can be shown to extend across a software module such that an efficient EDM
designed for that software module should seek to determine the correctness of
the identified variables.
7.1 Summary and Implications
In Chapter 4 a metric suite, alongside a fault injection approach for its evalua-
tion, was proposed for the ranking of the program variables in a software module
with respect to a notion of criticality that accounted for the potential impact
of those program variables in the spatial and temporal domains. It was shown
that the rankings generated by this metric suite, which must be thresholded in
order to identify critical variables, were justifiable, robust, and consistent with
the intention underpinning its proposal. The development of a mechanism for
the identification of critical variables serves as the first step towards supporting
the thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables, in that
it facilitates the investigation of the critical variables identified with respect to
the efficiency of the EDMs that incorporate them.
In Chapter 5 a systematic approach to the generation of highly-efficient er-
ror detection predicates for EDMs was proposed based on the application of
data mining algorithms to data sets derived from fault injection analysis. More
specifically, given a location in a software module, an efficient error detection
predicate for an EDM could be generated based on the application of a symbolic
pattern learning algorithm to the problem of learning the relationships between
program variables that influence the success of a software system execution.
The proposed approach enables the design of efficient EDMs with no reliance
on the experience of software engineers or a system specification. Crucially,
this approach provides a means for assessing the capacity of the importance
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metric to identify critical variables, in that it allows the efficiency properties of
EDMs generated using all program variable in a software module to be com-
pared against the efficiency properties of EDMs generated using only the critical
variables identified by the metric suite proposed in Chapter 4. The comparison
demonstrated that EDMs generated using only critical variables were efficient, in
that their efficiency properties were equal or only marginally worse than EDMs
generated using all the program variables in a software module. This outcome
is an indication that a set of critical variables can be used to efficiently detect
errors at a specified location in a software module, which serves to support the
thesis that an EDM consists of a set of critical variables. That is to say, at a
specified location in a software module, a set of critical variables can be used
for efficient error detection.
Chapter 6 proposed an approach for dependability enhancement, based on
the wrapping of critical variables using software wrappers that implement error
detection and correction predicates that are known to be efficient. This approach
provided a means for extending the results presented in Chapter 5 to account
for the criticality of program variables identified as critical across an entire
software module. Put differently, it was shown that, by protecting a relatively
small proportion of the identified critical variables in all locations of a software
module, the system failure rate associated with that software module can be
significantly reduced. The implication of this result is that, in order to design
an efficient EDM that is to be located in a particular software module, the values
of a set of critical variables must be ensured to be correct, i.e., the EDM must
contain such a set of critical variables. Indeed, when taken in conjunction with
the overarching outcomes of Chapter 4-5, this result serves to substantiate the
thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables.
The research presented in Chapters 4-6 support the thesis that an efficient
EDM contains a set of critical variables. This is asserted on the basis that (i)
the metric suite proposed in Chapter 4 is able, through application of an ap-
propriate threshold, to identify critical variables, (ii) the approach proposed in
134
7. Discussion
Chapter 5 allows efficient EDMs to be constructed based only on the critical
variables identified by the importance metric, and (iii) using the dependability
enhancement approach proposed in Chapter 6 the criticality of identified vari-
ables can be shown to extend across a software module such that an efficient
EDM designed for that software module should seek to ensure the correctness
of the identified critical variables.
At this point it should be noted that the stated thesis does not imply that
any EDM capturing an appropriate set of critical variables will yield the high-
est possible efficiency properties. Ideally it would be possible to ensure the
correctness of all program variables in a software module for all locations in
that software module. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, this is infeasible.
Indeed, even if this were feasible, it may not provide perfect error detection
capabilities [76]. The use of critical variables in the design of EDMs represents
an approach for providing an approximate solution to this problem, whereby far
fewer program variables, hence locations, must be considered in the design of
efficient, yet possibly imperfect, EDMs. This means that, even when an EDM
captures all critical variables, its efficiency properties can still be improved by
the suitable incorporation of further program variables. Indeed, the benefit of
capturing critical variables, as it has been shown in this thesis, is that these
program variables enable high levels of efficiency to be achieved, which means
that the subsequent incorporation of further program variables will yield only
small improvements in EDM efficiency.
The approach presented in Chapter 6 built on the results of previous chapters
to demonstrate that, in order to design an efficient EDM that is to be located
in a particular software module, the values of a set of critical variables must be
ensured to be correct, i.e., the EDM must contain such a set of critical variables.
This approach relied on the importance metric, proposed in Chapter 4, and
the application of a suitable threshold for the identification of critical variable
variables. However, whilst this approach was fit for this purpose, the existence of
a set of critical variables could also have been established by alternative means.
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Most notably, the application of feature subset selection techniques would allow
the underlying set of features of the data sets collected during fault injection
analysis, i.e., a set of critical variables, to be identified for incorporation in error
detection predicates of EDM [106] [114] [171]. However, feature subset selection
was not used in this thesis because, in addition to providing a mechanism for the
identification of critical variables, such techniques would also seek to minimise
the set of identified critical variables. As it was the intention of the research
presented to support the thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical
variables, the cardinality of the identified set of critical variables, assuming that
all program variables in a software module had not been identified as critical,
was not a primary concern.
7.2 Applications
There are two main practical applications of the thesis that an EDM consists
of a set of critical variables, one of which concerns the design of EDMs, whilst
the other concerns the location of EDMs. Firstly, the identification of critical
variables serves to simplify the design of efficient EDMs, as the state space that
a software engineer must consider in the design of error detection predicates is
dramatically reduced. Indeed, the identification of critical variables is comple-
mentary to existing experience and specification-based approaches for the design
of error detection predicates, in that it can easily be combined with other ap-
proaches in an attempt to improve their efficiency or effectiveness through the
aforementioned state space reduction. Secondly, following the identification of
critical variables, their occurrence in a software module can be used to inform
the location of EDMs. Indeed, such an application of the stated thesis is demon-
strated by the approach proposed in Chapter 6, where occurrences of critical
variables were use to guide the enhancement of software dependability. This
potential application can serve to complement existing approaches to the design
and location of EDMs, as the locations associated with occurrences of critical
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variables may govern the error detection predicates that may be implemented
and the efficiency that can be achieved by a proposed EDM.
7.3 Limitations
The thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables has been
substantiated by the research presented in Chapters 4-6. However, aside from
the issues raised above, there remain limitations of this thesis that must be ac-
knowledged in the context of the work presented. These limitations are discussed
below. Note that the limitations of the approaches proposed in Chapters 4-6
are discussed in their respective chapters, whereas the issues raised here focus
specifically on the limitations of stated thesis.
The design of efficient EDMs is a central theme of the research presented
and the thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables. How-
ever, the notion of efficiency applied in this thesis is relatively inexact, in that no
threshold was defined, with respect to the adopted efficiency measures, to deter-
mine whether a particularly EDM could be viewed as efficient. The motivation
of this inexact characterisation of efficiency was based on the fact that, whilst
the maximum efficiency that can be achieved by an EDM is well know, i.e.,
TPR = 1, FPR = 0 and AUC = 1, this maximum level of efficiency may not
always be achievable, particularly in situations where read and write constraints
are places on program variables [76]. As it is not possible to determine when
the maximum achievable efficiency has been reached, this means that a precise
characterisation of efficiency, even on a per software system basis, may discount
EDMs that are as efficient as they could be for a particular location, thereby
violating the intention of the EDM design problem as discussed in Chapter 2.
As mentioned previously, the thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set
of critical variables does not imply that every variable in that set of critical
variables must be captured by an EDM in order for it to be efficient or that
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doing so would result in the design of an efficient EDM. Indeed, the stated thesis
could less succinctly but equivalently be rephrased to state that an efficient EDM
consists of a subset of program variables from a software module that can be
considered critical. This restatement of the thesis is less succinct but emphasises
the point that not every critical variable in a software must be captured in order
for an EDM to be efficient at a specific location.
The thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables relies on
the existence of some notion of criticality. The research presented in this thesis
focused on a specific notion of criticality, as characterised by the measurement
of spatial impact, temporal impact and system failure rates. However, whilst
demonstrating that a notion of criticality by can be devised to support the
stated thesis is sufficient for the validation of the stated thesis, this work does
not completely specify the notion, or each and every notion, of criticality that is
consistent with the stated thesis. Indeed, an exploration of notion of criticality
with respect to program variables and the stated thesis represents an interesting
area for future work in EDM design.
Finally, though it is not an inherent limitation of the research presented,
the thesis that an EDM consists of a set of critical variables has relatively few
implications for the effective composition of error detection predicates. That
is, understanding that a set of critical variables must be identified and incor-
porated by an error detection predicate does not, by itself, enable the design
of an efficient EDM. This thesis limitation is somewhat circumvented by the
approach proposed in Chapter 5, in that this approach was shown to be capable
of generating efficient error detection predicates on the basis of critical critical
variables, though it should be noted that the approach provides little specific
insight into the general process of composing efficient EDMs and does not pro-
vide any guarantees with respect to the generation of a single most efficient
error detection predicate for a location.
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Having discussed the implications, applications and limitations of the thesis
that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables, as well as relating
the research presented to this thesis, it remains to conclude with a summary of
achievements and a discussion of future work. This concluding summary and
discussion is the focus of the final chapter of this thesis.
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Conclusion and Future Work
To this point a body of research, analysis and discussion has been presented
to substantiate the thesis that an EDM consists of a set of critical variables.
Moreover, the implications of the contributions made with regard to the design
of efficient EDMs have been drawn together to provide a sound basis to support
this notion. In this chapter a summary of these research contributions and
a discussion of future work relating to the EDM design problem is provided
as a conclusion to this thesis. In particular, the research contributions made
throughout Chapters 4-6 are summarised with respect to the stated thesis, whist
the discussion of future work focuses on issues such as the inheritance and
propagation of criticality among program variables, and the potential for the
location of EDMs to be based on achievable efficiency.
140
8. Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Thesis Summary
In this thesis the notion of program variable criticality has been used to address
the problem of EDM design. That is to say, it has been shown that efficient
error detection predicates for specified locations, hence EDMs, can be generated
based only on critical variables, where this notion of criticality has been shown
to extend across software modules associated with these variables. These results
were presented in the context of the thesis that:
Where an efficient EDM exists under the defined system model,
that efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables.
The key implications of this thesis are that, if an appropriate set of critical
variables can be determined, then (i) the problem of EDM design is dramatically
simplified, as the state space that a software engineer must consider in the design
of error detection predicates is dramatically reduced, and (ii) the occurrence of
critical variables can be used to inform the the location of EDMs.
8.2 Contribution Summary
In support of the stated thesis, the following specific contributions were made
to the design of efficient error detection predicates for EDMs:
• A metric suite that generates a relative ranking of variables with respect
to the notion of criticality applied throughout this thesis was proposed, as
well as a fault injection approach for its evaluation. The metric suite was
proposed with a view to facilitating the identification of critical variables.
This identification is performed through the application of a threshold to
the relative ranking generated, thus allowing a cost-benefit analysis to be
undertaken in the design of error detection predicates.
• A systematic approach for the design of efficient error detection predi-
cates was proposed based on the application of data mining techniques to
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fault injection data sets. As well as being shown to provide an effective
mechanism for the generation of efficient error detection predicates for
real-world, infinite-state software systems, this approach was also used to
demonstrate that error detection predicates generated using only critical
variables achieve similar levels of efficiency as those generated using all
program variables. This result is central to the stated thesis, as it implies
that the set of critical variables identified by the proposed metric suite
can be used to capture aspects of software system correctness.
• A methodology for the design of dependable software systems based on
the replication of only critical variables using software wrappers was pro-
posed and applied in order to demonstrate that significant dependability
enhancements can be achieved through the protection of a relatively small
number of critical variables. This result served to further substantiate
the thesis that efficient EDMs consists of a set of critical variables, as the
protection of relatively few program variables using error detection pred-
icates that are known to be efficient, e.g., majority voting and variable
replication, yields significant improvements in system failure rates.
The contributions detailed above represent novel work in the field of EDM
design, where each of these contributions can be drawn together in support
of the thesis that an efficient EDM consists of a set of critical variables.
8.3 Future Work
The design of efficient EDMs remains a key challenge in the development of
fault tolerant software systems, particularly in the content of real-world, infi-
nite state software systems. Through a focus on the criticality of variables and
approaches for the generation of efficient error detection predicates, the research
presented in this thesis has addressed this problem from a novel variable-centric
perspective, allowing steps to be taken towards the design of efficient EDMs.
Despite this progress, there are many areas for future work relating to the EDM
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design problem, many of which are related to the notion of program variable
criticality and the approach for the generation of efficient error detection mech-
anisms proposed in this thesis. Several areas for future research relating to the
work presented in this thesis are discussed below.
Understanding the Inheritance of Criticality: The notion of program
variable criticality established in this thesis is based on the potential worst-case
impact of a program variable with respect to corruption in the spatial and tem-
poral domains, as well as the capability of the program variables to induce a
system failure when corrupted. Under the adopted system model, actions per-
formed in the execution of a software system will necessarily have an impact
on the criticality of a particular variable across different locations in a software
module. Developing an understanding of how criticality is inherited through
interactions between program variables, i.e., actions involving more than one
program variables, would yield several positive results. In particular, such an
understanding may facilitate the identification of the smallest subset of criti-
cal variables that should be incorporated by the error detection predicate of an
EDM. In other words, it would be possible to simplify error detection predicates
based on the identification of program variables where criticality originates.
This identification may then lead to another potential benefit of understanding
the inheritance of criticality among program variables, which is the location of
EDMs based on the origins of criticality within a software module. This is sub-
tly different from using occurrences of critical variables to inform the location
of EDMs, as the identification of an origin of criticality may not necessarily be
an ideal location for an EDM. For example, it is reasonable to speculate that an
effective approach to EDM location may be to allow criticality to be inherited
by variables to a particular threshold before an EDM must ascertain that the
current system state is permissible. Aside from facilitating the simplification
of error detection predicates and the location of EDMs, an understanding of
how criticality is inherited among program variables could also serve to reduce
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the execution overheads associated with the checking of error detection predi-
cates. Indeed, whilst such considerations are beyond the scope of the research
presented in this thesis, in order to appreciate this potential benefit it suffices
to acknowledge that the cost, in terms of runtime overhead, associated with
program variable accesses in non-uniform.
Locating EDMs based on Achievable Efficiency: In this thesis a system-
atic approach for the generation of efficient error detection predicates has been
proposed. The premise of this approach was that, as fault injection analysis
captures relationships among the program variables and the success of software
system executions, data mining techniques can be applied to learn these rela-
tionships and how they impact the success of software executions, with a view
to applying the derived relationships as error detection predicates for failure-
inducing software system states at a specified location. If the specified location
is varied then the levels of efficiency achieved by the associated EDMs may
also vary. A possible approach to the EDM location problem would be to base
the location of EDMs on the level of efficiency that can be achieved by gener-
ated EDMs. That is, following the generation of a set of EDMs for different
locations in a software module, the EDMs at the locations that provide the
greatest level of efficiency with respect to error detection could be deployed to
impart software dependability. This would allow the EDM location problem to
be circumvented and ensure that the EDMs deployed in a software system were
efficient by design. A caveat on this approach is that locating EDMs based on
achievable efficiency presumes that the measured efficiency is accurate, which
itself depends on the representativeness of the adopted fault model.
Fault Models for the Design of Efficient EDMs: The fault model adopted
during a dependable evaluation expresses the set of faults, and hence potentially
erroneous states, that a system must be able to tolerate. The transient data
fault model, as adopted in this thesis, is one of many possible fault models.
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However, as mentioned previously, there is no guarantee that error detection
predicates generated under one fault model will be effective under another fault
model. With this in mind, it is important to understand how the selection of
a fault model impacts the efficiency of the error detection predicates that can
be generated by the approach proposed in this thesis. If such an understanding
could be gained then it may be possible to determine the most effective, with
respect to the efficiency of the EDMs derived, and representative, with respect
to occurrences of faults in real-world software systems, fault models for the gen-
eration of error detection predicates. Indeed, it is anticipated that determining
the most appropriate fault models for the generation of error detection predi-
cates would facilitate the adoption of the contributions made in this thesis for
the design of efficient EDMs.
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